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1. Introducción 
 
Hoy día es fácil encontrar la etiqueta ´Made in China´ en muchos productos. Parece que 
China es una fábrica enorme que produce casi todo. El gigante asiático tiene un gran 
superávit por cuenta corriente frente a los EE.UU. y frente a otras economías occidentales. 
¿Pero es verdad que China ingresa realmente tanto como su superávit en cuenta corriente 
sugiere? La respuesta es No. 
De hecho, algunos de los productos tienen etiquetas como 'diseño en los EE.UU., 
componentes procedentes de Japón, Corea y Taiwán, montaje en China'. Esto revela una 
división y colaboración en la cadena de suministro a nivel mundial.  Fenómeno que se ha 
designado en la literatura como “Redes de Producción Global”, comercio de intermedios y 
fragmentación.  
Xing y Detert (2010) concluyen que los trabajadores chinos agregan sólo 6,50 dólares al 
coste total ($179) de fabricación de un iPhone, mientras que el resto del valor es una 
transferencia de componentes procedentes de Alemania, Japón, Corea, los EE.UU. y otros 
países. La cadena de montaje de China depende en gran medida de los intermedios 
importados. Después del tsunami y la fuga nuclear de Fukushima, Foxconn, la empresa de 
Taipei a la que iPhone subcontrata importantes tareas en sus sedes de China, cerró un par 
de líneas de producción debido a la escasez de componentes. Los consumidores se 
encontraron con una escasez de suministro de iPhones durante ese período. Por contraste, 
los trabajadores de Foxconn, habitualmente hacen horas extras en sus líneas de montaje 
para satisfacer una demanda que se expande rápidamente. El caso del iPhone nos ha 
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llamado la atención como ejemplo de interacción entre la inversión extranjera directa (IED), 
el comercio de intermedios y las Redes de Producción Global. ¿Qué relación hay entre las 
importaciones de intermedios y el comercio de bienes finales? ¿Cómo influye la demanda 
final en el comercio? ¿Qué efectos tienen la IED en el patrón del comercio entre las 
diferentes regiones a través de las redes de producción asiáticas? ¿Qué papel desempeña 
cada región en el mercado mundial? ¿Cuál es el impacto en las principales variables micro 
y macroeconómicas de las diferentes regiones que participan en el proceso? Estas son las 
preguntas que esta tesis doctoral trata de responder. 
La entrada de IED en China, realizada por empresas multinacionales (EMNs), ha 
contribuido sustancialmente a la tasa de inversión de este país. Los flujos (el stock) de IED 
se elevaron de 2,8% (1,07%) en 1991 a 8,1% (3,48%) en 2011 (UNCTAD, varios años). 
Desde 2008 China ostenta la segunda posición como país de máxima atracción de flujos de 
IED del mundo, tras los EE.UU (UNCTAD, varios años). Las economías de Asia Oriental 
han proporcionado el 63% de la IED acumulada en China desde 1985 hasta 2008 (Xing, 
2010). A través de la IED y el comercio, China se ha integrado en las Redes de Producción 
Global. El surgimiento de China ha intensificado la segmentación internacional de los 
procesos de producción dentro de Asia, pero no ha creado un motor autónomo para el 
comercio de la región, ya que Asia sigue dependiendo de otros mercados para sus 
exportaciones de bienes finales (Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; Gaulier et al., 2007a). 
Las EMNs han utilizado China como base de producción y exportación. La producción de 
bienes intensivos en mano de obra se ha trasladado a China. Los países asiáticos 
desarrollados han perdido su cuota de exportación en los mercados de bienes finales, pero 
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han acelerado sus exportaciones de bienes intermedios sofisticados a China (Gaulier et al., 
2007b). 
Las exportaciones e importaciones entre China y Asia oriental casi se han cuadruplicado 
entre 2000 y 2009 (OCDE, varios años). Por otra parte, el 70% del comercio intrarregional 
en Asia oriental es de partes y componentes que serán montados y exportados a otras 
regiones (ADB, 2007). 
Koopman et al. (2011) y Wang et al. (2011) han investigado el comercio de valor añadido 
basándose en un análisis de tablas Input-Output (IO). Sus resultados muestran que existe un 
alto contenido de bienes intermedios importados de Asia Oriental en las exportaciones 
chinas y una alta dependencia del mercado occidental en las exportaciones chinas. Este país 
realiza principalmente tareas de montaje de piezas, quedando en la parte baja de la cadena 
de valor (Koopman et al, 2011; Baldwin y López-González, 2013). 
Sin embargo, la producción en realidad no es una combinación fija de  intermedios y 
factores como la metodología el análisis IO asume. Otra de las limitaciones de los análisis 
basados en la metodología IO es la dificultad de realizar comparaciones entre países 
precisamente porque las matrices I-O se calculan con poca regularidad. 
Dada la complejidad del proceso de globalización de China, se desconoce aún gran parte  
de cómo la IED afecta al patrón de comercio a través de las redes de producción global, y el 
impacto sobre variables como el PIB, la renta nacional, la demanda interna y el comercio 
entre las diferentes regiones involucradas. 
Los análisis con Modelos de Equilibrio General Aplicado (MEGAs o CGE Computable 
General Equilibrium models en inglés) son aún escasos. Una de las pocas excepciones es 
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Kawai y Zhai (2009), que ilustran a través de un MEGA cómo la reducción de la demanda 
de bienes filiales por parte de los países occidentales, debida a la crisis, reduce la demanda 
en China de importaciones intermedias procedentes de las economías asiáticas. 
Los MEGAs permiten analizar la tecnología de producción que utiliza cada sector en cada 
una de las regiones, así como, sus respectivos papeles por el lado de la demanda. Todo ello 
junto con la evolución de los flujos de comercio distinguiendo si los bienes finales son para 
el consumo privado, el consumo público, la formación de capital o productos intermedios. 
Esto permite analizar la presencia y el impacto de las redes de producción globales. A esto 
se añade la consideración de flujos de IED, que han sido poco tratados con esta 
metodología (Latorre, 2009). 
Este trabajo aporta a la literatura de IED y de redes de producción global los resultados de 
un MEGA de, al menos cuatro regiones (China, Asia Oriental, EE.UU. y el Resto del 
Mundo) y 15 sectores de producción. 
 
2. Objetivos y resultados 
 
Tras un Capítulo 1 inicial introductorio los principales objetivos y resultados de la tesis se 
desarrollan en los Capítulo 2, 3 y 4.  
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Capítulo 2: Objetivos 
Atraídos por los casos de iPod e iPhone, hemos querido analizar cómo los flujos de IED de 
las EMNs en China afectan a lo que se ha llamado el “Patrón de comercio triangular” 
(“Triangular trade pattern”) del sector de la Electrónica. La literatura utiliza esta expresión 
para describir un proceso por el que Asia Oriental importa intermedios de alto valor 
añadido de EE.UU, que son reexportados a China. China, a su vez, monta los intermedios y 
exporta los bienes finales a EE.UU (Amiti y Freund, 2010; Xing, 2011). Este capítulo 
analiza el papel de los flujos de IED en este proceso.  
La literatura, sin embargo, no ha prestado mucha atención al papel de la IED desempeñado 
en las redes de producción, menos aún la que utiliza la metodología de los MEGAs. La 
abundante oferta de obra barata, las políticas de promoción de la IED y exportaciones, el 
crecimiento económico elevado y el tamaño del mercado de China han sido importantes 
factores para la atracción de enormes flujos de IED. 
Según la base de datos GTAP 8 (Narayanan et al., 2012), Asia Oriental provee el 60,4% de 
las importaciones chinas y casi el 80% de las importaciones chinas son de productos 
intermedios. Asia es, por tanto, el principal proveedor de componentes para la producción 
de China. Estos datos coinciden con otras fuentes de evidencia empírica. China tiene un 
muy bajo consumo privado en Electrónica. El 55% de su producción se exporta y el 71% de 
sus exportaciones van a los EE.UU. y el resto del mundo (RM), regiones que, a su vez, 
dedican un alto porcentaje de las importaciones al consumo privado. 
Los EE.UU. y el RM son el mayor destino de las exportaciones chinas y China es también 
una fuente importante de importaciones de estas dos regiones. El “Comercio triangular” se 
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desarrolla cuando las filiales de EMNs en China importan intermedios de sus empresas 
matrices y exportan bienes finales a los mercados Occidentales. Tengamos en cuenta que 
más del 80% de la producción y el 70% de las exportaciones de Electrónica está en manos 
de las EMNs. Por lo tanto, parece que hay una fuerte relación entre la IED, las Redes de 
Producción Global y el comercio. 
Basado en la última base de datos de GTAP 8 (Narayanan et al., 2010), el modelo consta de 
15 sectores, 4 regiones y 2 factores de producción. La Electrónica es el sector más 
orientado a la exportación en China y, como acabamos de señalar, la mayor parte de su 
producción está en manos de EMNs. El capítulo examina los patrones de comercio entre 
China, Asia oriental, los EE.UU. y el RM tras la llegada de flujos de IED al sector de 
Electrónica en China. Replicamos el aumento real del stock de IED en Electrónica, que casi 
se ha duplicado entre 2004 y 2011.  
 
Capítulo 2: Resultados 
Los resultados de la simulación indican que China se ha beneficiado de las entradas de IED 
en términos de aumento del PIB (1%) y bienestar (el 3,8%, aproximado por el aumento de 
la renta nacional). 
En cuanto al comercio, el papel fundamental de China en la red de producción de la 
Electrónica se ha fortalecido mediante la intensificación de sus exportaciones a todos los 
socios comerciales. Sus vínculos de exportaciones e importaciones permanecen sin cambios, 
es decir, continúa con la estructura geográfica de comercio de la que partía. 
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El aumento en la producción de la Electrónica en China es más importante para el aumento 
de las exportaciones de Electrónica de Asia oriental a China que para el aumento de las 
exportaciones de EE.UU. y RM a China. Esto es debido a las redes de producción que 
existen entre China y Asia oriental. China colabora con Asia oriental en la producción de 
bienes de Electrónica, pero compite con esa región en los mercados de EE.UU. y el RM. 
Tras la entrada de IED, Asia oriental aumenta las exportaciones a China, pero reduce las 
exportaciones al resto de las regiones y, además, las exportaciones de componentes 
electrónicos dentro de Asia Oriental también son desplazadas por China. A pesar de que el 
Este de Asia exporta más a China, pierde terreno en el mercado mundial. Esta última fuerza 
se impone y, en general, las exportaciones de Asia Oriental se reducen. 
La estructura geográfica de importación del resto de las regiones cambia considerablemente. 
El gran aumento de las exportaciones chinas, tras una gran caída en sus precios de 
exportación, desplaza a otros competidores en todo el mundo. China también atrae más 
exportaciones del resto de las regiones (principalmente debido a los productos intermedios 
importados necesarios para su producción en Electrónica). Sin embargo, la estructura de 
exportación del resto de regiones varía menos que la estructura de importación. Esto 
implica que China desempeña un papel más importante como proveedor de productos 
electrónicos para RM que como mercado de bienes finales para ellos. 
China se ha fortalecido aún más en su papel como base de producción y exportación. Asia 
Oriental se integra más con China (a través de más exportaciones e importaciones), pero 
pierde competitividad y terreno en los mercados de EE.UU., el RM y en su propio mercado 
interno. La IED desempeña un papel vital en la formación de redes de producción 
regionales en Asia. 
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Este capítulo se ha aceptado en “Economic Modelling” tras una primera revisión que ha 
sido reenviado en Abril. También ha sido presentado en “16th Annual Conference on 
Global Economic Analysis, GTAP”, Shanghai en 2013 y en “XVI Jornadas de Economía 
Aplicada” celebradas en Granada en 2013. 
 
Capítulo 3: Objetivos 
En el capítulo 2, hemos profundizado en el análisis del “Patrón de comercio triangular” del 
sector de la Electrónica. En este nos planteamos si la IED tendría un impacto similar en los 
sectores de Textiles y Maquinaria, que también están muy orientados a las exportaciones 
como Electrónica. ¿Podemos esperar en China, Asia Oriental, EE.UU. y el RM efectos 
similares a nivel micro y macroeconómico? Este capítulo explora en detalle los papeles que 
cada región desempeña como proveedor de intermedios o como un mercado final para 
productos de 3 sectores diferentes: Electrónica, Textil y Maquinaria. 
Aunque conservamos las 4 regiones y los 15 sectores del capítulo previo, en este 
diferenciamos entre mano de obra cualificada y no cualificada que junto con el capital 
constituyen los 3 factores utilizados.  
Los sectores de Electrónica, Maquinaria y Textiles suponen el 55,4% y el 40% de las 
exportaciones e importaciones totales chinas, respectivamente, y el 13,6% de su PIB. Tres 
características del comercio chino destacan: 
1. Alrededor del 80% de las exportaciones chinas en estos sectores se dirigen a los EE.UU. 
y el RM. Esta última región es el destino más importante explicando entre el 50% y 60% de 
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las exportaciones totales chinas, mientras que las dirigidas a EE.UU., suponen entre el 25% 
y 30%. Por lo tanto, sólo alrededor del 20% de las exportaciones chinas van a Asia Oriental. 
A su vez la mayoría de las importaciones de Asia Oriental son de productos intermedios, 
considerando el muy reducido porcentaje de las importaciones que se destinan al consumo 
privado, especialmente en Maquinaria. Esto implica que la mayor parte de las 
exportaciones chinas de bienes finales se dirigen a los EE.UU. y al RM. Por lo tanto, estos 
últimos constituyen sus principales mercados finales. 
2. La mayoría de las importaciones chinas son intermedios, concretamente el 68% (en 
Maquinaria) y alrededor del 85% (en Electrónica y Textiles). Es difícil encontrar 
estadísticas de comercio que incluyan información simultánea sobre el tipo de bienes 
comercializados (es decir, si son bienes intermedios o destinados al consumo privado o 
público, o a la inversión) y el país de origen. La información puede existir en algunos 
países aislados, pero es poco común para grupos de países. La información de la base de 
datos de GTAP utilizada en este capítulo informa, por una parte, del tipo de bienes 
importandos y, por otra, del país de origen, sin cruzar ambos tipos de información. Sin 
embargo, nos da pistas importantes de la existencia de redes y de mercados finales en este 
sentido, como se verá en la tercera característica. 
3. Alrededor del 60% de las importaciones totales de China provienen de Asia Oriental. 
Como se señaló anteriormente, nuestros datos no permiten conocer al mismo tiempo el país 
de origen (si se trata de Asia Oriental o no) y el tipo de uso del bien de ese país de origen. 
Pero con un 80% las importaciones intermedias y 60% siendo proporcionada por Asia 
Oriental, parece razonable suponer que Asia Oriental está muy integrada en las redes de 
producción de China, proporcionando una importante cantidad de productos intermedios. 
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¿Cuál es el impacto de la IED en las redes de producción asiáticas y en los mercados finales 
a los que China envía la mayor parte de sus exportaciones? 
 
Capítulo 3: Resultados 
Los resultados revelan que China se ha beneficiado de la entrada de IED con un aumento 
del PIB (2,1%) y del bienestar (9,6%). Aumenta el salario de la mano de obra cualificada, 
pero disminuye el de la no cualificada y también la remuneración de capital. Las  
reducciones de precios y los aumentos de producción en los sectores en los que entra la IED 
es proporcional a la magnitud de flujos de IED recibidos. Debido a que el sector de la 
Electrónica es el principal receptor de flujos de IED, es el que experimenta la más intensa 
caída de precios y el más pronunciado aumento de la producción. 
Los patrones de comercio de China y los del resto de regiones difieren en los tres sectores 
considerados. Después de las entradas de IED, las exportaciones chinas de Electrónica y 
Maquinaria aumentan, mientras que las exportaciones del Textil bajan. Los EE.UU. y el 
RM absorben la mayor parte del aumento de las exportaciones chinas. El patrón del sector  
Textil difiere de Electrónica y Maquinaria debido a la importancia del Textil en el consumo 
privado chino. Con las entradas de IED, la renta de los hogares y la demanda nacional 
aumentan en China. Crece la demanda de Textil en el interior del país y se exportan menos. 
Por otra parte, después del aumento de las exportaciones de Electrónica y de Maquinaria, la 
producción y las exportaciones de estos bienes en el resto de las regiones se ven 
perjudicadas. La caída en los precios de exportación hace las exportaciones chinas muy 
competitivas. Además encontramos que China importa más bienes de Electrónica pero 
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reduce las importaciones de Maquinaria después de shock. Este contraste se debe al hecho 
de que las importaciones de Electrónica son clave porque la producción de Electrónica que 
se expande después de las entradas de IED, depende en gran medida de bienes intermedios 
importados. El sector de la Maquinaria utiliza con menor intensidad en su producción, que 
también se expande después de que los flujos de IED, los intermedios importados. Por 
último, la caída de las exportaciones chinas de Textiles provoca un aumento de las 
exportaciones del resto de regiones. Sin embargo, las exportaciones de Textiles son más 
pequeñas en el total de los flujos de comercio mundial que las de Maquinaria y Electrónica. 
Por lo tanto, el aumento de las exportaciones Textiles no es capaz de compensar la 
reducción de las exportaciones de Maquinaria y Electrónica que experimentan todas las 
regiones salvo China. 
Este análisis, utilizando una perspectiva de equilibrio general, confirma y amplía los 
principales resultados de la literatura empírica. Existen redes de producción importantes 
entre China y Asia Oriental en Maquinaria y en Textil, y no sólo en Electrónica. Aunque la 
integración de Asia Oriental y China es más intensa en el sector de la Electrónica. Además, 
analizamos el papel de EE.UU. y el RM como principales mercados de bienes finales para 
China. Tener en cuenta estos patrones geográficos, junto con las tecnologías de producción 
particulares de cada sector (por ejemplo, la intensidad de la utilización de bienes 
intermedios importados o domésticos) y la orientación de la demanda (por ejemplo, la 
orientación al consumo privado del Textil) ayuda a estimar el impacto de la IED en las 
Redes de Producción Global, flujos de comercio y mercados finales. 
Este capítulo, que ha enviado en diciembre 2013 a la revista en “Global Economic Review: 
Perspectives on East Asian Economies and Industries”, está en revisión en abril 2014 
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todavía. Se ha presentado en las “Las X Jornadas de Integración Económica” celebradas en 
Castellón de la Plana en diciembre de 2013, siendo organizadas por el grupo INTECO. Está 
disponible como documento de trabajo en “Munich RePEc Personal Archive”. También se 
ha enviado.  
 
Capítulo 4: Objetivos 
En el capítulo 3, se analiza cómo la IED afecta a la evolución del comercio y otras variables 
a través de la interacción con las redes de producción y los mercados de demanda final. En 
las redes de producción de Asia Oriental la región provee la mayoría de los bienes 
intermedios de China y China, a su vez, es el principal proveedor de intermedios de Asia 
Oriental. EE.UU. y el RM son los principales mercados para las exportaciones chinas. Sin 
embargo, desde la perspectiva de la producción mundial, el RM es un mercado muy grande. 
Un siguiente paso lógico es separar la Europa de RM y otra gran economía, a saber, Japón 
de Asia oriental.  
En la estructura de producción de los sectores de Electrónica, Maquinaria y Textil, los 
intermedios procedentes del sector de la Química son importantes. Además, el sector 
Químico también está muy orientado a la exportación y cuenta con una importante 
dependencia de intermedios importados. Por ello, extendemos nuestro análisis del impacto 
de la IED al sector Químico. 
Además, en los dos últimos capítulos, nos hemos centrado en el impacto de la IED en las 
variables microeconómicas, como las redes de producción y el patrón de comercio en los 
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sectores a los que la IED llega. En este capítulo, se da una explicación en profundidad de 
los impactos de la IED en los resultados macroeconómicos en seis regiones. 
Con un MEGA de 2 factores, 15 sectores y 6 regiones, analizamos cómo la IED que llega a 
los sectores Textil, Química, Electrónica y Maquinaria en China, afecta a las redes de 
producción (entre China, Japón y Asia Oriental ), y a los mercados finales (Estados Unidos, 
Europa y el RM). 
 
Capítulo 4: Resultados  
En el año 2007 China representaba una parte relativamente pequeña del PIB (6,3%), las 
exportaciones (8,3%) y las importaciones (6,4%) del mundo. Porcentajes muy reducidos 
frente a los de Europa (31%, 39.7% y 40.8%, respectivamente) o los de EE.UU. (25.2%, 
9.2% y 14.5%, respectivamente). No obstante, la llegada de IED a la fabricación china 
parece haber producido efectos negativos en muchas regiones del mundo. Cuando las 
exportaciones chinas aumentan, debido a la IED, las exportaciones y la producción se 
reducen en los sectores que compiten con ellas en el resto de regiones. Esas reducciones en 
la producción total hacen bajar los salarios y la renta de capital, disminuyendo también la 
renta nacional y el PIB en las regiones que compiten con China. 
Simulamos los incrementos reales de IED que ha acudido a los sectores de Electrónica, 
Maquinaria, Química y Textil en China. Estos cuatro sectores conjuntamente representan el 
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64,5% y el 53,5% de las exportaciones e importaciones totales chinas, y el 38,1%
1
 de las 
exportaciones (o importaciones) mundiales totales. 
China se beneficia de los flujos de IED, debido al aumento de los salarios (0,42%), el PIB 
(2,68%) y la renta nacional (11,54%). La competitividad de las exportaciones aumenta con 
fuerza en Electrónica, Maquinaria y Química. Asia Oriental es la región que resulta más 
negativamente afectada, a pesar de que comparte redes de producción con China. Asia 
Oriental exporta más en aquellos sectores en los que China compite menos después del 
aumento de la IED. Además, en general, va a suministrar intermedios en aquellos sectores 
en los que China aumenta la producción, va a ser desplazada por China en el resto de 
mercados. Los principales resultados negativos para Asia Oriental surgen de la disminución 
de la producción en los sectores en los que China es más agresiva (Electrónica, Maquinaria 
y Química). Estos tres sectores suponen el 13,3% del PIB en el Este de Asia, la proporción 
más alta entre todas las regiones consideradas. Como consecuencia, la caída del PIB es la 
más grande de todas las regiones (-0,4%, aproximadamente).  
En Japón y Europa, el peso de los sectores de Electrónica, Maquinaria y Química en el PIB 
es de 8,6% y 9,1%, respectivamente. Sus sectores Químicos son el único ejemplo de 
supervivencia a la competencia china en los sectores que han recibido la IED. De hecho, 
excepto en esto caso, China desplaza a las exportaciones de todas las regiones tras las 
entradas de IED. A pesar de esta virtuosa evolución del sector Químico, la producción total 
todavía se reduce en Japón y Europa, disminuyendo su PIB alrededor del 0,26% en ambas 
regiones. En los EE.UU., el peso en el PIB de los tres sectores, en los que la competencia 
china aumenta con fuerza, es inferior al de las tres regiones anteriores. Esto, junto con su 
                                                          
1
 Este 38,1% es el porcentaje que el total de comercio en estos 4 sectores (del que China explica una parte 
importante supone en el total de comercio mundial en todos los sectores. Véase Tablas 2 y 3 del capítulo 4). 
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menor apertura al comercio y la gran importancia en su economía de los servicios (de los 
que China exporta menos tras el shock), reduce considerablemente sus resultados negativos 
en el PIB (-0,10%). 
El RM es la única región de las que hemos analizado que se beneficia de la IED en China. 
El RM está protegido de la competencia de China debido a que en la estructura de su PIB 
los sectores como Minería y Agricultura son muy importantes. De hecho, después de la 
entrada de IED, las exportaciones de estos sectores de RM se dirigen principalmente a 
satisfacer la demanda creciente de China de productos agrícolas y de recursos mineros. 
A la luz de la literatura sobre la especialización vertical, este trabajo concluye que la 
participación en las redes de producción con China no garantiza resultados rentables. 
Adicionalmente, nuestro análisis del equilibrio general permite analizar con detalle el papel 
de las regiones como mercados finales. Podríamos esperar “a priori” que los consumidores 
se beneficiarían de las más baratas importaciones chinas. Este no parece ser el caso, 
tampoco. Como hemos visto Europa, EE.UU. y el RM son los principales destinos de las 
exportaciones chinas. Éstas se abaratan, pero el problema es que Europa, EE.UU. y el RM 
también son productores importantes en el mundo. 
Nuestro análisis revela que las fuerzas del lado de la producción de la economía son más 
importantes que las del lado del consumo. Como hemos dicho, RM sale beneficiado pero 
Europa y EE.UU. se ven dañadas aunque en una magnitud diferente.  
En conjunto, nuestro trabajo sugiere que las mejores políticas industriales fuera de China 
deben tratar de fortalecer la ventaja comparativa en aquellos sectores en los que China 
compite menos. 
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En la tesis el Capítulo 5 ofrece las principales conclusiones. A continuación, presentamos 
un resumen de las mismas y propuestas de investigación futura. 
 
3. Principales contribuciones y conclusiones 
 
Con el modelo GTAPinGAMS, analizamos la interacción entre la IED y las redes de 
producción global. Este es uno de los pocos estudios que aplican el análisis de MEGAs 
considerado al impacto de la IED. Proporcionamos un análisis en profundidad, basado en 
una amplia serie de resultados micro y macroeconómicos, con el fin de capturar las fuerzas 
impulsoras detrás de los ajustes después de shock de la IED. Este trabajo amplía la 
literatura existente mediante la combinación de las Redes de Producción Global y IED en 
un análisis empírico. 
Encontramos un impacto diferencial de la IED según los sectores a los que se dirige. La 
IED puede provocar una mayor demanda de intermedios domésticos (como en Maquinaria) 
o  de intermedios importados (como en Electrónica). Por otra parte, el aumento de la renta 
nacional y el PIB, después de las entradas de IED, eleva la demanda interna en China y 
afecta al patrón de comercio de los sectores relacionados con el consumo privado, como en 
el caso del Textil. Adicionalmente, identificamos un importante papel de la IED como 
instrumento de política económica porque la magnitud de los flujos de IED afecta 
proporcionalmente a  los ajustes de las variables como las exportaciones, la producción o 
los precios, de los sectores a los que se dirige. 
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La entrada de IED eleva la producción y reduce los precios. En los casos de Electrónica, 
Maquinaria y Química las exportaciones chinas se elevan considerablemente desplazando 
las de otras regiones en el mercado mundial. El resto de las regiones exportarán más al 
gigante asiático pero perderán exportaciones en el resto de regiones. 
Las importaciones de Electrónica, Química y Textil suben mientras que las importaciones 
de Maquinaria disminuyen. La demanda de productos intermedios importados explica en 
gran medida el aumento de las importaciones de Electrónica y  Química, que depende en 
gran medida de intermedios importado en su producción y tienen fuertes redes de 
producción con los proveedores de Asia Oriental. La tecnología de producción de 
Maquinaria es más dependiente de los intermedios domésticos que la de Electrónica y  
Química. Por lo tanto, reduce sus importaciones de Maquinaria comprando los intermedios 
domésticos más baratos, tras el shock de IED, en China. 
Asia oriental, como proveedor más importante de importaciones chinas, experimente los 
cambios más importantes en el comercio. Cuando China aumenta las importaciones de 
Electrónica, Química y Textil, el aumento proviene principalmente de Asia Oriental. Del 
mismo modo, cuando China reduce las importaciones de Maquinaria, Asia Oriental 
experimenta la mayor reducción de exportaciones. EE.UU., Europa y el RM siguen siendo 
los mayores mercados para las exportaciones chinas, absorbiendo los que en mayor medida 
el aumento de las exportaciones chinas después del shock. 
Nuestro análisis confirma la existencia de redes de producción en Asia Oriental. China 
depende en gran medida del suministro de intermedios de Asia Oriental mientras Asia 
Oriental también es muy dependiente de las importaciones procedentes de China. Hay un 
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patrón de comercio triangular entre China, Asia Oriental y las economías desarrolladas, 
especialmente en Electrónica y Química. El sector de Maquinaria en China también 
muestra una fuerte red de producción con la de Asia Oriental, pero de menor intensidad que 
la de los otros dos sectores, debido a que su producción utiliza en mayor medida 
intermedios domésticos. El Textil en China también tiene una estrecha relación comercial 
con Asia Oriental, pero esta red es más débil debido a que su producción depende 
principalmente de intermedios domésticos y es un sector muy orientado al consumo privado. 
Para el resto de regiones, nuestros resultados revelan que el RM, que depende en gran 
medida de las exportaciones de Minería, gana tras las entradas de IED en China. El resto de 
regiones, especialmente Asia Oriental experimentan impactos negativos en su PIB y  
bienestar. La esencia de este contraste es la estructura sectorial del PIB, las importaciones y 
las exportaciones en las regiones. Después del shock, el RM incrementa intensamente sus 
exportaciones de servicios y de Minería, sectores en los que China no compite tan 
ferozmente como en los sectores que reciben la IED. Por el contrario, la estructura del PIB 
de Asia Oriental es similar a la de China. Inevitablemente compiten en esas exportaciones 
en las que China pasa a tener mayor ventaja en precios. Es por eso que se ve más afectado a 
pesar de que proporciona intermedios importantes a China. Por lo tanto, la estrategia para el 
resto de las regiones es fomentar sus ventajas en los sectores en los que China compita 
menos. 
Esta tesis doctoral desarrolla una visión holística del impacto de la interacción de la IED en 
China y las redes de producción global para distintas economías del mundo. El carácter de 
equilibrio general del estudio permite estudiar un variado elenco de sus efectos a nivel 
micro y macroeconómico. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
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1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays products with a ‘Made in China’ label can be easily found everywhere. It seems 
that China is an enormous factory that produces nearly everything. The Asiatic giant has a 
big current account surplus against the U.S. and other Western economies. But does China 
really earn so much as its current account surplus suggests? The answer is No.  
In fact, some of the products have labels like ‘design in US, components from Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan, assembly in China’. This reveals a worldwide division and collaboration in 
Global Production Networks (GPNs). The phenomenon has drawn scholars’ close attention 
to issues like supply chains, trade in intermediates, value chains or fragmentation. Xing and 
Detert (2010) propose that Chinese workers add a merely $6.50 to the entire US$179 
manufacturing cost of an iPhone, while the rest of the value is a transfer of components 
from Germany, Japan, Korea, the US, and other countries. Chinese assembly line depends 
heavily on the imported intermediate inputs. After the tsunami and Fukushima nuclear leak, 
Foxconn, a Taipei firm subcontracted by iPhone and investing in mainland China, shut 
down a few production lines due to the lack of components. Consumers faced a shortage of 
iPhone supply during that period. By contrast, the workers in Foxconn usually overwork in 
the assembly line to satisfy the fast expanding market. The iPhone case has greatly 
intrigued us. We wanted to analyze the impact of FDI, trade in intermediates and GPNs, 
especially in the most export-oriented sectors of that economy, namely, Electronics, 
Textiles, Machinery and Chemicals. How does the intermediate trade facilitate the final 
good trade? How does the final demand affect the intermediate inputs and trade? What is 
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the impact of FDI on the trade pattern among different regions through Asian production 
networks? Which role does each region play in the world market? What are the impacts on 
the main micro and macroeconomic variables of the different regions involved in the 
process? These are the sort of questions this PhD dissertation tries to answer. 
FDI inflows in China, led by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), have substantially 
contributed to its capital accumulation process. Its share of the world inward FDI flows 
(stocks) rose from 2.8% (1.07%) in 1991 to 8.1% (3.48%) in 2011 (UNCTAD, several 
years). East Asian economies have provided 63% of cumulative FDI in China from 1985 to 
2008 (Xing, 2010). Through FDI and trade, China has become integrated in the GPNs. The 
emergence of China has intensified the international segmentation of production processes 
within Asia, but has not created an autonomous engine for the region's trade, as Asia still 
depends on outside markets for its final goods exports (Gaulier et al., 2007a).  
Multinational firms (MNEs) rely on China as a production and export base. Production of 
labor-intensive goods has moved to China. Developed Asian countries have lost their 
export share on the final good markets but have accelerated their exports of sophisticated 
intermediate goods to China (Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; Gaulier et al., 2007b).  
The exports and imports between China and East Asia have nearly quadrupled between 
2000 and 2009 (OECD, several years). Furthermore, 70% of intraregional trade in East 
Asia is in parts and components that will be further assembled and exported to other 
regions (ADB, 2007).  
Some researchers (Koopman et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2011) have studied value added trade 
based on Input-Output (I-O) tables. The results show that there is a high foreign content of 
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imported intermediates from East Asia in Chinese exports and a high reliance on Western 
markets for exports. China is mainly involved in processing trade (i.e., mere assembly 
operations) and remains at the low end of supply chains (Koopman et al., 2012; Baldwin 
and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013). However, in the real world production is not a fixed 
combination of intermediates and factor inputs as the fixed coefficient from the I-O 
analysis assumes. Another limitation of the I-O based analysis is the difficulty to make 
accurate cross-country comparisons since I-O matrices are computed sparsely in time and 
across countries. 
Given the complexity of the process of Chinese globalization, much is still unknown about 
how FDI impacts on trade patterns through GPNs, and how FDI affects GDP, national 
income, domestic demand and trade of the different regions involved in the process. 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analyses on this production networks are still 
scarce. One of the few exceptions is Kawai and Zhai (2009), who illustrate the transmission 
of the global financial crisis through the fall in final demand in Western economies, which 
further impacts on the reduction in Chinese demand for intermediate imports from Asian 
economies.  
In order to capture the production technology each sector uses and to consider the role that 
each region plays from both the demand and supply side, a CGE model is sound for our 
analysis to study FDI. Further, the CGE analyses that include FDI are rather scarce (Latorre, 
2009). This work will contribute to the literature on FDI and GPNs with a multi-regional 
CGE analysis, considering at least four different, namely China, East Asia, the U.S. and 
ROW, 15 sectors of production.  
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2. Objectives and results 
 
The first chapter of the Dessertation offers an introduction, while the main objectives and 
results are offered in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Chapter 2: Objectives 
Attracted by the case study of iPod and iPhone, we want to analyze how FDI flows of 
MNEs in China impact on the “Triangular trade pattern” of Electronics. The literature uses 
the expression “Triangular trade pattern” to describe the process by which East Asia 
imports from the U.S. high-tech parts, which are converted into key intermediates and latter 
exported to China. China, in turn, processes and exports the finished goods to the U.S. (e.g., 
Amiti and Freund, 2008; Xing, 2011). This chapter aims at finding out the how FDI affects 
this triangular trade pattern.  
The literature has not paid much attention to the role of FDI in GPNs, even less in the 
papers using a CGE framework. Chinese abundant cheap labor supply, FDI and export 
promotion policies, stable and high economic growth and market size have been important 
for attracting huge FDI inflows.  
According to GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2010), in Electronics East Asia
1
 
provides 60.4% of Chinese imports and nearly 80% of Chinese imports are of intermediates. 
Thus, East Asia is the main supplier of components for Chinese production. This is also 
                                                          
1
 East Asia includes Japan, Korea, Hong Kong China, Taipei China and Singapore. 
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consistent with other empirical evidence. Very low shares of production and imports of 
Electronics in China are devoted to private consumption. 55% of its output is exported and 
71% of its exports go to the U.S. and ROW, which devote a high percent of imports to 
private consumption. The U.S. and ROW are the biggest destinations in the Chinese 
geographical structure of exports meanwhile China is also an important source for these 
two regions’ imports. The triangular trade then develops when the branches of 
multinationals in China import intermediates from their parent firms and export it to the 
Western markets. Note that more than 80% of Electronics production in China is in the 
hands of MNEs. Thus, there seems to be a strong relationship between FDI, GPNs and 
trade. 
Using the latest GTAP 8 Data Base, we build a 15-sector, 4-region and 2-factor data 
version. Electronics is the most export oriented sector in China and, as already noted, most 
of its output is in the hands of MNEs. We, thus, focus on FDI and trade in this sector. This 
chapter has studied the trade patterns among China, East Asia, the U.S. and ROW after the 
FDI inflows, while examining the impact on other micro and macroeconomic variables as 
well. We replicate the real increase in FDI stock experienced in Electronics in China, which 
has nearly doubled from 2004 to 2011.  
 
Chapter 2: Results 
The simulation results indicate that China has benefited from the FDI inflows in terms of 
GDP increase (1%) and welfare gains (3.8%, proxied by national income). Regarding the 
bilateral trade, the pivotal role of China in the production network of Electronics has been 
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strengthened by intensifying its exports to all the trade partners. Its geographical export and 
import destination or origin remain unchanged (i.e., its product division persists) according 
to its original geographical trade structure.  
The increase in the production of Electronics in China is more important for the increase of 
exports of Electronics from East Asia to China than for that from the U.S. and ROW to 
China, due to the production networks that exist between China and East Asia. China 
collaborates with East Asia in the production of Electronics but competes with that region 
in the U.S. and ROW markets. After the shock, East Asia increases exports to China but 
reduces exports to the rest of regions and, further, exports of Electronics within East Asia 
are also crowded out by China. Even though East Asia exports more to China, it loses 
ground in the world market. This latter result prevails and, on the whole, East Asian exports 
of Electronics are reduced.  
By contrast, the geographical import structure of the rest of regions changes considerably. 
The large increase of Chinese exports, following a big fall in their export prices, crowds out 
other competitors across the world. China also attracts more exports from the rest of 
regions (mainly due to the imported intermediates needed in its Electronics production). 
However, the export structure of the rest of regions varies less than the import structure. 
This implies that China plays a more important role as a provider of Electronics goods for 
ROW compared to its role as a final good market for them.    
To sum up, the FDI inflows in Chinese Electronics has further strengthened the role of 
China as a production base and export center. East Asia becomes more integrated with 
China (through more exports and imports) but loses competitiveness and shares in the U.S., 
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ROW and in its own internal market. In line with previous findings (e.g. Kawai and Urata, 
2004), we conclude that FDI plays a vital role in shaping Asian regional Electronics 
production networks. 
This chapter has been presented in the “XVI Applied Economics” Conference in Granada 
of Spain and in the “16th Annual conference at Global Economic Analysis” in Shanghai of 
China. It has been revised and resubmitted to “Economic Modelling” in April. Now it is 
accepted and forthcoming. 
 
Chapter 3: Objectives 
In chapter 2, we delve into the nature of the triangular trade pattern of Electronics. Now we 
wonder whether FDI inflows would have a similar impact on the trade pattern of Textiles 
and Machinery among China, East Asia, the U.S. and ROW. Note that production in the 
latter sectors is also very much export oriented, as happens in Electronics. Would these 
sectors have similar effects on variables at the micro and macroeconomic level? This 
chapter aims at answering these questions and exploring the roles that each regions plays as 
an intermediates’ supplier or as a market for these goods.  
We use a 3-factor, 4-region, 15-sector CGE model to capture the demand and production 
changes, arising from the production networks and final demand roles of the different 
geographical areas. Labor is split into skilled and unskilled. That is why there are 3 factors 
of production now. 
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Though we focus only on Electronics, Machinery and Textiles, we are, in fact, analyzing 
55.4% and 40% of overall Chinese exports and imports, respectively, and 13.6% of Chinese 
GDP. Three characteristics of Chinese trade data stand out:  
    1. Around 80% of Chinese exports are directed to the U.S. and ROW. ROW is the most 
important destination accounting for 50% to 60% of total Chinese exports while the U.S. 
weighs around 25% to 30%. Thus, only around 20% of Chinese exports go to East Asia. 
Note that Chinese imports from East Asia are mostly intermediates with a rather low weight 
of imports to be used for private consumption, particularly in Machinery goods. This 
implies that most of the Chinese exports of final goods are directed to the U.S. and ROW. 
Therefore, the latter constitute the main final markets of Chinese exports. 
    2. Chinese imports are mostly intermediates ranging from 68% (in Machinery) to around 
85% (in Electronics and Textiles). One of the main challenges of trade statistics nowadays 
is to combine the dimension of type of good traded with that of country of origin. While 
that information might exist for some isolated countries, it is rather uncommon and 
unavailable across groups of countries. The information from the GTAP database used in 
this chapter, however, provides us with important clues in this regard, as will be seen in the 
third characteristic.  
    3. Around 60% of total Chinese imports come from East Asia. As noted above, our data 
do not allow knowing simultaneously the country of origin (whether it is East Asia or not) 
and the use of good
2
 from that country of origin. But with 80% intermediate imports and 60% 
being provided by East Asia, it seems reasonable to assume that East Asia is heavily 
                                                          
2
 Whether it is an intermediate or a final good and in this latter case, whether it is used for private or public 
consumption or investment. 
30 
 
integrated in the Chinese production networks, providing an important amount of 
intermediates. 
What is the impact of FDI on the East Asian networks of China and on the final markets to 
which China sells most of its finished goods? 
 
Chapter 3: Results 
We find that China has benefited from the FDI inflows according to the rise of GDP (2.1%) 
and welfare (9.6%). The scope of the reductions in wages of unskilled labor and capital 
remunerations, as well as, the subsequent reductions in prices and increases in output 
follow the magnitude of FDI inflows each sector has received. Because Electronics is the 
main recipient of FDI inflows, it experiences the most intense fall in prices and increase in 
production. Next in importance come the adjustments in prices and production in 
Machinery. Finally, Textiles exhibits the most moderate price decreases and output 
expansion. The wage of skilled workers increases in contrast with the fall of unskilled ones. 
The Chinese trade patterns and the trade patterns in the rest of regions differ in the three 
sectors considered. After FDI inflows, Chinese exports of Electronics and Machinery 
increase, while exports of Textiles go down. The U.S. and ROW absorb the majority of the 
increase in Chinese exports. The contrasting pattern in Textiles seems related to its 
importance in Chinese private consumption. With FDI inflows, household income and 
national demand in China increase. More Textiles will be demanded domestically and less 
will be exported. 
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On the other hand, after the increase in exports of Electronics and Machinery, production 
and exports from the rest of regions are crowded out. The important fall in export prices 
makes Chinese exports very competitive. However, note that China will import more 
Electronics and less Machinery from the rest of regions after the shock. This contrast arises 
from the fact that Electronics imports are heavily used for Electronics production which 
goes up after FDI inflows. While imported intermediates are used less intensively in 
production of Machinery, which also expands after the FDI inflows. Finally, the fall of 
Chinese exports of Textiles results in an increase of Textiles exports across the rest of 
regions. However, exports of Textiles are smaller in world trade flows than the ones from 
Machinery and Electronics. Therefore, the increase in Textiles exports falls short to 
compensate the reduction in exports of Machinery and Electronics that the rest of regions 
experience.  
This analysis, using a general equilibrium perspective, confirms and expands the main 
outcomes from the empirical literature. Important production networks exist between China 
and East Asia, while the U.S. and ROW are their main final markets. Taking those 
geographical patterns into account together with the particular production technologies (e.g., 
the intensity of the use of imported intermediate in production) and the demand orientation 
(e.g., the private consumption orientation of Textiles) helps to trace the impact of FDI on 
trade. 
This chapter has been presented in the conference “X Jornadas de Integración Económica” 
on 28-29 November 2014 in Castellón de la Plana, organized by the INTECO. It is 
available as a working paper on “Munich Personal RePEc Archive”. It has also been sent to 
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the journal “Global Economic Review: Perspectives on East Asian Economies and 
Industries”. The current status is under review. 
 
Chapter 4: Objectives 
In Chapter 3, we have analyzed how FDI affects the evolution of trade and other variables 
through the interplay of production networks and final demand markets. East Asia is still a 
close supplier for Chinese trade as China does for East Asian trade. The U.S. and ROW are 
the biggest markets for Chinese exports. However, from the world production perspective, 
ROW is a very big market. A logical next step is to separate Europe from ROW and 
another big economy, namely, Japan from East Asia. 
Then, looking at the production structure of Electronics, Machinery and Textiles, we find 
that intermediates of Chemicals are important for their production. In addition, the 
Chemicals sector is also export oriented and import dependent. Thus, we extend our 
analysis of FDI to the Chemicals’ sector, as well.  
Further, in the two previous chapters, we focus on the impacts of FDI on microeconomic 
variables like production networks and trade patterns in the sectors to which FDI accrues. 
In the third chapter, we give an in-depth explanation of the effects of FDI on the 
macroeconomic results across six different regions. We use a 2-factor, 15-sector and 6-
region CGE model of FDI inflows in Chinese Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and 
Machinery sectors. We analyze in more detail the existing production networks (between 
China, Japan and East Asia) and the role of the final markets (the U.S., Europe, and ROW).  
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Chapter 4: Results 
In 2007, China accounted for a relatively small share in World GDP (6.3%), exports (8.3%) 
and imports (6.4%). This was far from the weights of regions like Europe (31%, 39.7% and 
40.8%, respectively) or the U.S. (25.2%, 9.2% and 14.5%, respectively). However, the 
arrival of FDI inflows to Chinese manufacturing seems to have produced negative effects in 
many regions of the world. When Chinese exports increase, due to FDI, exports and 
production shrink in the sectors that compete with them across the rest of regions. The latter 
experience an overall reduction in production which drives down wages and the capital rent, 
thus, reducing their national income and GDP. 
We simulate the real FDI increases that have taken place in Chinese Electronics, Machinery, 
Chemicals and Textiles. These four sectors account for 64.5% and 53.5% of Chinese 
overall exports and imports, respectively, while their weight is of 38.1%
3
 in total world 
exports (or imports). 
China benefits from the FDI inflows, since there is a rise in wages (0.42%), GDP (2.68%) 
and national income (11.54%). Chinese export competitiveness increases very heavily in 
Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals. East Asia is the region that is most negatively 
affected, even though it is heavily involved in production networks with China. It will 
export more in those sectors in which China compete less after the FDI increase. Further, it 
will, generally, supply important intermediates for the sectors in which China increases 
production, but it will be displaced by China in the rest of markets. The main negative 
outcomes for East Asia arise from its decrease in production in the sectors in which China 
                                                          
3
 This weight is of total trade in these sectors (of which Chinese accounts for important shares) in total world 
trade flows across sectors. See Tables 2 and 3 of Chapter 4. 
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is more aggressive (Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals). These three sectors explain 
13.3% of GDP in East Asia, the highest share among all the regions considered. As a 
consequence, its fall in GDP is the largest across all regions (-0.4%, approximately). 
In Japan and Europe, the weight in GDP of Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals is 8.6% 
and 9.1%, respectively. Their Chemicals sectors are the only case of survival to Chinese 
competition in sectors that have received the FDI. Indeed, except in these latter cases, 
China crowds out exports across all regions when it becomes more competitive due to FDI. 
Despite this virtuous evolution of Chemicals, overall production still shrinks in Japan and 
Europe, driving their GDP down by 0.26% in both areas. In the U.S., the weight in GDP of 
the three sectors, in which Chinese competition rises strongly, is lower than in the three 
previous regions. This, together with its smaller openness to trade and big importance in 
services (in which China export less), considerably reduces its negative outcomes in GDP (-
0.10%). 
ROW is the only region that we have analyzed that is positively affected by the Chinese 
booming economy. ROW is protected from Chinese competition because in its GDP 
structure sectors like Mining and Agriculture account for the biggest shares. In fact, ROW’s 
exports from these sectors are primarily going to satisfy Chinese rising demand for 
Agricultural products and Mining resources. 
In the light of the literature on vertical specialization, this paper finds that engaging in 
production networks with China does not guarantee profitable outcomes. Our general 
equilibrium analysis allows to further analyze the role of regions as final markets. We could 
a priori expect that consumers would benefit from cheaper Chinese imports. This does not 
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seem to be the case, either. Europe, the U.S. and ROW are the main destinations of Chinese 
exports. These may become cheaper, but the point is that Europe, the U.S. and ROW are 
also important producers in the world.  
Our analysis reveals that the forces from the production side of the economy are more 
important than the ones from the consumption side. As we have said, this benefits ROW 
but will harm Europe and the U.S. in a different magnitude.  
All in all, our analysis suggests that the best industrial policies outside China should further 
strengthen the comparative advantage in the sectors in which China competes less. 
Chapter 5 in the Dissertation gives the main results. Then, it discusses proposals for future 
research. 
 
3. Main conclusions and contributions  
 
Using the GTAPinGAMS model, we analyze the impact of FDI on the evolution of trade 
and other micro and macroeconomic variables in several regions through Asian production 
networks and final markets. This is one of the few studies that applies CGE analysis to the 
impact of FDI and GPNs. We provide an in-depth analysis, based on a wide set of micro 
and macroeconomic results, in order to capture the driving forces behind the adjustments 
after the FDI shock.  
The impact of FDI across sectors differs largely, as reflected for example on whether the 
expansion of the sectors brings about a higher demand for domestic intermediates (like 
36 
 
Machinery) or for imported ones (like Electronics). Rising income and GDP, following FDI 
inflows, will lift up the domestic demand and affect the trade pattern of private 
consumption related sectors, such as in the case of Textiles. Furthermore, we find an 
important role for FDI in policy intervention since the magnitude of FDI inflows 
proportionally affects the relevant changes in sectoral variables (such as exports, production, 
prices, and etc.) 
The arrival of FDI will increase the output of the sectors analyzed expands making their 
prices fall down. Chinese supply of Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals crowd out 
exports from the other regions in the world market. The rest of regions strengthen the trade 
ties with China and loosen the ties with others.  
The imports of Electronics, Chemicals and Textiles go up while those of Machinery 
imports decrease. The demand for imported intermediates largely explains the rising 
imports of Electronics and Chemicals, which are very intensively used as intermediates and 
have a strong production networks with East Asian suppliers. Rising national income 
largely explains the rising imports and decreasing exports of Textiles. The production 
technology in Machinery relies more heavily on domestic intermediates than on imported 
one. Therefore, with cheaper Machinery goods in China after the FDI inflows, it will 
reduce its imports.  
East Asia, as the biggest supplier for Chinese imports, undergoes the most substantial 
changes in trade. When China enlarges the imports of Electronics, Chemicals and Textiles, 
the increase mainly comes from East Asia. Similarly, when China reduces the Machinery 
imports, East Asia experiences the biggest reduction of Chinese imports. The U.S., Europe 
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and ROW are still the biggest markets for Chinese exports. So they absorb the most of the 
increase of Chinese exports after the shock.  
Our analysis confirms the existence of production networks in East Asia. China relies 
heavily on East Asian intermediate supply meanwhile East Asia is also highly dependent on 
the imports coming from China. There is a triangular trade pattern among China, East Asia 
and developed economies, especially in Electronics and Chemicals. Machinery also has 
strong production networks with East Asia but less intensively than the other two sectors, 
because its production uses most intensively domestic intermediates. Textiles also has a 
close trade relation with East Asia but this network is weaker than the others because its 
production mainly relies on its domestic intermediate inputs and it is a more private 
consumption oriented sector.  
For the rest of regions, our results reveal that ROW, which relies heavily on exports of 
Mining, gains from FDI inflows in China. The rest of regions, especially East Asia, receive 
negative impacts on their GDP and welfare. The essence for this contrast is the GDP, 
import and export structure across regions. After the shock, ROW enlarges heavily its 
exports of Services and Mining, in which China does not compete as fiercely as in the 
sectors that receive the FDI shock. By contrast, the GDP structure of East Asia is close to 
that of China. It is inevitably crowd out in those exports in which China has a cost edge. 
That is why it is affected most although it provides substantial intermediates to China. This 
PhD dissertation provides a holistic view of the impact of interaction between FDI in China 
and global production networks on the different world economies. Its general equilibrium 
nature provides an in-depth analysis of its effects for a rich set of variables at the micro and 
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macroeconomic level. Thus, the best industrial policies outside China should further 
strengthen the comparative advantage in the sectors in which China compete less. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, products with a ‘Made in China’ label can be easily found everywhere. The 
emergence of China on the world stage poses important questions about its economic 
consequences for that and other regions of the world and demands powerful methodologies 
able to quantify its challenges and opportunities.  
Somehow, Chinese geographical frontiers have become “blurred” in this process. On the 
one hand, China has been escalating positions as a favorable Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) destination. It has ranked 2nd among top hosts of FDI inflows in the world since 
2008 (UNCTAD, several years). This implies that FDI must play an important role in 
Chinese GDP growth (e.g., Kim et al., 2003) and foreign trade (e.g., Dean et al., 2009). 
Some authors have pointed out that in the absence of FDI flows, the Chinese high rates of 
GDP growth and exports would be in danger (Whalley and Xin, 2010; Zhang, 2013).On the 
other hand, a significant part of what is produced in (and later exported from) China relies 
heavily on foreign imported intermediates. What does, then, the “made in China” really 
mean? 
Imported intermediate inputs embodied in exports have raised close attention to what the 
literature calls: global production networks (GPN). There are various terminologies that 
describe this phenomenon like production unbundling (Baldwin, 2006), vertical 
specialization (Hummels et al., 2001), global supply chain trade (Baldwin and Lopez-
Gonzalez, 2013), production networks (Henderson et al., 2002; Ernst and Kim, 2002; 
Sturgeon, 2002), slicing up the value chain (Krugman, 1995), international production 
sharing (Ng and Yeats, 2001), fragmentation (Deardorff, 1998; Jones and Kierzkowski, 
2001)...  
East Asian economies have provided 65.4% of cumulative FDI in China from 1994 to 2012 
(Figure 1). It is also the main supplier of Chinese imports. The exports and imports between 
China and East Asia have nearly quadrupled during year 2000 to year 2009 (OECD, 
various years). Between 1988 and 2008, the share Chinese processing imports originating 
from its most important trading partners—East Asia has risen from 59.6% to 75.1%, while 
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the share of processing imports originating from non-Asian OECD countries has decreased 
from 37.7% to 18.7% over the same period (Ma and van Assche, 2010). The case study of 
iphone (Xing and Detert 2010) is another example of a global production networks (GPNs). 
Chinese workers only account for $6.5 to the entire $179 manufacturing cost of an iPhone, 
while the rest of the value is mainly transferred from Germany, Japan, Korea and the US. 
 It seems clear that East Asian economies are highly integrated through GPNs. However, 
due to their low private consumption, they heavily depend on the Western markets for their 
output. In fact, more than 70% of intraregional trade in East Asia (except the one from 
Japan) is in parts and components (ADB, 2007), around 50.2% to 78.7% of which will be 
re-exported (OECD, several years). The production networks seem therefore to be really 
global, since they end up in several different Western markets. This is an aspect that the 
literature has not emphasized very much. 
One of the main challenges of trade statistics nowadays is to combine the dimension of type 
of good traded (i.e., whether it is an intermediate for further processing or a final good) 
with that of country of origin. While that information might exist for some isolated 
countries, it is rather uncommon and unavailable across groups of countries. The 
information from the GTAP8 Data base used in this Dissertation, however, provides a good 
starting point in this regard. It will allow to identify (quantifying the importance of) the 
different roles played by regions across the production division, while the computable 
general equilibrium methodology will derive the consequences.     
Given the complexity of the process of Chinese globalization, much is still unknown about 
how FDI impacts on trade pattern through production networks, and how FDI affects GDP, 
national income, domestic demand and trade of the different regions involved in the process. 
 
2. The methodology 
 
Input-Output (IO) analysis has been the dominant methodology to analyze GPNs. The 
salient work of Hummels et al. (2001) has quantified the import content embodied in a 
44 
 
country’s exports and the vertical specialization index of a sector. A caveat of this analysis 
is, however, that often the so called “proportionality assumption” is used, i.e., when data 
are not available they assume that proportions in other type of trade relationship also hold 
in the one for which they have no data. For example, if the amount of imported 
intermediates coming from East Asia to China is unknown and only total imports from East 
Asia are known, the same proportion would be used for East Asia’s weight in Chinese 
imported intermediates.  
Koopman et al. (2014), and Johnson and Noguera (2012) have improved the work of 
Hummels et al. (2001). Johnson and Noguera (2012) estimate the domestic contents of re-
imports, thus, calculating the amount of value added generated in the country that exports 
the goods (ratio of value added to gross exports). They get a significant conclusion. The 
Chinese trade surplus with the US is 30–40% smaller when measured in value added in 
2004. Focusing on Chinese processing trade (i.e., trade after mere assembly operations in 
China with very little value added), Koopman et al. (2008) point out that only 40-50% of 
Chinese processing exports value is produced in China, while the rest consists of the value 
of imported inputs. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the U.S. are the primary 
contributors to Chinese products
1
. They find a triangular production sharing pattern among 
China (processing), Japan and Korea (intermediates) and the US (destination). Dean et al. 
(2011), following Koopman et al. (2008) methodology to split the Chinese IO tables, show 
strong evidence of vertical specialization in Chinese trade, particularly in Electric 
Computers and Telecommunications Equipment exports. Their results point out that there 
is a significant Asian-supplier network, with Japan and the Four Tigers (Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Korea) accounting for more than half of China’s imported inputs in 
1997 and 2002. This network is even more significant for processing trade. Baldwin and 
Lopez-Gonzalez (2013), based on two different data sets (the World IO Database and the 
Trade in Value Added Database), suggest that supply-chain trade has shifted heavily 
towards “Factory Asia” and away from “Factory North America” and “Factory Europe”.  
All these studies show important evidence on the presence on East Asian production 
networks. Besides, they quantify their magnitude. However, this Dissertation does not use 
                                                          
1
 They also derive that in the case of Electronics the share of value added in China goes down to 18.1%. 
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an IO methodology for 3 main reasons: 1) In the real world production is not a fixed 
combination of intermediates and factor inputs as the fixed coefficient from the I-O 
analysis assumes. 2) Another limitation of the I-O based analysis is the difficulty to make 
accurate cross-country comparisons since I-O matrices are computed sparsely in time and 
across countries. 3) Beyond the IO methodology, one step further can be given in order to 
analyze what the effects of these production networks are. This is what we aim to do in this 
PhD Dissertation, focusing on the interplay of FDI with GPNs. To this aim we use a CGE.  
A CGE model incorporates real data of the economies into a rigorous theoretical 
framework. It offers a comprehensive representation of the economy in which the 
interactions among different economic agents are presented as a system of equations 
derived from microeconomic optimization theory. The model also rests in the usual 
progression of the circular flow of the economy: production, income distribution and 
domestic and foreign demand (Latorre, 2010). In a CGE, production sectors across borders 
are linked through intermediates and final goods trade, while domestic production sectors 
are related to one another through intermediate inputs and through competition in attracting 
labor or capital (Francois et al., 2013). Therefore, this technique seems suitable to derive a 
deep analysis of the interaction between FDI and GPNs and its effects. 
Our model is the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) version (Rutherford, 2005) 
of a well-known CGE, namely, the Global Trade Analysis (GTAP) model (Hertel, 1997). 
The model grasps whether production and trade of the sector (and the rest of goods in the 
economy) are devoted to intermediate demand or to any of the forms of final demand (i.e., 
private consumption, public consumption, exports and investment). We want to study the 
role that the regions play in the different stages of the production chain (e.g., as providers 
of intermediates or as final consumption markets).  
The core GTAP model is a static CGE model of the world, which makes viable evaluating 
the medium term impacts of different shocks. One of the nice features of this model is its 
specification of the production nest. On the first layer, production is carried out by 
combining the composite intermediate and value added under a Leontief technology. On 
the second layer, value added is a constant elasticity substitution (CES) composite of 
sluggish capital and mobile labor. So far, the approach is rather standard. However, GTAP 
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includes a CES composite of intermediate inputs by which different combinations of 
domestic and import intermediates are possible. This is a rather non-standard characteristic 
in CGE models, and it will allow us to better exploit the treatment of the different sectors’ 
intermediates. The modeling of imported goods is standard but carries an allocation to its 
demand use (i.e., whether imports are used for intermediate inputs, private consumption, 
public consumption or investment). We will also exploit this feature in the present analysis. 
     
3. Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 
We are interested in how FDI flows of MNEs in China interact with GPNs and affect trade 
patterns. In this chapter we analyze one of the GPNs for which there exists evidence in the 
empirical literature, namely, the “Triangular trade pattern” of the Electronics sector.  
The expression “Triangular trade pattern” describes the process by which East Asia imports 
from the U.S. high-tech parts, which are converted into key intermediates and latter 
exported to China. China, in turn, processes and exports the finished goods to the U.S. (e.g., 
Amiti and Freund, 2010; Xing, 2011). So this chapter aims at finding out how FDI affects 
this triangular trade pattern, because not much attention has been paid to the role of FDI in 
this GPNs, even less in the papers using a CGE framework.  
According to GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012) Electronics is the most export 
oriented sector of China contributing to 22% and 20% of its overall exports and imports, 
respectively. East Asia provides 60.4% of Chinese imports and nearly 80% of Chinese 
imports are of intermediates. Thus, East Asia is the main supplier of components for 
Chinese production. This is also consistent with other empirical evidence, such as the one 
quoted above. Very low shares of production and imports of Electronics in China are 
devoted to private consumption. 55% of its output is exported and 71% of its exports go to 
the U.S. and ROW, which devote a high percent of imports to private consumption. The 
U.S. and ROW are the biggest destinations in the Chinese geographical structure of exports 
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meanwhile China is also an important source for these two regions’ imports. The triangular 
trade then develops when the branches of multinationals in China import intermediates 
from their parent firms and export it to the Western markets. Note that more than 80% of 
Electronics production and 70% of its exports in China is in the hands of MNEs. Thus, 
there seems to be a strong relationship between FDI, GPNs and trade.  
Using the latest GTAP 8 Data Base, we build a 15-sector, 4-region and 2-factor data 
version. We replicate the real increase in FDI stock experienced in Electronics in China, 
which has nearly doubled from 2004 to 2011, and examine the impact on the trade patterns 
among China, East Asia, the U.S. and ROW, as well as, the effects for other micro and 
macroeconomic variables. 
 
Chapter 3 
In chapter 2, we delve into the nature of the triangular trade pattern of Electronics. In this 
chapter we analyze whether FDI inflows would have a similar impact on the trade pattern 
of Textiles and Machinery among China, East Asia and the U.S. and ROW. Note that 
production in the latter sectors is also very much export oriented, as happens in Electronics. 
Would these sectors have similar effects on variables at the micro and macroeconomic level? 
This chapter aims at answering this question and exploring the roles that each regions plays 
as an intermediates’ supplier or as a market for these goods.  
The chapter presents a comprehensive appendix where model equations, variables and 
parameters are described. Besides, it also offers Figures with the nests of production, 
private and public consumption, foreign trade etc., to facilitate the analysis of the 
mathematical functional forms of the model.  
We use a 3-factor, 4-region, 15-sector CGE model to capture the demand and production 
changes, arising from the production networks and final demand roles of the different 
geographical areas. In this version of the model, contrasting with the previous chapter, 
labor is split into skilled and unskilled.  
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Though we focus only on Electronics, Machinery and Textiles, we are, in fact, analyzing 
55.4% and 40% of overall Chinese exports and imports, respectively, and 13.6% of Chinese 
GDP. Two characteristics of Chinese trade data stand out:  
    1. Around 80% of Chinese exports are directed to the U.S. and ROW. ROW is the most 
important destination accounting for 50% to 60% of total Chinese exports while the U.S. 
weighs around 25% to 30%. Thus, only around 20% of Chinese exports go to East Asia. 
Note that East Asian imports from China are mostly intermediates with a rather low weight 
of imports to be used for private consumption, particularly in Machinery goods. This 
implies that most of the Chinese exports of final goods are directed to the U.S. and ROW. 
Therefore, the latter constitute the main final markets of Chinese exports. 
    2. Chinese imports are mostly intermediates ranging from 68% (in Machinery) to around 
85% (in Electronics and Textiles). Around 60% of total Chinese imports come from East 
Asia. As noted above, it is not easy to find data displaying simultaneously the country of 
origin (whether it is East Asia or not) and the use type of good (i.e., intermediates of final 
goods) from that country of origin. But with 80% intermediate imports and 60% being 
provided by East Asia, it seems reasonable to assume that East Asia is heavily integrated in 
the Chinese production networks, providing an important amount of intermediates. What is 
the impact of FDI on the East Asian networks and on the final markets to which China sells 
most of its finished goods? 
 
Chapter 4 
In Chapter 3, we go deeper in the analysis of how FDI affects the evolution of trade and 
other variables through the interplay of production networks and final demand markets. 
Electronics is more integrated in the production networks than other sectors, according to 
the intensity of the imported components used in its output. ROW and East Asia are very 
big markets. A logical next step is to separate Europe from ROW and another big economy, 
namely, Japan from East Asia. 
49 
 
Then, looking at the production structure of Electronics, Machinery and Textiles, we find 
that intermediates of Chemicals are important for their production. In addition, the 
Chemicals sector is also export oriented and import dependent. Thus, we extend our 
analysis of FDI to the Chemicals’ sector, as well.  
Further, in the two previous chapters, we focus on the impacts of FDI on microeconomic 
variables like production networks and trade patterns in the sectors to which FDI accrues. 
In the third chapter, we give an in-depth explanation of the effects of FDI on the 
macroeconomic results across the six different regions. The emphasis of the analysis turns 
from the sectoral to the aggregate variables in this chapter. We use the model with 2 factors, 
15 sectors and 6 regions. But now FDI inflows go to Chinese Textiles, Machinery, 
Electronics and Chemicals sectors. We examine in more detail the existing production 
networks (between China, Japan and East Asia) and the role of the final markets (the U.S., 
Europe, and ROW).  
 
Chapter 5: Conclusions  
Chapters 2-4 are written as papers to be sent to scientific journals, therefore, they exhibit 
the standard structure of those types of papers. A final chapter on conclusions, as well as, a 
summary in English and Spanish, wrap up their main results and contributions at the end of 
the Dissertation.   
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How FDI influences the triangular trade pattern among China, 
East Asia and the U.S.? 
A CGE analysis of the sector of Electronics in China
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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the FDI 
inflows in the Electronics sector in China. Our aim is to capture how the causation chain 
works through production networks and the triangular trade pattern. China is a production 
base and export center for Electronics, with a heavy dependence on East Asian Electronics 
supply. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Rest of the world (ROW) are important markets for 
Electronics exports. China collaborates with East Asia in the production networks but 
competes with East Asia for the exports to the U.S. and ROW. The shock of FDI reinforces 
the pivotal role of China and intensifies its exports without any remarkable change on the 
pattern of the geographical destination or origin of its Electronics exports and imports. The 
Chinese trade links and production division remain unchanged. However, China takes up 
more of the world market crowding out its competitors. In this sense, after the shock, the 
shares in imports of Electronics of rest of regions change noticeably, showing a remarkable 
increase in the weight of China. East Asia will increase its exports to China, providing 
more intermediates for further processing. However, it will be displaced by China in the 
rest of markets, thus, reducing its overall exports.  
Key words: Production Networks; computable general equilibrium, intermediates. 
JEL Classification: C68, F14, F15, F17, F21. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The impact of triangular trade among China, East Asia and the U.S. has raised much 
interest. Particular attention has been devoted to the pattern of collaboration (Haddad, 2007) 
or competition (Gaulier et al., 2007) through FDI (foreign direct investment) or trade. Some 
authors have focused on free trade agreements and trade policy to explain the regional 
integration. One important conclusion is that trade liberalization policy has accelerated the 
transition of East Asia (Kitwiwattanachai et al., 2010; Kawai et al., 2010). 
Other studies have paid attention to production networks, as well as processing trade, 
vertical specialization, domestic export content, triangular trade and production networks 
among China, East Asia itself and the U.S. (Koopman et al., 2011; Ma and van Assche, 
2010; Wang et al., 2011; Xing and Detert, 2010). Indeed, there is considerable evidence 
that East Asia imports from the U.S. high-tech parts, which are converted into key 
intermediates and latter exported to China, while China processes and finally exports the 
finished goods to the U.S. The U.S., in fact, is the main export market for Asian finished 
goods and has been playing a significant role in this network (Amiti and Freund, 2008; 
Xing, 2011).  
In the literature, however, not much attention has been paid to the role of FDI in these 
processes, particularly using a CGE framework. We try to bridge this gap by analyzing the 
impact on the triangular trade pattern of the FDI accruing to China. China, as an emerging 
and transition economy, is abundant in cheap labor supply and unique in its FDI and export 
encouraging policies, continuous high economic growth and potential market size. These 
factors together have been important for attracting huge FDI from the rest of the world. 
Especially, the neighboring East Asian economies, due to the geographic proximity and 
cultural links, have provided 63% of cumulative FDI in China from 1985 to 2008 (Xing, 
2010). An important part of the triangular trade, then, develops when the multinationals 
from advanced Asian economies set up fragmentation production branches and import 
intermediates from their parent firms. Thus, there seems to be a strong relationship between 
FDI, networks and trade.   
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This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model that we use. The 
data and simulation scenario are discussed in section 3. The results from the 
simulation are analyzed both at the aggregate and sectoral level in section 4. Section 
5 concludes.  
 
2. The model 
 
We think the present model is suitable for a deep analysis of the production, demand and 
foreign trade of the Electronics sector. Indeed, we analyze several dimensions of those 
three sides of the economy across several regions of the world. The model grasps whether 
production and trade of Electronics (and the rest of goods in the economy) are devoted to 
intermediate demand or to any of the forms of final demand (i.e., private consumption, 
public consumption, exports and investment). We want to study the role that the regions 
play in the different stages of the production chain (e.g., as providers of intermediates or as 
final consumption markets). This analysis is greatly facilitated when a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model is used. A CGE allows the combination of the supply and 
demand sides of the economies, as well as, their interplay with foreign trade.   
Our model is the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) version (Rutherford, 2005) 
of a well-known CGE, namely, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model (Hertel, 
1997). The GTAPinGAMs is a traditional static Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium model 
in which the equilibrium is defined by zero profit and market clearance conditions. Most of 
the model specifications are the same as in Hertel (1997), which uses GEMPACK software 
package instead of GAMS, with only two differences. First, the GEMPACK version is 
based on a constant difference elasticity demand system, while the GAMS model uses 
Cobb–Douglas preferences. Second, in GEMPACK global capital is treated as a portfolio 
investment and, thus, endogenously allocated by regional rates of return. By contrast, for 
simplicity, the GTAPinGAMS exogenously fixes the global capital flows at base year 
levels.  
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The core GTAP model is a static CGE model of the world, which makes viable evaluating 
the medium term impacts of different shocks. Mathematically it is a system derived from a 
series of non-linear equations determined by each agent’s optimization, as well as, national 
account identities. In the model there are four economic agents: producers, private 
consumers, government and trading partners, all of them maximizing their own profit or 
welfare.   
One of the nice features of this model is its specification of the production nest. On the first 
layer, production is carried out by combining the composite intermediate and value added 
under a Leontief technology. On the second layer, value added is a constant elasticity 
substitution (CES) composite of sluggish capital and mobile labor. So far, the approach is 
rather standard. However, GTAP includes a (CES) composite of intermediate inputs by 
which different combinations of domestic and import intermediates are possible. This is a 
rather non-standard characteristic in CGE models, and it will allow us to better exploit the 
treatment of Electronics’ intermediates. 
We adopt a framework of perfect competition, therefore, the marginal cost of production 
equals the price. There are authors that suggest the use of imperfect competition in some 
sectors of the economy (e.g., Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). However, others obtain that the 
impact of FDI would not vary much depending on the climate of competition (e.g., 
Verikios and Zhang, 2001, and Dee et al., 2003). 
Production is distributed to private consumption, government consumption, investment, 
exports and international transportation. The modeling of imported goods is standard but 
carries an allocation to its demand use (i.e., whether imports are used for intermediate 
inputs, private consumption, public consumption or investment). We will also exploit this 
feature in the present analysis. 
Hertel (1997) offers a complete explanation of the model. The equations appear in a 
“linearized” form, as is standard in GEMPACK. Rutherford (2005) explains the whole set 
of equations, parameters and variables in a more friendly algebraic format, while Latorre 
(2010, Chapter 3) provides a particularly detailed explanation of the model
1
. In the current 
                                                          
1 The full set of data and GAMS code needed to replicate the results in this paper is available by request,. 
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aggregation of the model, we use a 4-region, 2-factor and 15-sector version. Let us turn to 
the data that underlie it.  
 
3. Data and simulations 
 
As mentioned before, there are two factors of production (labor and capital), four regions 
(China; East Asia
2
; the U.S. and Rest of World) and fifteen sectors. The Manufacturing 
sector is disaggregated into thirteen sub-sectors. The other two sectors are Agriculture and 
Services. We model capital as sector-specific and labor as fully mobile within but not 
across regions. This implies that our results grasp the medium term impact of the shock 
analyzed.  
Table 1, offers the whole sectoral picture of the Chinese economy. In the first two columns, 
it presents the complete sectoral names, as well as, the shorter name after aggregation that 
will be used, henceforth. The percentage calculations of the table are based on the latest 
GTAP8 database (Narayanan et al., 2012), which is the one used in our model. The 
information refers to the Year 2007. The exports of Electronics account for 22% of total 
Chinese exports while the imports of Electronics take up 20% of all the imports in China. 
By contrast, sectoral output and value added of Electronics only account for 5% and 3% of 
total production and aggregate GDP, respectively. Similarly, the amount of labor and 
capital used in Electronics is for both only 2.5% of the total amount of factors available in 
China. This rather small sector has a high dependence on the world market, as 56.33% of 
its production goes to exports and 48.17% of the domestic demand for Electronics relies on 
the imports.  
Apart from Electronics, Textiles and Machinery also show a high dependence on the export 
markets, contributing to 16.7% and 16.9% of total Chinese exports. As happened with 
                                                          
2
 After the close observation of the FDI sources and main trade partners of China, we finally aggregate Japan 
and new industrialized economies (Republic of Korea, Taiwan China, Hong Kong China and Singapore) as 
East Asia. 
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Electronics, the two sectors are smaller in terms of value added, production, use of capital 
and labor. However, their foreign trade links are very important in Chinese total trade. 
Table 1 also shows that other sectors are more oriented to private consumption. This is the 
case of Agriculture, Food and Beverages, as well as, the Services sectors, which account for 
12.5%, 17.5% and 45.5% of total private consumption in China. We will see that the export 
or private consumption orientation of the sectors will be important for their outcomes of 
production and labor demand after the shock. 
China, out of its abundant labor and market potential, has attracted huge FDI flows in its 
most export-oriented sector— Electronics. MNEs account for 80% of total Electronics 
production and contribute to more than 70% of Electronics exports
3
. We are interested in 
how the evolution of FDI reshapes the East Asian economy and how the effects are 
magnified through production networks and trade linkages of Electronics. Thus, our 
simulation consists of a realistic shock about the evolution of the capital stock of 
Electronics in China. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (various 
years), the accumulated FDI inflow in Electronics has more than doubled during the period 
of 2004- 2011
4
. Thus, we simulate a 100% increase of capital stock in Electronics in China, 
meanwhile the capital stock in rest sectors and regions remains fixed.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Aggregate results 
Table 2 presents the macroeconomic impacts across regions of the FDI shock in Electronics 
in China. It provides the percentage change in real terms with respect to the benchmark 
                                                          
3
 中国工业经济统计年鉴 2008 (China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 2008) . 
4
 The exact source is the ‘Investment in Fixed Assets in Urban Area By Sector, Jurisdiction of Management 
and Registration Status’ from National Bureau of China Statistics (various years). Due to the lack of detailed 
FDI stock data and FDI flows across sectors, we take the “fixed assets investment funded by foreign capitals” 
as a proxy for the foreign fixed assets. The latter takes into account the capital invested in China by all foreign 
firms across the world, including firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao.  
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value of aggregate variables: the wage, the capital rent, GDP from the income side, national 
income
5
, the CPI and the overall increase of capital stock.  
Since the capital input of the Electronics sector only accounts for 2.48% of total capital 
stock in China (Table 2), the 100% increase of capital stock in it results in a 2.48% increase 
of total capital stock. The rest of the regions keep their capital stock stable. Capital 
accumulation leads to a fall in the rental rate of capital. The abundant labor supply and the 
flexible substitution between labor and capital in manufacturing ensure that the wage in 
China rises by 0.22%. The fall in the rental rate of capital and the increase in wages, 
following an increase in the capital stock, have been generally obtained in previous CGEs 
(e.g., Latorre et al., 2009; Latorre, 2013), as well as in broader reviews of the literature 
using other methodologies (e.g., Rama, 2003).  It is also the expected outcome in a capital 
specific setting, as the theory of trade models with specific capital shows (e.g., Jones, 2000; 
2002). Higher wages and, more importantly, a bigger capital stock lead to a 3.82% and 0.99% 
increase in national income and GDP, respectively. The impact on macroeconomic 
variables across the rest of regions is very small. 
The CPI
6
 in China has risen up around 2%. The higher domestic prices of Services, 
Agriculture, as well as Food and Beverage have mainly lead to the higher CPI. This upward 
pressure is only partially offset by the fall in Electronic prices, due to the small weight 
(1.9%) of this sector in total private consumption. Across the rest of regions variations in 
the CPI are small.  
 
 
                                                          
5
 Due to the fact that private consumption is calculated using a Cobb-Douglas form, percentage variations in 
private consumption coincide with changes in households’ income. According to Hertel (1997, Chapter 1), the 
change of households’ consumption or income can be considered as a welfare change when investment and 
public consumption are fixed in real terms (as in GTAPinGAMS).  
6
 As a CGE model describes only relative prices, we take the standard approach of choosing CPI as the 
model’s numeraire. CPI is the weighted sum of initial consumer prices, where the weights are each good’s 
base budget share in the consumption bundle. GTAP6inGAMS by default takes a different variable as the 
numeraire. That is the dispensable budget for private consumption in ROW (RArow). The CPI outcomes are 
then expressed in terms of the (RArow), since RArow only experiences a change of 0.09%, the CPI itself can be 
regarded as the real evolution of prices in each region.  
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4.2. Sectoral results 
4.2.1. Production, output prices and labor demand 
In China, the evolution of exports and private consumption are the key to the changes in 
output across sectors. Those sectors that are more export oriented—devoting a large part of 
its production to exports, as shown in Table 1, will diminish their production (Table 3). The 
reason for this is that the increase in the Chinese prices (as reflected in the higher CPI) are 
bigger than in the rest of regions, so China loses competitiveness (except in Electronics). 
Production falls because these sectors export less. The sectors experiencing increases in 
output are the ones whose production is more devoted to private consumption. Private 
consumption increases due to the higher national income in China, pushing up the 
production of the sectors more responsive to its tendency.  
The biggest changes in output take place in the Electronic sectors itself. Following the 
arrival of new capital, output increases strongly in this sector in China. The important 
increase of Chinese exports to the rest of regions will crowd out the output of electronics in 
East Asia, the U.S. and ROW (Table 3). In East Asia production has contracted by 3.76%. 
Reductions are more sizeable in the U.S. (-6.89%) and ROW (-4.61%). This is due to the 
role of East Asia as a provider of intermediates of Electronics to China. This will be 
analyzed more deeply when dealing with exports.  
Labor demand follows the evolution of production. In this capital specific setting, sectors 
that increase production do so by employing more labor. The only exception is Electronics. 
Since its capital rent in China is nearly half of the former price after the shock meanwhile 
the labor price goes up slightly, this sector replaces labor with capital.  
4.2.2. Intermediate input of the Electronics sector 
Table 4 shows the demand for total, imported and domestic intermediates to be used in the 
Electronics sector across regions. The final three columns show the change in total 
intermediates. We find they exactly follow the production change in Electronics production 
(shown in Table 3). This is due to the Leontief function of the upper nest in the production 
tree of GTAP6inGAMS. The interesting point, however, is that the combination of 
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imported or domestic varieties (first six columns of Table 3), which underlies the total 
demand for intermediates, differs.  
Except for Electronics intermediates themselves, the Electronics sectors in East Asia, the 
U.S. and ROW rely more on domestic intermediates than on imported ones (i.e., the fall in 
imported intermediates is more sizeable than the fall in domestic intermediates). In China 
the tendency is reversed (i.e., the increase in the demand for imported intermediates is 
larger than the increase experienced for domestic ones). This difference arises from the fact 
that domestic intermediate prices are cheaper than imported ones in East Asia, the U.S. and 
ROW, but are more expensive than imported ones in China (see Part 2 of table 4). These 
tendencies are following the evolution of the CPI presented in Table 2. The CPI increases 
in China, it also increases slightly (and less than in China) in ROW, but decreases in East 
Asia and the U.S.  
Let us focus now on the demand in Electronics for Electronics intermediates themselves. 
East Asia, the U.S. and ROW reduce more the demand for domestic inputs than imported 
ones when they cut down their output, as the imported inputs are cheaper than domestic 
ones. Imported goods are cheaper because the output price of Electronics goods in China 
falls heavily, pushing import prices for East Asia, the U.S. and ROW down
7
. This sector in 
China, however, uses 47.55% more of domestic intermediates and 20% more of imported 
ones. As a result, the production of domestic intermediates to be used in Electronics 
increases much more than does that of imported intermediates.  
4.2.3. Bilateral exports of Electronics  
4.2.3.1. Benchmark allocation structure of production and imports of Electronics 
Table 5 shows the different roles that the four regions considered play in Electronics in the 
benchmark, i.e., before the shock. Let us look first at the use of imports in this sector. The 
left side of Part 1 of the table displays the allocation of each region’s total imports of 
Electronics according to their use (i.e., the share used for private consumption, government 
consumption, gross capital formation or intermediates). China and East Asia stand out in 
                                                          
7
 More detail on these results on prices is provided in Table 6 below and will be further analyzed later on.  
63 
 
the weight of imports that are intermediate goods, i.e., goods that will be further processed, 
with a weight of around 80% and 66%, respectively. By contrast, in the U.S. and ROW the 
weight of intermediates of Electronics falls to around the half of imports. This reflects the 
idea that China and East Asia have an important role as “factories of Electronics” in the 
world, also considering that among the imported intermediates of Electronics, 74% (79%) 
go to the Electronics’ sector itself and not to other sectors in China (in East Asia).    
The right side of Part 1 of Table 5 shows a complementary picture. It displays the 
destination of the production of Electronics in each of the four regions. In particular, it 
shows the percentage of Electronics’ production that is allocated to private and government 
consumption, gross capital formation, intermediates and exports. This information further 
confirms the role of China as a factory of Electronics in the world. 55% of its production is 
exported and 36% is used as intermediates. It also plays an important role as an export 
center. In China only 2.5% of production goes to private consumption and only 6% is for 
gross capital formation, while government consumption is negligible. In East Asia about 75% 
of the output is devoted to either exports (49%) or intermediates production (26%). 
However, the weight of private consumption and gross capital formation is higher than in 
China (10.5% and 13.3%, respectively). East Asia is a region which includes developed 
Asian economies, therefore, it devotes a higher share than China to the consumption of 
finished Electronics goods. It also reveals that East Asia plays a role as an export center for 
Electronics as China does, though less intensively, according to their export ratio of 
production. Thus, there are some similarities in the weight of export and intermediate ratio 
relative to production in China and East Asia. 
The left side of Part 2 of Table 5 displays the geographical share of total imports of 
Electronics across the world, by demand component (i.e., classified as intermediate inputs, 
private consumption, public demand and investment demand). It unfolds the truth that the 
U.S. and ROW are the biggest markets for Electronics goods, according to their joint 
weight in imports for private consumption (82%), public demand (99%) and investment 
demand (78%). By contract, China and East Asia account for rather small share in private 
consumption (18%), public demand (0.17%) and investment demand (21%). China and 
East Asia account for 38% of world imports of Electronics intermediates.  
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The right side of Part 2 of Table 5 shows us the geographical shares of total world 
production of Electronics by demand component. Looking at the geographical shares world 
production of intermediates, 44% of them are concentrated in China and East Asia (with 
21.6% and 23%, respectively). The table does not exhibit any absolute numbers. However, 
taking into account absolute numbers behind the imports of intermediates of China and East 
Asia (21.4% and 16.7% at the left of the table) together with absolute numbers of 
production of intermediates taking place in them, the whole East Asia overtakes ROW as 
the center of intermediates processing.  This enables us to interpret China and East Asia as 
the main factory of Electronics in the world. This is further confirmed by looking at their 
share in total domestic supply of Electronics in the world (right side of Part 2 of Table 5). 
China and East Asia together account for more than 46% of total world production of 
Electronics.   
These data suggest that the regions considered play a different role in the “triangular trade 
pattern”. China stands out as a factory, East Asia follows that same trend although less 
intensively. The U.S. and ROW are the biggest markets for the Electronics finished goods 
of the world. 
4.2.3.2. Evolution of bilateral trade in Electronics. 
The main outcomes for the evolution of trade appear in Table 6. Part 1 of that Table 
presents the benchmark real values of exports of Electronics, as well as, the values after the 
simulation and their corresponding percentage changes. Note that the values of imports can 
be inferred from the exports values.  
Let us begin by looking at the first group of columns in Part 1 of Table 6, which refer to 
Chinese exports. After the arrival of FDI to China its exports increase heavily and by a 
rather similar percentage (around 34%
8
) to the rest of regions. This implies that China 
strongly intensifies its exports without any marked change on the pattern of the 
geographical destination of those exports. The trade links and the export division remain 
unchanged. The absolute values show that for Chinese exports, the U.S and ROW are the 
most important markets. This is also confirmed by the percentage weight in total Chinese 
                                                          
8
 Note that the increase experienced in the production of Electronics after the shock is of 34% (Table 3). 
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exports reported in the second part of Table 6. It can be seen that the U.S. and ROW 
account for 32.4% and 48.7% of Chinese exports in the benchmark. Note the contrast with 
the pattern of the East Asia region. For East Asia China alone accounts for 32.04% of East 
Asian exports, while the U.S. and ROW account for 13.44% and 34.57% of East Asian 
exports, respectively. The East Asian region is also a rather important market for itself, 
bigger than the U.S., since it takes up nearly 20% of exports from East Asia.  
As a result of the shock, all the rest of regions intensify their exports to China, while 
diminishing exports to other destinations (percentage changes in Part 1 of Table 6). We 
have seen that most of the exports accruing to China are of intermediates (Table 5 Part 1). 
More imports of intermediates are necessary given that Chinese production is increasing 
very heavily. The ROW region exhibits the biggest increase of exports to China (10.9%). 
However, in absolute values the increase is smaller than the exports of East Asia to China. 
The percentage is bigger just because the level of ROW’s initial exports is much smaller 
than the one from East-Asia to China. Indeed, East-Asia provides much more exports to 
China (in absolute terms, before and after the shock). This means that there are important 
production networks between East Asia and China. East Asia is more a partner in the 
production networks for China than a market like the U.S. or ROW.  
Indeed, Table 6 confirms that the nature of the ties of Electronics’ trade between China and 
East Asia is different from the ones between China, the U.S. and ROW. Part 3 of that Table 
shows the geographical import structure. Nearly two thirds of Electronics imports of China 
come from East Asia while two thirds of the imports of East Asia come from itself and 
China. The adjustment after the shock is more intense when we look at its import side. Note 
that China does not change much its import structure in Electronics (again the product 
division remains unchanged). This means that the regional import shares in China remain 
nearly unaffected. However, due to the lower Chinese prices in Electronics it crowds out 
other providers of Electronics. In other words, imports coming from China increase in all 
regions, while the ones coming from the rest of regions go down. The adjustments in the 
import structure in other regions than China are more intense than in the case of the exports 
structure.  
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The last row of Table 6 shows import prices and domestic output prices of Electronics 
goods. Imports coming from China exhibit the biggest fall in prices in East Asia (-5.85%), 
the U.S. (-5.90%) and ROW (-6.00%). Clearly the price competitiveness of China has 
become very challenging. Particularly when we compared the import prices with the 
domestic output prices in Electronics. This explains why China gains in the import share of 
all regions: from 27.38% to 35.16% of total imports of Electronics in East Asia; from 38.01% 
to 46.54% in the U.S. and from 21.50% to 28.08% in ROW. By contrast, the shares of the 
imports provided by East Asia, U.S. and ROW are always reduced in the bilateral 
transactions among them. 
 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
In order to examine the robustness of the results, we change the values of two crucial 
elasticities in the model: 1) the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production (i.e. the Armington elasticity) and 2) the elasticity of substitution between labor 
and capital. We perform a Conditional Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (CSSA) following 
Harrison et al. (1993). We halve and double of each the two types of elasticities in all of the 
fifteen sectors while keeping the rest of elasticities at their benchmark value. Then we rerun 
the model and obtain the results for the aggregate and sectoral variables which have been 
analyzed above.  
Table 7 shows the results of the aggregate variables, in a structure analogous to that of 
Table 2. The columns of “double” and “half” show the results obtained from the sensitivity 
analysis in which each of the elasticities are multiplied or divided by two. Changes in 
elasticities do not lead to significant variance in the aggregate variables. Only factor prices 
are slightly more affected under the different values of the elasticity of substitution between 
labor and capital. It is reasonable that the more flexible the substitution the smaller the 
impacts on wage and capital rents. Apart from that, the general outcomes analyzed before 
are preserved.  
Now we turn to Table 8, analogous to the output results displayed in Table 3. Again the 
differences are negligible for the substitution elasticity between domestic goods and 
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imports. Only for the output of Electronics increases are more sizeable with the larger value 
of the Armington elasticity. The reason is that with higher values for this elasticity the 
sector tends to replace the imported goods with domestic ones whose prices are cheaper. 
Regarding the change of substitution elasticity between labor and capital, the output of 
Electronics increases less when the elasticity is higher. The more abundant capital in this 
sector replaces labor inputs more easily with a higher elasticity but faces a decreasing 
marginal product revenue of capital and also has less labor to produce. On the contrary, the 
inelastic substitution between factors leads to the higher demand for labor inputs which 
complement the capital inputs in the production of Electronics and lead to higher 
production levels.  
Lastly we turn to Table 9 to analyze the trade pattern. There are no remarkable changes in 
the trade pattern for East Asia, the U.S. and Rest of World. Therefore, we concentrate on 
the effects for China. The overall trade pattern persists as before. East Asia is still the main 
supplier for Chinese imports of Electronics, and the U.S. and ROW are the biggest markets 
for Chinese exports. Although the changes are small, the lower the values of the elasticity 
of substitution between labor and capital, the larger the exports from China to Rest of 
World. Production in Electronics is larger in the more inelastic case, leading to a higher 
expansion on exports. Changes in the elasticity of substitution between imported and 
domestic goods are small.  
All in all, the changes we have analyzed in the elasticities could vary the magnitude of the 
process described above but they would not change their causation chain since no outcomes 
straddle the origin.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has examined the trade patterns of Electronics among China, East Asia, the 
U.S. and ROW. In particular, it has analyzed how the evolution of production and sourcing 
of intermediate inputs, as well as, the supply of final goods affect foreign trade. In line with 
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previous findings (e.g. Kawai, 2004), we obtain that FDI plays a vital role in shaping Asian 
regional Electronics production networks. 
We replicate the real increase in FDI stock experienced in Electronics in China, which has 
doubled in the period 2004-2011. The simulations from our CGE model indicate that China 
has benefited from the FDI inflow. Its GDP increases by 1% while welfare rises by 3.8%. 
Besides, the pivotal role of China in the production network of Electronics has been 
strengthened by intensifying its exports to all the trade partners. However, the increase in 
Electronics exports occurs without any remarkable change in the pattern of its previous 
geographical destinies neither of its importing sources. In other words, Chinese export and 
import links remain unchanged (i.e., its product division persists).  
By contrast, the geographical import structure of the rest of regions considered in the model 
changes considerably. The large increase of Chinese exports, following a big fall in their 
export prices, crowds out other competitors across the world. China also attracts more 
exports from the rest of regions (mainly due to the imported intermediates needed in its 
Electronics production). However, interestingly, the export structure of the rest of regions 
varies less than the import structure. This implies that China plays a more important role as 
a provider of Electronics goods for the rest of the world compared to its role as a final good 
market for them.    
China plays, indeed, a central role as a production base and export center for Electronics in 
the world. Its main export markets are the U.S. and ROW. East Asia is the main input 
provider of Chinese Electronics. The increase in the production of Electronics in China is 
more important for the larger exports of electronics from East Asia than for the U.S. and 
ROW, due to the production networks that exist between China and East Asia. China 
collaborates with East Asia in the production of electronics but competes with that region in 
the U.S and ROW markets. After the shock, East Asia increases exports to China but 
reduces exports to the rest of regions and, further, some East Asian providers of Electronics 
within the region itself are also crowded out by China. Even though East Asia will export 
more to China it loses ground in the world market. This latter result prevails and, on the 
whole, East Asian exports of Electronics are reduced.  
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All in all, the FDI shock in Electronics sector in China has further strengthened its role of 
China as a production base and export center. East Asia becomes more integrated with 
China (through more exports and imports) but loses competitiveness and shares in the U.S., 
ROW, and in its own internal market.  
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Table 1: Definition of sectors, commodity shares, import reliance, export tendency and production structure of China (year 2007) 
Sector/Goods Definition 
(based on GATPAgg) 
Commodity % in: Import % 
of 
domestic 
consumpti
on 
Export % of 
domestic 
production 
Production side (%) 
Domestic 
Demand 
Trade % of 
Producti
on Value 
V.A. % 
in GDP 
% of 
capital 
input 
% of 
Labor 
input 
Private 
consumption 
Imports Exports 
Agriculture 01~14 Agriculture, hunting and fishing 12.49 2.97 0.91 5.05 1.85 6.40 11.04 10.33 15.05 
Mining 15~18 Mining and quarrying 0.20 15.04 0.53 34.93 2.39 2.89 3.95 5.74 2.97 
Food and Beverage 19~26 Food, beverages and tobacco 17.56 1.91 1.95 4.69 5.15 4.92 3.21 2.58 2.80 
Textiles 
27~29 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather, 
footwear 
5.99 2.7 16.7 6.83 35.81 6.06 4.07 2.84 4.18 
Woods and Paper 
30~31 wood without furniture, paper, 
publishing, media 
0.62 1.98 4.08 7.37 17.05 3.11 2.06 1.95 2.33 
Petroleum 32 Petroleum 2.58 2.36 1.72 9.46 7.85 2.84 0.60 0.49 0.45 
Chemicals 
33~34 Chemicals, rubber and plastic 
products 
2.51 12.81 7.15 22.82 12.88 7.21 5.67 4.75 3.86 
Metals 
34~37 Mineral products nec, Ferrous 
metals, metals nec, metal products 
0.63 8.27 9.51 7.25 9.88 12.49 7.41 8.23 7.30 
Motor Vehicles 
38~39 Motor vehicles and parts, transport 
equipment nec 
2.36 4.07 3.24 13.35 11.42 3.69 2.46 1.63 2.44 
Electronics 40 Electronic equipment 1.89 19.44 21.84 48.17 56.33 5.03 2.95 2.48 2.47 
Machinery 41 Machinery and equipment nec 2.07 17.85 16.93 23.78 24.85 8.85 6.45 5.34 5.56 
Other 
Manufacturing 
42 Manufactures nec 1.42 0.42 6.01 3.9 38.97 2.00 2.48 3.99 1.24 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water 
43~45 Electricity; Gas manufacture and 
distribution; Water 
3.28 0.08 0.12 0.31 0.56 2.84 3.36 4.53 2.48 
Construction 46 Construction 0.85 0.34 0.42 0.48 0.67 8.18 6.34 4.39 8.26 
Services 47~57 Services 45.55 9.76 8.89 4.44 4.92 23.50 37.94 40.73 38.62 
Total 100 100 100 11.53 12.99 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012).
73 
 
Table 2: Impact on aggregate variables (% change) 
Macro indices CHN EAS U.S. ROW 
Wage 0.22 -0.14 -0.03 -0.08 
Capital rental  -0.71 -0.17 0.02 0.02 
National income 3.82 -0.16 0.02 -0.09 
GDP 0.99 -0.12 -0.02 -0.03 
CPI 2.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.09 
Capital stock 2.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: CHN represents China, EAS stands for East Asia, and ROW for Rest of the world. 
 
 
Table 3: Impact on sectoral output and labor input (% change)  
% change 
Output Labor input 
CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW 
Agriculture 0.38 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.64 0.21 0.25 0.11 
Mining -0.22 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.65 0.44 0.25 0.2 
Food & 
Beverage 
0.94 -0.02 0.03 0.01 1.82 -0.05 0.05 0.03 
Textiles -2.72 1.41 1.04 0.87 -4.55 2.05 1.3 1.43 
Woods and 
Paper 
-1.19 0.30 0.19 0.22 -2.18 0.49 0.26 0.36 
Petroleum 0.61 0.11 -0.13 -0.06 1.29 0.32 -0.25 -0.21 
Chemicals -0.68 0.6 0.3 0.23 -1.52 1.19 0.5 0.46 
Metals -0.54 0.55 0.22 0.25 -1.15 0.97 0.28 0.45 
Motor 
Vehicles 
-0.97 0.53 0.23 0.01 -1.62 0.80 0.28 0.02 
Electronics 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 -13.68 -7.05 -9.56 -9.10 
Machinery -1.55 0.76 0.42 0.25 -3.03 1.23 0.53 0.37 
Other 
manufacturing 
-0.94 0.45 0.65 0.19 -3.94 0.70 0.77 0.31 
Electricity, 
Gas and Water 
0.6 -0.01 -0.02 0 1.7 -0.06 -0.04 0 
Construction 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0 
Services 1.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 2.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See note on Table 2. 
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Table 4: Impact on intermediate demands and prices of the Electronics sector (% change) 
Part 1: Intermediate demand of the Electronics sector  
  
domestic intermediate demand Imported intermediate demand total intermediate demand 
CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW 
Agriculture 26.08 -3.67 -6.95 -4.57 34.18 -4.63 -6.86 -4.73 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Mining 33.89 -4.05 -6.81 -4.67 35.15 -3.73 -6.94 -4.50 34.19 -3.77 -6.89 -4.61 
Food and Beverage 33.95 -3.76 -6.89 -4.59 42.23 -4.81 -7.28 -4.70 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Textiles 33.8 -3.39 -6.76 -4.26 39.93 -5.94 -8.76 -5.25 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Woods and Paper 33.6 -3.70 -6.85 -4.56 39.81 -4.82 -8.00 -4.82 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Petroleum 34.07 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 35.28 -3.79 -6.87 -4.60 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Chemicals 32.94 -3.66 -6.79 -4.54 38.43 -4.04 -7.36 -4.68 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Metals 33.68 -3.56 -6.72 -4.51 39.32 -4.26 -7.68 -4.75 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Motor Vehicles 33.47 -3.59 -6.82 -4.60 38.75 -4.14 -7.04 -4.62 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Electronics 47.55 -6.72 -10.09 -7.21 19.76 -0.46 0.34 -3.28 34.34 -3.75 -6.86 -4.6 
Machinery 33.1 -3.41 -6.60 -4.49 37.76 -4.11 -7.41 -4.72 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Other 
manufacturing 
34.05 -3.19 -6.52 -4.48 37.38 -4.34 -7.70 -4.89 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Electricity, Gas and 
Water 
34.16 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 41.55 -4.77 -7.24 -4.66 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Construction 34.16 -3.76 -6.89 -4.60 38.33 -4.12 -7.15 -4.70 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Services 33.82 -3.70 -6.88 -4.60 40.18 -4.33 -7.07 -4.65 34.18 -3.76 -6.89 -4.61 
Part 2: Intermediate input prices  
  
domestic intermediate input price import intermediate input price 
composite intermediate input 
price 
CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS US ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW 
Agriculture 0.83 0.28 0.33 0.13 -1.79 0.71 0.29 0.2 -1.79 0.32 0.3 0.15 
Mining -1.26 0.77 0.63 0.58 -1.42 0.71 0.65 0.55 -1.29 0.71 0.64 0.57 
Food and Beverage 0.5 0.12 0.09 0.03 -1.91 0.56 0.26 0.07 0.43 0.12 0.09 0.03 
Textiles -0.56 0.38 0.18 0.24 -1.73 1.09 0.76 0.52 -0.64 0.48 0.22 0.34 
Woods and Paper -0.48 0.09 0.06 0.05 -1.92 0.47 0.46 0.13 -0.62 0.11 0.08 0.06 
Petroleum -1.08 0.63 0.57 0.46 -1.5 0.65 0.55 0.46 -1.12 0.63 0.56 0.46 
Chemicals -0.6 0.32 0.15 0.12 -1.81 0.44 0.33 0.16 -0.88 0.35 0.18 0.14 
Metals -0.65 0.26 0.07 0.11 -1.84 0.48 0.37 0.18 -0.75 0.32 0.12 0.14 
Motor Vehicles -0.78 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -2 0.22 0.07 -0.02 -0.95 0.09 0.02 -0.03 
Electronics -7.93 -1.33 -0.99 -1.8 -3.46 -2.77 -3.43 -2.72 -5.92 -2.03 -1.77 -2.42 
Machinery -1.14 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -1.98 0.30 0.20 0.03 -1.34 0.21 0.06 0 
Other 
manufacturing 
-1.29 0.09 0.03 0.05 -1.94 0.41 0.38 0.17 -1.32 0.25 0.14 0.09 
Electricity, Gas and 
Water 
0.01 0.15 0.06 0.08 -1.89 0.53 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.15 0.07 0.08 
Construction -0.39 0.02 0 -0.01 -1.98 0.22 0.15 0.05 -0.40 0.02 0 -0.01 
Services 0.37 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -2.06 0.29 0.08 -0.02 0.23 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See note on Table 2. 
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Table 5: Benchmark allocation of production and imports of Electronics (% shares, year 2007) 
Part 1 
Total Electronics’ imports of each region by demand type (%) Demand use of production in Electronics in each region (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Demand 
Investment 
Demand 
Intermediates Total 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Demand 
Investment 
Demand 
Export Intermediates Total 
CHN 6.05 0.00 14.56 79.38 100 2.45 0.00 5.89 55.16 36.51 100 
EAS 11.71 0.01 22.36 65.93 100 10.57 0.01 13.34 49.32 26.76 100 
U.S. 21.14 0.00 26.10 52.75 100 5.92 0.00 23.88 18.38 51.81 100 
ROW 16.17 0.89 31.31 51.62 100 9.46 0.33 12.46 55.96 21.80 100 
Part 2 
Geographical share of world Electronics imports by demand type (%) Geographical share of world production of Electronics by demand type (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Demand 
Investment 
Demand 
Intermediates Total 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Demand 
Investment 
Demand 
Export Intermediates Total 
CHN 6.44 0.00 8.71 21.47 15.78 5.91 0.00 8.10 22.13 21.65 18.78 
EAS 11.73 0.17 12.60 16.80 14.87 37.19 1.78 26.70 28.80 23.09 27.33 
U.S. 26.47 0.01 18.38 16.79 18.57 14.60 0.01 33.51 7.53 31.35 19.16 
ROW 55.37 99.82 60.30 44.94 50.78 42.29 98.21 31.69 41.54 23.91 34.74 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See note on Table 2. 
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Table 6: Impact on bilateral trade in Electronics (absolute values and % change) 
Part 1. Export Quantity (benchmark values, simulations values and percentage change) 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 50.48 86.53 130.08 267.09 114.87 71.64 47.99 123.43 357.94 10.70 20.26 61.97 92.94 64.26 46.50 97.47 306.77 515.00 
Simulation 68.43 114.61 176.92 359.96 124.01 64.20 42.05 111.01 341.26 11.14 17.51 53.78 82.43 71.29 42.79 87.68 283.70 485.46 
% change 35.58 32.45 36.00 34.77 7.95 -10.39 -12.38 -10.07 -4.66 4.13 -13.58 -13.22 -11.30 10.94 -7.97 -10.04 -7.52 -5.74 
Part 2. Regions’ shares in exports at FOB price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points 
Regions’ 
shares in 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 18.86 32.42 48.71 100 32.04 19.96 13.44 34.57 100 11.51 21.81 66.68 100 12.48 9.05 19.05 59.42 100 
Simulation 18.97 31.87 49.16 100 36.28 18.76 12.35 32.61 100 13.51 21.25 65.24 100 14.69 8.84 18.18 58.29 100 
Difference 0.11 -0.56 0.45 0 4.24 -1.20 -1.09 -1.96 0 2.00 -0.56 -1.44 0 2.21 -0.21 -0.87 -1.13 0 
Part 3. Regions’ shares in imports at CIF price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points  
Regions’ 
shares in 
Imports 
Imports of China by source Imports of East Asia by source Imports of the U.S. by source Imports of ROW by source 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 60.43 5.67 33.91 100 27.38 37.45 10.69 24.48 100 38.01 20.38 41.61 100 21.50 19.72 9.93 48.85 100 
Simulation 60.04 5.45 34.51 100 35.16 33.33 9.21 22.30 100 46.54 17.30 36.16 100 28.08 17.86 8.71 45.34 100 
Difference -0.39 -0.22 0.60 0 7.78 -4.12 -1.48 -2.18 0 8.53 -3.08 -5.45 0 6.59 -1.86 -1.22 -3.51 0 
Part 4. % change of bilateral import price (PM) and output price of Electronics (PY) 
Prices 
bilateral PM of China, from PY_ 
CHN 
bilateral PM of East Asia, from PY_ 
EAS 
bilateral PM of the U.S., from PY_ 
U.S. 
bilateral PM of ROW, from  PY_ 
ROW EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW 
% change -3.38 -2.98 -3.68 -7.93 -5.85 -1.31 -0.90 -1.61 -1.33 -5.90 -1.38 -1.67 -0.99 -6.00 -1.47 -1.07 -1.78 -1.80 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: The export quantity is in billions of dollars, it does not include any subsidy on the exports neither the transport margin. See note on Table 2. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis—effects on aggregate variables of changes in elasticities (% change from benchmark) 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See note on Table 2. 
 
A) Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production B) Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
Half Double Half Double 
CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS USA ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW 
Wage 0.18 -0.14 -0.04 -0.08 0.29 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07 0.75 -0.15 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 
Capital 
Rent 
-0.68 -0.17 0.02 0.02 -0.75 -0.18 0.03 0.03 -1.36 -0.19 0.03 0.02 -0.40 -0.14 0.02 0.03 
National 
income 
3.81 -0.16 0.02 -0.10 3.84 -0.17 0.02 -0.08 3.98 -0.18 0.03 -0.12 3.67 -0.14 0.01 -0.06 
GDP 0.95 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 1.05 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.91 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03 1.06 -0.10 -0.02 -0.02 
CPI 2.26 -0.07 0.01 0.10 1.77 -0.11 -0.03 0.08 2.98 -0.06 0.02 0.12 1.35 -0.10 -0.03 0.06 
Imports 2.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.10 2.73 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 2.43 -0.11 0.04 -0.15 2.21 0.00 0.05 -0.06 
Exports -0.56 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.81 -0.05 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.08 
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Table 8:  Sensitivity analysis—Effects on sectoral variables of changes (% change from benchmark) 
Effects on Sectoral 
Output 
A) Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production 
B) Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
Half Double Half Double 
CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. Row CHN EAS U.S. ROW 
Agriculture 0.48 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.78 0.07 0.07 0.05 
Mining -0.22 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.21 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.23 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.15 0.13 0.06 0.03 
Food &Beverage 1.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.82 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.57 -0.01 0.04 0.01 1.30 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
Textiles -2.90 1.32 1.10 0.94 -2.49 1.58 0.95 0.76 -3.21 1.62 1.21 1.00 -1.93 1.12 0.81 0.67 
Woods and Paper -1.20 0.28 0.19 0.22 -1.19 0.34 0.19 0.21 -1.64 0.36 0.23 0.26 -0.65 0.24 0.15 0.16 
Petroleum 0.67 0.08 -0.13 -0.06 0.50 0.15 -0.12 -0.05 0.45 0.16 -0.11 -0.04 0.75 0.06 -0.14 -0.07 
Chemicals -0.47 0.51 0.29 0.23 -0.95 0.73 0.31 0.23 -1.05 0.73 0.36 0.29 -0.21 0.46 0.23 0.17 
Metals -0.52 0.49 0.23 0.26 -0.59 0.66 0.21 0.25 -0.81 0.69 0.27 0.34 -0.27 0.41 0.17 0.17 
Motor Vehicles -0.80 0.49 0.21 0.01 -1.25 0.60 0.25 0.02 -1.46 0.62 0.29 0.03 -0.48 0.42 0.18 0.00 
Electronics 31.81 -3.28 -6.73 -4.40 38.23 -4.60 -7.16 -4.97 42.41 -4.68 -8.46 -5.67 26.13 -2.86 -5.31 -3.55 
Machinery -1.50 0.69 0.43 0.27 -1.61 0.87 0.40 0.22 -1.91 0.86 0.50 0.30 -1.05 0.61 0.33 0.18 
Other manufacturing -1.02 0.45 0.67 0.21 -0.83 0.47 0.62 0.17 -0.87 0.46 0.66 0.16 -0.86 0.41 0.60 0.20 
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.62 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.56 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.42 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.78 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Construction 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 
Services 1.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.91 0.06 -0.01 -0.00 0.72 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 1.16 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See note on Table 2. 
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Table 9: Sensitivity analysis—Trade Patterns for China 
  
A) Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production B) Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
Half Double Half Double 
Part 1. Export Quantity (benchmark values, simulations values and percentage change) 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from China to: Exports from China. to: Exports from China to: 
EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total 
Benchmark 50.48 86.53 130.08 267.09 50.48 86.53 130.08 267.09 50.48 86.53 130.08 267.09 50.48 86.53 130.08 267.09 
Simulation 69.58 115.78 179.20 364.56 66.34 112.43 172.70 351.47 72.70 121.15 188.05 381.90 64.23 108.11 165.94 338.27 
% change 37.85 33.80 37.76 36.49 31.43 29.93 32.76 31.59 44.02 40.02 44.56 42.99 27.24 24.94 27.56 26.65 
Part 2. Regions’ shares in exports at FOB price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points 
Regions’  
shares in 
exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from China to: Exports from China to: Exports from China to: 
EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total 
Benchmark 18.86 32.42 48.71 100 18.86 32.42 48.71 100 18.86 32.42 48.71 100 18.86 32.42 48.71 100 
Simulation 19.05 31.79 49.16 100 18.84 32.02 49.15 100 19.00 31.75 49.25 100 18.95 31.99 49.06 100 
Difference 0.19 -0.64 0.45 0 -0.03 -0.41 0.43 0 0.13 -0.67 0.54 0 0.09 -0.44 0.35 0 
Part 3. Regions’ shares in imports at CIF price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points 
Regions’ 
shares in 
improts 
Imports of China by source Imports of China by source Imports of China by source Imports of China by source 
EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total 
Benchmark 60.43 5.67 33.91 100 60.43 5.67 33.91 100 60.43 5.67 33.91 100 60.43 5.67 33.91 100 
Simulation 59.91 5.49 34.60 100 60.26 5.39 34.35 100 59.93 5.40 34.67 100 60.14 5.50 34.36 100 
Difference -0.51 -0.18 0.69 0.00 -0.16 -0.28 0.44 0.00 -0.50 -0.26 0.76 0.00 -0.29 -0.16 0.45 0.00 
4. % change of Real bilateral import price (PM) and real output price of Electronics (PY) 
Prices 
bilateral PM of China, from 
PY_CHN 
bilateral PM of China, from PY_CH
N 
bilateral PM of China, from PY_CH
N 
bilateral PM of China, from PY_CH
N EAS U.S. ROW EAS U.S. ROW EAS U.S. ROW EAS U.S. ROW 
% change -3.45 -3.16 -3.81 -8.22 -3.32 -2.74 -3.52 -7.47 -4.54 -4.06 -4.91 -9.96 -2.40 -2.10 -2.63 -6.02 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See note on Table 6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
The impact of FDI on the production networks between China 
and East Asia and the role of the U.S. and ROW as final 
markets
*
                                                          
*
 This paper has been presented at the conference "Las X Jornadas de Integración Económica", organized by 
the INTECO, on 28-29 November 2014 in Castellón de la Plana, Spain. It is available as a working paper on 
‘Munich Personal RePEc Archive’. It has also been sent to the journal ‘Global Economic Review: 
Perspectives on East Asian Economies and Industries’. The current status is under review. 
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Abstract 
 
This Chapter uses a 3 factor – 4 region – 15 sector computable general equilibrium model 
to study the impact of FDI accruing to China. We focus on the sectors of Electronics, 
Machinery and Textiles which account for 55.4% and 40% of Chinese overall exports and 
imports, respectively. Our data confirm the existing empirical knowledge on the production 
networks between China and East Asia, and the role that the U.S. and ROW play as final 
markets for Chinese exports. The magnitude of FDI inflows brings about proportional 
impacts on the increase in production and the fall in prices across the three sectors 
considered. However, the subsequent adjustment in bilateral trade differs. On the one hand, 
FDI leads to an increase of Chinese exports of Electronics and Machinery, crowding out 
production and exports in the rest of regions. On the other hand, the increase in FDI in 
Textiles still brings about increase in production which does not result in higher exports. 
The private consumption orientation of Textiles explains its contrasting trade pattern with 
respect to Electronics and Machinery. The fall in Chinese exports of Textiles in China 
underlies the increase on exports of Textiles across the rest of regions. However, world 
trade flows in Textiles are of smaller volume than the one in Electronics and Machinery. 
Therefore, the increase in Textiles of exports of the rest of regions does not compensate 
their big losses of exports in Machinery and Electronics. 
Key words: Computable general equilibrium; Intermediates; Multinationals; Triangular 
trade pattern; Production fragmentation. 
JEL classification: C68, F14, F15, F17, F21. 
83 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade, China has become increasingly 
integrated into the global production Chain. It is the largest recipient of FDI among all 
developing economies. Its share of the world inward FDI flows rose from 2.8% in 1991 to 
8.1% in 2011 (UNCTAD, various years). FDI inflows have substantially contributed to its 
capital formation process.  
East Asian economies, out of the geographic proximity and cultural links, provide 63% of 
cumulative FDI in China from 1985 to 2008 (Xing, 2010). As empirically tested by Fukao 
et al. (2003) with data from the electrical machinery industry, FDI plays a significant role 
in the rapid increase in vertical intra-industry trade in East Asia in recent years. 
The exports and imports between China and East Asia have nearly quadrupled from 2000 to 
2009 (OECD, various years). In fact, more than 70% of intraregional trade in East Asia is 
in parts and components that will be further assembled and exported to other region (ADB, 
2007). Trade of intermediate goods has largely driven the rapid growth of intra-Asian trade 
(Athukorala, 2008; Brooks and Hua, 2009). Dean et al. (2008), using two Chinese 
benchmark input-output tables and a detailed trade dataset which distinguishes processing 
trade from other forms of trade, shows strong evidence of an Asian network of intermediate 
supplies to China. Xing (2011) points out that most of the processing imports from East 
Asian economies are used as intermediate inputs for finished products targeting third 
markets and that China has primarily functioned as a big assembling factory for MNEs 
from East Asian economies. The U.S. is the largest single market for processing exports of 
China, based on panel data of 51 trading partners of China from 1993–2008.   
The emergence of China has intensified the production fragmentation within Asia (Gaulier 
et al., 2007a) and led to a triangular trade pattern among China (the export base), advanced 
Asian economies (component suppliers), the U.S. and Europe (markets) (Gaulier et al., 
2007b). Triangular trade through China is thought to form the principal mechanism of 
shock transmission in the Asia-Pacific region under the Crisis based on international Input-
Output analysis (Inomata and Uchida, 2009).  
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The close ties among Asian economies can be explained by the increased production 
fragmentation and the rise in intra-industry trade. Production fragmentation (Deardorff, 
1998) is a production process during which final product is split into two or more steps and 
each production step is undertaken in different locations across national boundaries. 
Various terms have been used to describe this phenomenon including production networks 
(Henderson et al., 2002; Ernst and Kim, 2002; Sturgeon, 2002), slicing the value chain 
(Krugman, 2005), vertical specialization (Hummels et al., 2001), international production 
sharing (Ng and Yeats, 1999) and outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). Xing and 
Detert (2010) give iphone as an example of the global production networks and highly 
specialized production processes in which China is mainly devoted to the assembly phase. 
Koopman et al. (2008) develop a general formula for computing domestic and foreign 
contents, and reveal that the share of foreign content in exports from Chinese electronic 
devices is particularly high (about 80%). Wang et al. (2009), using an international input-
output table, disclose the heterogeneity in the value chain across sectors: the Electronics 
industry has the most integrated global production network, with value shares becoming 
more evenly distributed among East Asian economies from 1990 to 2000. In contrast, 
Wearing apparel is more concentrated in Asian developing countries, with a shift in value-
added away from industrialized Asian countries and the rest of the world. Decomposing 
Chinese real export growth of over 500 percent since 1992, China’s export structure 
changed dramatically, with growing export shares in Electronics and Machinery and a 
decline in Agriculture and Apparel. These results match the evidence derived in this 
Chapter. The strongest overall export growth has been in Machinery, and within this broad 
category, particularly in Telecoms, Electrical Machinery (Amiti and Freund, 2008). 
Specialization allows the production to be distributed efficiently across the regions, based 
on their comparative advantage, like wage differentials. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
in advanced Asian economies specialize in production of intermediate goods and they 
further export intermediates to their affiliates in China for assembly and re-export 
(Haltmaier et al., 2007). Production networks centered on China have contributed 
significantly to growth in East Asia (Haddad, 2007).  
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In summary, the empirical literature points to the existence of different geographical roles 
in the production process worldwide. In particular, it suggests that the emergence of China 
has intensified integration in Asia through production networks. China works closely with 
other Asian economies through processing trade and its growth further reinforces the 
production networks within the region. China plays an important role as a production center 
and export base, relying heavily on the intermediates from more advanced Asian economies 
(Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore). FDI inflows in China, as well as, trade 
have largely induced the development of this production network, which in turn, has 
consequences for the trade patterns within and outside the region. The U.S. and ROW, by 
contrast, are the main final markets for East Asian exports.  
However, the above refereed literature, often lacks a general equilibrium perspective which 
would allow analyzing the micro and macroeconomic impact, as well as, the demand and 
supply sides of this phenomenon, in a manner consistent with trade patterns. Further, the 
CGE analyses that include FDI are rather scarce (Latorre, 2009). This is the gap that we 
aim to cover with this study of the impact of inward FDI in Electronics, Machinery and 
Textiles sectors of the Chinese economy. We focus on the effects on the Chinese trade 
pattern in these sectors which constitute 55.4% and 40% of its overall exports and imports, 
respectively. We pay particular attention to the role that the different geographical areas 
play in their associated production networks and in their final demand. In particular, we 
analyze the evolution of East Asian production networks and its final markets – the U.S. 
and the Rest of the World (ROW).   
This Chapter is organized as follows. The benchmark data and simulation scenario are 
discussed in section 2. Section 3 describes the model that we use. The results are analyzed 
both at the aggregate and sectoral level, as well as, from the demand and supply side in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data  
 
In our model there are three factors of production (capital, unskilled and skilled labor), four 
regions (China, East Asia1, the U.S. and ROW) and fifteen sectors. The Manufacturing 
sector is disaggregated into thirteen sub-sectors which are presented in Table 1. The other 
two sectors are Agriculture and Services. We model capital and skilled labor as sector-
specific, while unskilled labor is fully mobile within but not across regions. This 
assumption allows us to capture the medium term impact of the simulated FDI shock.  
Table 1 displays the whole structure of the Chinese economy. In the first two columns, it 
presents the names of the sectors and their correspondences with the original GTAP sectors. 
The percentage calculations of the table are based on the latest GTAP8 database 
(Narayanan et al., 2012), which is the one used in our model. The information refers to the 
year 2007.  
 
2.1. Comparing the three sectors’ importance in Chinese economy 
As shown in column 3 of Table 1, Electronics, Textiles and Machinery are the most export 
oriented sectors in the Chinese economy: 56% of Electronics production, 36% of Textiles 
and 25% of Machinery are exported. Combining their exports together, they account for 
55.5% of Chinese overall exports (column 5). According to their weights in the production 
and value added (GDP), Machinery is a bit larger, followed by Textiles and Electronics 
(columns 8 and 9). Moreover, MNEs are highly involved in the production of these sectors, 
since they contribute to more than 80% of Electronics output, 24% and 27% in Textiles and 
Machinery, respectively2. 
                                                          
1
 After the close observation of the FDI sources and main trade partners of China, we finally aggregate Japan 
and new industrialized economies (Republic of Korea, Taiwan China, Hong Kong China and Singapore) as 
East Asia. 
2
 中国工业经济统计年鉴 2008 (China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 2008). 
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On the other hand, the three sectors vary largely in the aspects mentioned below. As shown 
in column 4, imports play a much smaller role for domestic consumption of Textiles (6.8%), 
contrasting with 48.2% of Electronics and 23.8% Machinery. Column 7 shows that Textiles 
outweighs the sum of Electronics and Machinery in Private consumption. From the 
production side, Textiles is unskilled labor intensive compared with Electronics and 
Machinery (column 11). The Machinery sector is logically most capital intensive (column 
12).  
 
2.2. Comparing the role of the four regions in the world commodity market 
2.2.1 Role in Electronics 
Table 2 shows the different roles that the four regions play in Electronics. The left side of 
Part 1 of this table displays the demand structure (private consumption, government 
consumption, gross capital formation and intermediate inputs) of imported Electronics in 
each region. China and East Asia lie ahead of the U.S. and ROW with respect to their high 
weight of intermediate inputs in imports. The U.S., ROW and, to a lesser extent, East Asia 
distinguish themselves from China due to their high private consumption weight (20%, 14% 
and 11.5%, respectively) and high capital formation weight (26.2%, 31.5% and 22.2%, 
respectively). These tendencies underlie the geographical shares of world Electronics 
imports by demand (left side of Part 2 of Table 2). Note first, that the U.S. and ROW 
together account for 69.4% (18.8% + 50.5%) in world Electronics imports
3
. However, their 
weights are higher in world private consumption (81.6% = 28.3% + 53.3%), public 
consumption (99.8%) and capital formation (80.5% = 19.1% + 61.4%), exhibiting a smaller 
importance in intermediates (61.7% = 16.8% + 44.9%). East Asia and China together, play 
a more important role in intermediate imports of Electronics (38.3%= 21.5% + 16.8%) than 
in the rest of components of demand. Imports for private demand in China are the lowest in 
the world.  
                                                          
3
 Imports include the value of physical imports, transport margins and import tariffs.  
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Now let us analyze the roles played by the different regions in production. The right side of 
Part 1 reflects the allocation of domestic Electronics goods (production
4
). China, East Asia 
and ROW share similarities in devoting most of their output to exports and intermediates, 
while the U.S. devotes domestic goods intensively to capital formation and intermediates, 
with a rather small share going to private consumption. China exhibits the lowest of 
production devoted to private consumption across regions. The low private consumption 
weight in production and imports of the Chinese economy will soon become familiar to us. 
These patterns in production also have a reflection in world patterns. This can be seen in 
the right side of Part 2, which shows us the geographical shares of world production of 
Electronics, further specifying the shares in each demand component. Nearly half of world 
production of Electronics (46.4% = 18.9% + 27.5%) is concentrated in China and East Asia, 
which also contribute to 51% (22.1% + 28.8%) of world exports and employ 35.7% (23.9% 
+ 11.8%) of world domestic intermediates. Private consumption, public consumption and 
Investment in the U.S. and ROW contribute to 81.7%, 99.4% and 77.2 % of world levels, 
respectively. 
To sum up, in relative terms, imports and production of Electronics are more related to 
intermediates and exports in China and East Asia. Most of Chinese imports are of 
intermediates, mainly from East Asia due to the existing production networks
5
 between the 
two regions. They together serve as the biggest world production and export base for 
Electronics. By contrast, in the U.S. and ROW, Electronics seem more related to final 
domestic demand (i.e., private consumption, public consumption and investment). This 
underlies a triangular trade pattern among these regions that has been pointed out by some 
authors (Gaulier et al., 2007b; Inomata and Uchida, 2009), by which East-Asia provides 
intermediates to be further processed in China, while the latter exports them to the U.S. 
                                                          
4
 The right side of Tables 2, 3 and 4 display the demand allocation of “domestic goods”. Strictly speaking, 
domestic goods (commodities) in a social accounting matrix (SAM) table are the sum of production (output) 
and total export tariffs. Production takes up 96.1%, 98.4% and 99.2% of domestic goods in Textiles, 
Electronics, and Machinery, respectively. Therefore, we will use the terms production or output to refer to 
domestic commodities, hereafter. 
5
 In Part 1 of Table 2 we see that 84.5% of Chinese imports are of intermediates. We will see later (in Part 3 
of Table 7) that 60% of total Chinese imports of Electronics come from East Asia. It seems logical to assume 
that most of the Chinese imports are intermediates from East Asia. The literature review from the introduction 
also points clearly in this direction.  
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which is the main (single-country) final market. A pattern which is consistent with the 
literature review presented in the Introduction. 
2.2.2 Role in Machinery 
Table 3 shows the different roles that the four regions play in Machinery in a manner 
analogous to Table 2. Therefore, the left side of Part 1 of this table exhibits the allocation 
structure of imported goods in each region. The imports are largely used for intermediates 
but this tendency is more intense in China and East Asia. As befits the nature of the 
Machinery sector, an important part of imports is also devoted to investment. Imports for 
private consumption are more important in the U.S. and ROW. China exhibits the lowest 
import tendency for private consumption and the highest for intermediates. The left side of 
Part 2 shows the geographical shares of world Machinery imports by demand. Following 
the above explained patterns, East Asia and China account for 22% (11.4% + 10.6%) of 
world intermediate inputs and 18.5% (8.8% + 9.7%) of world capital formation but their 
shares are very low in world private consumption. The U.S. and ROW take up 90% (23.2% 
+ 66.4%) of world private consumption of imported goods. 
The right side of Part 1 displays how each region allocates their domestic output. Private 
consumption of Machinery goods is pretty low across regions, though more important in 
the U.S. and ROW. Production for investment is important across all regions. China 
devotes most of its production (49.3%) to intermediates, followed by exports (24.7%). By 
contrast, East Asia and ROW, devote nearly half of their outputs for exports, next in 
importance come intermediates. The resulting world output patterns are in the right side of 
Part 2, which displays the geographical share of each demand component of world 
Machinery production. Domestic intermediate input in China ranks high in the world. East 
Asia shows a large share in the world exports, though ROW, as a combination of rest of the 
regions has a much higher weight. China and East Asia provide 30.4% (16.5% + 13.9%) of 
world production of Machinery and 28.3% (10.5% + 17.8%) of world exports. The U.S. 
and ROW contribute 87.5% to the world private consumption, and around two thirds to the 
world capital formation and intermediates.  
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These patterns suggest that, in relative terms, China and East Asia play more the role of 
producers than the role of final markets, the latter being more important in the U.S. and 
ROW. To put it simpler, from a world perspective the U.S. and ROW play a more 
important role as final markets, while China and East Asia are more specialized in 
producing intermediate goods and export goods. Thus, we again find a similar pattern to the 
one described above for Electronics, especially in the flows of Chinese intermediate 
imports coming from East Asia (Part 1 of Table 3 and Part 3 of table 8 below). But because 
the Machinery production depends less on imported intermediates (and more on domestic 
ones) than Electronics does (Figure 6), the production networks between China and East 
Asia is not as strong as in Electronics. In addition, the higher importance of Machinery in 
investment across all geographical areas, makes its pattern somewhat different to the one of 
Electronics.  
2.2.3 Role in Textiles 
Table 4 repeats the structure of Tables 2 and 3, now including information for Textiles. The 
left side of Part 1 reveals how each region allocates the imported Textile goods. According 
to the nature of the product, Textiles is quite different from Electronics and Machinery in 
its small importance for capital formation. In China 86.3% of the imports are intermediates. 
As happened in Electronics and Machinery, China exhibits the smallest share of imports 
used for private consumption across all regions. However, it is important to note that in the 
case of textiles 13.7% of all Chinese imports go to private consumption, while in 
Electronics and Machinery the shares were much lower (4.5% and 2.7%, respectively). In 
East Asia, the U.S. and ROW, by contrast, more than 59% of imports are for private 
consumption, especially high is the case of the U.S., with 72.7% of imports going to private 
consumption. The rest of imports are mainly used for intermediates in these regions. The 
left side of Part 2 shows the geographical shares of world Textiles imports by demand type. 
In contrast with Electronics and Machinery, Textiles imports from China and East Asia 
account for a much reduced share (12.7% = 3.7%+9%) of world imports. These two regions 
hold similar weights (around 8% each) in world intermediates imports but differ in final 
demand due to China’s extremely low private consumption (less than 1%) and negligible 
investment in the world. Private households from the U.S. explain 22.7% of world imports. 
91 
 
ROW, being a region comprised of a mixture of many countries, shows a pretty high 
weight in the world imports of Textiles in every component of final and intermediate 
demand.  
The right side of Part 1 shows how each region allocates its domestic output. As happened 
in Machinery, Textiles output in China is largely used as intermediates (54.5%) and exports 
(34.4%), while again only small quantities are devoted to private consumption. With a high 
share of private demand (46.4%) and very low exports (7.5%), the U.S. pattern contrasts 
with the Chinese one. East Asia devotes a higher share than usual to private consumption 
(32.9%), but devotes more to intermediates (35.9%). ROW exhibits a rather similar pattern 
to the one of East Asia but the latter is slightly more specialized in intermediates’ 
production and ROW in production for private consumption. The right side of Part 2 
reflects the geographical shares of world production of Textiles. China takes up 10% of 
world production for private consumption, while the U.S. accounts for 17.6%. China again 
shows nearly zero world production devoted to investment, while the U.S. and ROW lie 
ahead, taking up 37.1% and 40.1%, respectively. In terms of the weights of exports and 
intermediates in the world, China exhibits the highest importance if we do not consider 
ROW. Looking at Part 2 as a whole, China takes up only 3.7% of world textile imports but 
27.9% of world output as shown in the last column of this part. This means that domestic 
demand for textiles in China is mostly satisfied by national production (93.2%)
6
. The 
imported goods mainly serve as intermediates in China in contrast to their use as private 
consumption in the rest of regions considered. 
Overall, China accounts for 28% of world output and 30.7% of world exports in Textiles. 
These percentages are higher than the ones exhibited in Electronics and Machinery. As in 
the two former sectors, China still relies on the imported intermediates coming mainly from 
East Asia (again we find evidence for production networks), while the U.S. and ROW are 
its main export markets (Part 3 of Table 9).  
 
                                                          
6
 This can also be seen in the column of “Import percentage of domestic consumption” in Table 1, with 6.8% 
in Textiles. 
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3. The model and simulation 
 
Mathiesen (1985) has expressed an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model in a compact 
and efficient way. Equilibrium is defined by three types of equations: market clearance (i.e., 
supply equals demand for all goods and factors), income balance (i.e., net income equals 
net expenditure) and zero profits (i.e., cost of inputs equals the value of outputs). 
Rutherford (2005) uses Mathiesen’s approach for the setup of the GTAPinGAMS model. It 
is the version in the software GAMS of the well-known GTAP model created by Hertel 
(1997). The GTAP model is able to reflect the world economy using input-output 
information, detailed foreign trade data, as well as, a rich set of data from national accounts 
of the different regions. All data are homogenized in the GTAP database (Narayanan et al., 
2012). Latorre (2010, Chapter 3) offers a very detailed explanation of the GAMS version, 
while a more succinct one is available in Latorre et al. (2009).   
In the mathematical form, Rutherford’s model is derived from maximizing a series of 
nonlinear equations using a dual approach (Dixit and Norman, 1980). Thus, microeconomic 
optimization reflects the adjustments to the shocks introduced in the model. The adjustment 
is also consistent with the macroeconomic framework embedded in the national accounts 
identities present in the model. The whole set of equations of the model appear in appendix 
1, which includes illustrative figures of the trees with their mathematical functional forms.  
The shock we run consists of a simultaneous increase in the capital stock of the Chinese 
sectors of Electronics, Machinery and Textiles. According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (various years), the accumulated FDI inflow in Electronics has more 
than doubled during the period of 2004—20117, the increase was of 50% in Machinery and 
of 30% in Textiles. Thus, we simulate a shock of the corresponding capital stock increases 
in the three sectors simultaneously, meanwhile the capital stock in rest sectors and regions 
                                                          
7
 The exact source is the ‘Investment in Fixed Assets in Urban Area By Sector, Jurisdiction of Management 
and Registration Status’ from National Bureau of China Statistics (various years). Due to the lack of detailed 
FDI stock data and FDI flows across sectors, we take the “fixed assets investment funded by foreign capitals” 
as a proxy for the foreign fixed assets. The latter takes into account the capital invested in China by all foreign 
firms across the world, including firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao.  
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remains fixed. We are interested in how the accumulation of FDI reshapes the trade 
divisions within East Asia, as well as, the impacts for the U.S. and ROW. 
After the shock, factor remunerations will be changed. Then the sectors will readjust their 
factor inputs, intermediate inputs, prices and production. This further has an impact on the 
regional income, domestic consumption and exports in the host country. Through the trade 
links and production networks, this shock is transmitted to rest of regions. As a result, they 
will change the production, imports, and exports. According to the above analyzed 
contrasting characteristics of these three sectors, we expect that their subsequent 
adjustments will differ.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Aggregate results 
As shown in Table 5, after the simulation China has benefited from the FDI inflows 
according to the rise of GDP (2.1%) and national income and welfare (9.6%)
8
, which are 
mainly related to the increase of the capital stock. The aggregate skilled wages are pushed 
up by 1.9%. By contrast, the unskilled wages and capital rents are pulled down in China, 
0.7% and 1.6%, respectively, resulting from the shrink of labor input and the large decrease 
of capital rent in the sectors receiving FDI. Note that these evolutions of factors 
remunerations are intuitive since one would expect a higher complementarity between 
foreign capital and skilled labor so that the entry of capital raises skilled labor remuneration. 
On the other hand, the fall in the wage of unskilled labor would match its smaller 
complementarity with capital. Further, capital accumulation pushes down its rent and this is 
also consistent with an increase in the competition climate brought about by the increase in 
FDI.  
                                                          
8
 Note that in GTAPinGAMS the increase in national income is equal to the increase in real private 
consumption, which, in turn, can be used as a proxy for the variation of the country’s welfare. For more 
details on this see Hertel (1997, chapter 1) or Latorre (2010, chapter 3). 
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The impact of this shock, initially involving only three sectors, is negligible in the rest of 
regions at this aggregate level. However, East Asia seems slightly more affected, 
experiencing a very small contraction. 
 
4.2. Sectoral output, prices and specific factor prices  
FDI inflows in China will result in a decrease of capital and skilled labor remunerations in 
the sectors directly involved in the shock, which, in turn, will push down their prices and 
increase their production (Table 6). The scope of the reductions in skilled labor and capital 
remunerations, as well as, the subsequent reductions in prices and output increases follow 
the relative importance of the amount of FDI inflows received. Recall that FDI inflows are 
much higher in Electronics (100%) than in Machinery (50%), followed by Textiles (30%). 
Besides, there is a substitution effect between new foreign capital and unskilled labor, so 
that capital crowds out unskilled labor in Textiles, Machinery and Electronics. Unskilled 
labor is then reallocated throughout the rest of sectors in the economy. Those sectors (not 
receiving FDI) that increase production do so because they employ more unskilled labor, 
since capital and skilled labor are sector specific. When more unskilled labor is 
accumulated, skilled labor and capital become relatively less abundant in the sectors (not 
receiving FDI) that produce more, thus increasing their productivity and remuneration.  
The outputs of Electronics and Machinery in the rest of regions are crowded out by their 
large expansion in China and the much cheaper Chinese prices. As a result, output has 
contracted noticeably for Electronics (ranging from 2.8% fall in East Asia to a 5.3% 
decrease in the U.S.) and moderately in Machinery (with around 1% to 1.5% reductions). 
By contrast, the output of Textiles remains unchanged since the shock on Textiles in China 
is weak to affect the rest of regions. Further, Textiles is much more oriented to private 
consumption than Electronics or Machinery. Therefore, following a drastic increase in 
national income and demand of 9.6% (Table 5), Textiles production will tend to satisfy this 
prevailing force. Returns on capital and skilled wages are affected negatively in Electronics 
and Machinery for East Asia, the U.S and ROW, while they go up in the case of Textiles. 
95 
 
This seems to be the result from the reduction (increase) of output in the first two sectors 
(Textiles) which carries a reduction of (an increase in) the demand for factor inputs. 
 
4.3. Comparing the evolution of trade patterns  
Tables 7, 8 and 9 offer a broad panorama about the main geographical partners in bilateral 
trade of each of the four regions in the sectors of Electronics, Machinery and Textiles, 
respectively. In particular, they present detailed information on bilateral exports (in Parts 1 
and 2), imports (Part 3), as well as, import prices (Part 4). This is a valuable complement to 
the Tables 2, 3 and 4, which provide information on each region’s production and imports 
putting them in relationship with macroeconomic variables from the demand side of the 
economy (private and public consumption, Investment, intermediates and exports.).  
4.3.1. Chinese exports  
Chinese exports of Electronics have increased by 29.4% after the FDI inflow (Part 1 of 
Table 7). This figure is very close to the expansion rate of output (30.2%). Given that 
Electronics is very export oriented, the increase in output will be primarily allocated to 
exports. The difference of exports between the simulation and the benchmark (labeled as 
“difference” in Part 1 of Table 7), shows that the U.S. and ROW absorb the majority of the 
increase in Chinese exports. Indeed they are the main markets of China (Part 2 of Table 7), 
accounting for 81% (32.4% + 48.7%) of its exports in the benchmark. Chinese exports 
crowd out other suppliers and gain substantially in the world export market as a big source 
of Electronics. As reflected in Part 3 of Table 7, it raises the share in its trade partners’ 
import structures and crowds out other suppliers’ shares. An important force contributing to 
the heavy increase in exports is the large fall in the price of Chinese Electronics goods (Part 
4 of Table 7).  
After the shock, the Machinery sector in China expands its overall exports by 19.6% (Part 1 
of Table 8), exceeding by far the expansion rate (9.6%) of output. Machinery allocates 
more output to exports than Electronics because the Machinery intermediates are 
extensively used across sectors rather than intensively for its own production as Electronics 
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does (Figure 6)
9
. As a consequence, the extra intermediate demand caused by the increase 
in its own output is smaller in Machinery than in Electronics, so more production is 
exported in Machinery. As happened in Electronics, the U.S. and ROW are the biggest 
markets of China (together they explain 79.6% (23.8% + 55.8%) of overall exports in the 
benchmark. That is why they absorb the majority of the increased exports of China after the 
shock (see the “difference” in absolute value terms). And again, similarly to the Electronics 
case, though less intensively, output and exports in the rest of regions are crowded out (Part 
3 of Table 8). Machinery goods also experience an important fall in prices in China, thus 
enhancing its competitiveness, even though the fall is less pronounced than in Electronics 
(Part 4 of Table 8).  
Textiles is distinct from the two other sectors because it is more private-consumption 
oriented. Because FDI inflows increase national income and demand in China, Textiles 
exports go down by 1.2% (Part 1, Table 9) despite of its production expansion (2.4%). Part 
3 also reflects the fall in the weight of China in the import structure of the rest of regions. 
On the other hand, the fall in the output price of Chinese Textiles is milder than in the case 
of Electronics or Machinery (Part 4, Table 9).  
Looking at the export structure of China across Part 2 of Tables 7, 8 and 9, we find that it 
basically remains stable, especially in Textiles. China expands the exports to all the 
partners relative to their weight in its exports, largely revealing the underlying collaboration 
and division in production and demand among them. In short, in Electronics and Machinery 
exports are enlarged while Textiles exports are reduced when the three sectors receive FDI 
flows and expand their output.  
4.3.2. Chinese imports  
We reorganize the same information on exports that appears Tables 7, 8, and 9 in a 
different manner with the purpose of making easier the analysis of imports. Table 10 
displays imports values in the benchmark and simulation, as well as, the percentage and 
value (in billions of dollars) change after the shock. This calculation is based on the 
                                                          
9
 Figure 6 presents the input-output structure of Machinery, Electronics and Textiles in China. 
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absolute numbers shown in Part 1 of Tables 7, 8 and 9. Therefore, the overall Electronics 
imports of China are the sum of the Electronics exports from the rest of regions to China.  
Chinese overall imports of Electronics increase by 9.9% (Table 10). As a destination of 
Electronics exports from other regions, China becomes more important, since its domestic 
consumption of Electronics —private consumption, capital formation and intermediates, 
relies heavily (48.2% in Table 1) on imports. In particular, the intermediate demand for 
Electronics imports has largely pushed up the overall import demand. Indeed, intermediates 
account for 84.5% of overall imports and they are very intensively used in Electronics 
production, which expands after the FDI inflow
10
. The biggest increase of Chinese imports 
comes from East Asia. This region, which is highly integrated with China in the Electronics 
production networks, provides 60% of Chinese overall imports (Part 3, Table 7). Thus, after 
the shock East Asia strengthens its export ties with China as an important intermediate 
supplier. One interesting phenomenon is that even though domestic output price is cheaper 
than imported ones (Part 4 of Table 7), China still enlarges the imports from other regions.  
Unlike the increase of Electronics imports, overall imports of Machinery shrink by 4% 
(Table 10). The overall import demand is mainly pulled down by the decreasing investment 
demand. As mentioned above, Machinery relies less on its own imported intermediates in 
its production process than Electronics does (Figure 6). Therefore, the increase in 
production in Machinery does result in a relatively smaller increase in demand for imported 
Machinery intermediates compared to the case of Electronics. Further, domestic output 
price is much cheaper than the imported one (Part 4 of Table 8) and all the sectors 
substitute imports with domestic production. East Asia suffers the biggest decrease of 
Chinese imports, in absolute value, because it supplies 59.2% for Chinese imports and 
serves as an import intermediate supplier. Nevertheless, comparing the import structure of 
China before and after shock, East Asian weight grows up a bit due to the overall reduction 
of Chinese Machinery imports.  
                                                          
10
 The intense use of imported intermediates in the production of Electronics, which is higher than their use in 
Machinery or Textiles, can be well related to the more important presence of multinationals in the former 
sector. This finding is common to other previous studies (e.g., Latorre, 2012; Latorre, 2013).  
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More surprisingly, China enlarges its overall Textiles imports by 4.4% from the rest of 
regions (Table 10). This is twice the increase experienced in the production of Textiles after 
the FDI shock. This means that the big increase of national income (9.6%) further pushes 
up private consumption of Textiles which, in turn, increases the demand for their imports. 
East Asia, as the biggest supplier (60.4%) of Chinese imports, experiences the biggest 
increase of exports to China, in absolute value; while ROW, due to a smaller benchmark 
value, undergoes the biggest percent increase of exports to China.  
Looking at the import structures of China (Part 3 of Table 7, 8, and 9), as happened with 
the Chinese export structure, they basically do not change. The main collaboration and 
division trends with the rest of regions remain. East Asia is the main provider of Chinese 
imports before and after the shock. It accounts for around 60-65% of them.  
4.3.3. Exports of the rest of regions 
Let us analyze the differences between the benchmark value of exports and their  
simulation values (Part 1, Tables 7, 8 and 9). If we want to compare the impact on exports 
across regions, we should compare the evolution of the difference between the simulation 
and benchmark values (not the percentages changes). In this sense, East Asia loses, 
decreasing its exports of Electronics (-11.6 billion of dollars, Part 1 of Table 7) and 
Machinery (-5.7 billion, Part 1 of Table 8). Even though East Asia exports a bit more of 
Textiles, the impact is very small, compared to the falls experienced in Machinery and 
Electronics. The U.S. loses more in its Electronics exports (-7.8 billion of dollars compared 
to -5.5 billion in Machinery). For both East Asia and the U.S. the most important cause of 
losses is the fall in exports to ROW. However, their losses are more important in 
Electronics than in Machinery because Chinese exports are more competitive in the former 
sector. In the case of ROW, by contrast, the largest falls in exports arise in the Machinery 
sector. ROW exports more volume of Machinery than Electronics and the associated losses 
are larger.  
Even though all the rest of regions, apart from China, increase their exports of Textiles, the 
values involved are so small that they do not make up for the above commented losses that 
all of them experience in Electronics or Machinery. 
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4.3.4. Imports of the rest of regions 
In Electronics, total imports of all regions increase after the shock, as reflected in Table 10. 
China and East Asia become more integrated since the Electronics imports from China 
(probably more of the intermediates) increase. Imports of the U.S. and ROW also increase. 
In the latter case, probably the exports are mainly final goods
11
.   
A similar pattern arises in Machinery. The U.S. and ROW increase their imports. East Asia 
also increases its imports although less intensively. Note that the U.S., both in Electronics 
and Machinery, increase its overall imports more intensively than ROW. This may come as 
a surprise given that ROW is by far a more important trade partner for both China and East 
Asia. It seems that even through China increases its exports more heavily to ROW (Part 1 
in Table 7 and 8, Table 10), there is a substitution effect in the interregional trade flows in 
the regions of ROW, so that previous imports among ROW regions are now displaced by 
Chinese exports, resulting in a reduction of  imports within the ROW region. Total trade 
within that region is reduced. These results would therefore support the triangular trade 
pattern between China, East Asia and the U.S. (Gaulier et al., 2007a; Inomata and Uchida, 
2009). 
Again the Textiles pattern differs drastically from the two previous ones. Due to the 
reduction of Chinese exports after the shock, the rest of regions increase their exports, we 
now also see that they reduce their imports. Only China, which experiences an important 
increase in private consumption, increases its imports demand for Textiles.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Part 3 of Tables 7, 8 and 9 reflect that for the U.S. and ROW, China is not the main provider of imports. 
Indeed, it is ROW the region that weights more as an import source both for the U.S. and ROW. This 
contrasts with the importance of the U.S. and ROW as markets for the Chinese economy (Part 2 of Tables 7, 8 
and 9). The two former regions account for around 80% of total Chinese exports in the 3 sectors considered.  
China is, however, more integrated with East Asia if we look at the data from the point of view of East Asia. 
China, indeed, exhibits a much higher weight in East Asian geographical structure than it does in the ones 
from the U.S. and ROW. 
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5. Sensitivity analysis  
 
To examine the robustness of the results, we change the values of two crucial elasticities in 
the model: 1) the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production (i.e. 
the Armington elasticity); 2) the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. We 
carry out an Unconditional Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (Harrison et al. 1993), in which 
we halve and double each one of the two types of elasticities in all of the fifteen sectors in 
China, while keeping the rest of elasticities at their benchmark value. Then we compare the 
results for the aggregate and sectoral variables which have been analyzed above.  
Table 11 shows the results of the aggregate variables, in a structure analogous to that of 
Table 5. The columns of “double” and “half” list the results obtained when each of the 
elasticities are multiplied or divided by two, respectively. There are not significant 
differences in the aggregate variables compared to our previous results. Slightly bigger 
differences occur in the percent change of capital rent and skilled wage in China in the case 
of changing the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. A bigger elasticity of 
substitution among factors conveys a more flexible production technology. This implies 
that the adjustments in factors remunerations are milder (more intense) with higher (lower) 
elasticities of substitution among factors. In general, the more elastic the substitution, the 
bigger the increase of GDP, since factors and goods can be more easily reallocated across 
sectors which helps the economy to become more efficient.  
Table 12 shows us the Chinese trade patterns in the simulation previously run and those 
obtained with the new values of the elasticities. We omit the trade patterns for the rest of 
regions, due to the very small changes found after the sensitivity test. The overall trade 
pattern in China remains unchanged. East Asia is still the main supplier of Chinese imports 
while the U.S. and ROW are the biggest markets for Chinese exports. The different values 
of the elasticities have a small impact on Chinese exports. The less elastic the substitution 
elasticities, the higher the Chinese exports. In the case of lower elasticity of substitution 
among factors of production, the less flexible technology results in a larger amount of 
unskilled labor being employed in the sectors receiving the FDI shock. As a consequence, 
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their production will be larger and their prices lower. Therefore, Chinese exports become 
more competitive and expand more in the world market. In the case of lower substitution 
between imported and domestic goods, there is higher rigidity in the domestic demand for 
final consumption even though the domestic price is relatively cheaper. Thus, more 
domestic goods will be exported after the output expansion.  
All in all, we find that our results are robust, since the causation chain found remains 
unchanged.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter analyzes how FDI accruing to Electronics, Machinery and Textiles in China 
affects the bilateral trade patterns among China itself, East Asia, the U.S. and ROW. We 
use a (3-factor 4-region 15-sector) CGE model that allows us to capture the demand and 
production side, as well as, the production networks and final demand roles of the different 
geographical areas. 
Though we focus only on Electronics, Machinery and Textiles, we are, in fact, analyzing 
55.4% and 40% of overall Chinese exports and imports, respectively, and 13.6% of Chinese 
GDP. We find that China has benefited from the FDI inflow according to the rise of GDP 
(2.1%) and welfare (9.6%, proxied by national income). The scope of the reductions in 
skilled labor and capital remunerations, as well as, the subsequent reductions in prices and 
output increases follow the magnitude of FDI inflows each sector has received. Because 
Electronics is the main recipient of FDI inflows it experiences the most intense fall in 
prices and increase in production. Next in importance come the adjustments in prices and 
production in Machinery. Finally, Textiles exhibits the most moderate price decreases and 
output expansion. 
There are 3 characteristics of Chinese trade that stand out from the data. We summarize 
them as follows: 
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1. Around 80% of Chinese exports are directed to the U.S. and ROW. ROW is the 
more important destination accounting for 50% to 60% of total Chinese exports 
while the U.S. weights around 25% to 30%. Thus, only around 20% of Chinese 
exports go to East Asia. Note that imports of East Asia from China are mostly 
intermediates with a rather low weight of private consumption, particularly in 
Machinery goods. This implies that most of the Chinese exports of final goods are 
directed to the U.S. and ROW. Therefore, the latter constitute the main final 
markets of Chinese exports. 
 
2. Chinese imports are mostly intermediates ranging from 68% (in Machinery) to 
around 85% (in Electronics and Textiles). One of the main challenges of trade 
statistics nowadays is to combine the dimension of type of good traded and country 
of origin. While that information might exist for some isolated countries, they are 
rather uncommon and not available across groups of countries. The information 
from the GTAP database used in this Chapter, however, provides us with important 
clues in this regard, as will be seen in the third characteristic.  
 
3. Around 60% of total Chinese imports come from East Asia. As noted above, our 
data (to the best of our knowledge, no existing data) do not allow knowing 
simultaneously the country of origin (whether it is East Asia or not) and the type of 
good from that country of origin (whether it is an intermediate or a final good). But 
with 80% intermediate imports and 60% being provided by East Asia, it seems 
reasonable to assume that East Asia is heavily integrated in the Chinese production 
networks, providing an important amount of intermediates. 
The Chinese trade patterns brought about by more FDI and the trade patterns in the rest of 
regions differ in the three sectors considered. Figure 7 shows a diagram summarizing our 
main findings. Let us point out here the essence behind them. 
After FDI inflows, Chinese exports of Electronics and Machinery increase, while exports of 
Textiles go down. The U.S. and ROW absorb the majority of the increase in Chinese 
exports. The contrasting pattern in Textiles seems related to its importance in Chinese 
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private consumption. With higher FDI inflows, household income and national demand in 
China increase. More Textiles will be demanded domestically and less will be exported. 
On the other hand, after the increase in exports of Electronics and Machinery, production 
and exports from the rest of regions are crowded out. The important fall in export prices 
makes Chinese exports very competitive. However, note that China will import more 
Electronics and less Machinery from the rest of regions after the shock. This contrast arises 
from the fact that Electronics imports are heavily used for Electronics production which 
goes up after FDI inflows. In Machinery, though, imported intermediates are used less 
intensively in production which also expands after the FDI inflows. Finally, the fall in 
Chinese exports of Textiles results in an increase of Textiles exports across the rest of 
regions. However, exports of Textiles are smaller in world trade flows than the ones from 
Machinery and Electronics. Therefore, the increase in Textiles exports falls short to 
compensate the reduction in exports of Machinery and Electronics that the rest of regions 
experience.  
This analysis confirms and expands the main outcomes from the empirical literature 
summarized in the introduction using a general equilibrium perspective. There are tight 
production networks between China and East Asia, while the U.S. and ROW are their main 
final markets. Taking those geographical patterns into account together with the particular 
production technologies (e.g., the intensity of the use of imported intermediate in 
production) and the demand orientation (e.g., the private consumption orientation of 
Textiles) helps to trace the impact of FDI on trade. 
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Appendix 
Apart from some new parameters, we basically keep the GTAP’s notation. Sets i and j define sectors and 
commodities; r and s refer to regions; and f denotes factors of production, i.e., unskilled labor, skilled labor 
and capital. The new parameters are h (host economy), which belongs to r; l (sectors receiving the FDI shock), 
which is a subset of i; and FDI(f, j, r), which is the new overall capital stock index. 
Model equations: 
Production 
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Endogenous variables: 
Production 
ijrdifm  Total demand for the imported intermediate i in sector j in region r  
ijrddfm  Total demand for domestic purchases of intermediate i in sector j in region r  
firdfm  Total demand for primary factor f in sector i in region r 
KrNEWevom   Value of the capital stock after FDI inflows in region r 
KrFT   One plus the percentage change in the capital stock in region r 
  Tax-inclusive price of factor f used in sector j in region r 
L
rp   Tax-inclusive wage in region r 
  Tax-inclusive price of capital in sector j in region r 
d
ijrp   Tax-inclusive price of the domestically purchased intermediate i to be used in sector j in 
region r 
m
ijrp   Tax-inclusive price of the imported intermediate i to be used in sector j in region r 
K
jrp  Price of capital in sector j in region r   
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i
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K
rp  Price of capital, excluding taxes or subsidies, in region r 
Y
jrp   Price of good j before taxes 
jrY    One plus the percentage change in total gross output in sector j in region r 
 
Public consumption 
irddgm  Demand for domestic purchases of good i for public consumption in region r 
irdigm   Demand for imports of good i for public consumption in region r 
rG   One plus the percentage change in national public consumption in region r 
dg
irp   Tax-inclusive price of public consumption of the domestic good i in region r  
mg
irp   Tax-inclusive price of public consumption of the imported good i in region r  
g
irp   Tax-inclusive price of good i for public consumption in region r 
G
rp   Aggregate price of public consumption in region r 
 
Private consumption  
irddpm  Demand for domestic good i for private consumption in region r 
irdipm  Demand for imports of good i for private consumption in region r 
 Budget available for private consumption of the representative household in region r 
rC    One plus the percentage change in national private consumption in region r 
dc
irp   Tax-inclusive price of private consumption of domestic good i in region r   
mc
irp   Tax-inclusive price of private consumption of imported good i in region r  
c
irp   Tax-inclusive price of good i for private consumption in region r 
C
rp   Aggregate price of private consumption in region r 
 
Imports and transport services  
rraInc
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isrdxmd   Demand for physical units of imports of good i in region r coming from region s  
jisrdtwr  Demand for the transport service j needed for transport of good i from region s to region r 
irdst    Production of good i used as a transport service in region r 
irM   One plus the percentage increase in imports of good i in region r 
 Bilateral import price of region r for good i from s, including transport-service cost 
M
irp   Price of imports of good i, including transport services, in region r 
m
isryp   Import price in region r of physical good i coming from region s, including export subsidy 
of region s, import tariff of region r 
m
jisrtp   Price of the transport service j for moving good i from s to r, including import tariffs of 
region r 
T
ip   Price of the transportation service i 
jYT  One plus the percentage change in the world production of the international transport service 
j 
 
Taxes and subsidies 
y
rrevt   Total payments of subsidies on output in region r  
f
rrevt   Total income from taxes on primary factors in region r 
fd
rrevt   Total income from taxes on domestic intermediates in region r 
fm
rrevt   Total income from taxes on imported intermediates in region r 
pd
rrevt  Total income from taxes on private consumption of domestic goods in region r 
pm
rrevt   Total income from taxes on private consumption of imported goods in region r 
gd
rrevt  Total income from taxes on public consumption of domestic goods in region r 
gm
rrevt   Total income from taxes on public consumption of imported goods in region r 
xs
rrevt   Total payments of subsidies on exports in region r 
ms
rrevt   Total income from tariffs on imports in region r 
isrpm
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Exogenous variables and parameters: 
Production 
frevom   Total endowment of factor f in region r 
  Share of the factor f in value in sector j in region r           
  Share of the domestic intermediate input i in its total use in sector j in region r 
 Share of the intermediate input i (domestic plus imported) in gross production in sector j             
    Share of value added in gross production in sector j in region r           
  Share of specific factor sf (skilled labor; capital) employed in sector j in region r 
 Benchmark value of the domestic purchases of intermediate i, used in sector j in region r  
firvfm  Benchmark value of the demand for the primary factor f in sector j in region r 
ijrvifm  Benchmark value of the demand for the imported intermediate i to be used in sector j in 
region r  
irvom   Benchmark value of the sectoral gross production in region r 
Demand 
irI   Fixed investment expenditure in sector i in region r 
Public consumption 
dg
ir  Share of the domestic good i in public consumption in region r 
g
ir   Share of the good i in total public consumption in region r 
irvdgm  Benchmark value of the domestic purchases of good i for public consumption in region r 
irvigm   Benchmark value of the imports of good i for public consumption in region r 
rmgv  Benchmark value of total (imported plus domestic) national public consumption in region r 
Private consumption 
dc
ir  Share of the domestic good i in private consumption in region r 
p
ir   Share of the good i in total private consumption in region r 
fjr
dijr
ijr
f
jr
sf
jr
ijrvdfm
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irvdpm  Benchmark value of the domestic purchases of good i for private consumption in region r  
irvipm  Benchmark value of the imports of good i for private consumption in region r 
rvpm  Benchmark value of total national private consumption in region r 
Foreign sector 
rvb  Current account balance of region r in the benchmark  
irvim   Benchmark physical volume of imports in sector i in region r  
  Bilateral import value share (the weight of region s in total imported good i of region r) 
Transport services  
ym
isr    Share of the amount of physical units of goods (excluding transport services) in imports of 
region r 
  Share of the amount of transport service j used in imports of good i in region r  
t
ir  Share of the part of production of good i devoted to transport services in region r in the part 
of world production of good i devoted to transport services  
isrvxmd   Benchmark amount of physical units of imports of the good i in region r coming from 
region s  
jisrvtwr  Benchmark amount of the transport service j needed for transport of good i from region s to 
region r  
jrvst   Benchmark production of good j used as a transport service in region r  
jvtw   Benchmark aggregate of international transport services in sector j in the world 
Taxes   
fd
ijrt   Tax rate of the domestic intermediates from sector i to be used in sector j in region r  
fm
ijrt   Tax rate of the imported intermediates from sector i to be used in sector j in region r  
f
jrt   Tax rate on the factor f used in sector j in region r 
y
jrt   Output subsidy rate in sector j in region r 
gd
irt   Tax rate on the domestic public good i purchased domestically in region r 
gm
irt          Tax rate on the imported public good i in region r 
m
isr
tm
jisr
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pd
irt   Tax rate on the domestic private good i purchased domestically in region r  
pm
irt   Tax rate on the imported private good i in region r  
ms
isrt   Import tariff rate on the good i exported from s to r 
xs
isrt   Export subsidy rate on the good i exported from s to r 
Elasticities 
A
i   Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production in sector i (Armington 
elasticity) 
 Intra-import elasticity of substitution 
  Elasticity of substitution between labor and specific factors in sector i 
sf   Elasticity of transformation of specific factors across sectors 
Simulation parameters  
KjrFDI  One plus the percentage increase in the total stock of capital of sector j in region r 
 
Figures 
1. Production 
As shown in Figure 1, on the top layer, the production is carried out under a Leontief technology combining a 
composite of intermediate goods and a composite of primary factors. On the second layer, the composite of 
intermediate inputs is a Leontief combination of n inputs. In turn, each of these n inputs are a constant 
elasticity substitution (CES) bundle of domestic and import intermediates. The composite of primary factors  
is also a CES nesting of sluggish capital, sluggish skilled labor and mobile unskilled labor.  
Figure 1 Production function: ( , , )ir irY F ddfm difm dfm   
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2. Imports  
As can be seen at the top of Figure 2, imports of a particular good i are the nested CES aggregation of bundles 
of imported goods and associated transportation services coming from different regions. At the second layer, 
transportation services and imports for each regions are combined proportionally (i.e., using a Leontief 
technology). Trade flows embody export subsidies, paid by government in the exporting region, and import 
tariffs, collected by government in the importing region. 
Figure 2 Armington aggregation of imports: ( , )
ir ir
A dxmd dtwr M  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                
 
 
3. International transportation services 
International transportation is a Cobb-Douglas combination of transport services across the different regions 
in the world, as shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3: International Transportation Services:   
 
 
 
 
 
4. Private consumption  
Private consumption is a Cobb-Douglas function of i (i =1, …, n) composite goods . Each of those goods are, 
in turn, Armington composites of its domestic and imported varieties. As shown in figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: private consumption  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Public consumption  
Public consumption is a Leontief combination of i (i =1, …, n) composite goods, where each composite is an  
Armington composites of its domestic and imported varieties.  
Figure 5: Public consumption   
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Table 1: Definition of sectors and their relative importance in China 
Sector/Goods Definition  
Exports % 
in domestic 
production 
Imports % in 
domestic 
consumption 
Commodity % in: Production side (%) 
Trade 
Domestic 
Demand % of 
Production  
V.A. % 
in GDP 
% of 
skilled 
Labor 
% of 
unskilled 
Labor 
% of 
Capital 
Exports Imports 
Private 
consumption 
Agriculture 
01~14 Agriculture, hunting and 
fishing 
1.9 5.1 0.9 3.0 12.5 6.4 11.0 0.5 19.7 10.3 
Mining 15~18 Mining and quarrying 2.4 34.9 0.5 15.0 0.2 2.9 4.0 1.5 3.4 5.7 
Food and 
Beverage 
19~26 Food, beverages and 
tobacco 
5.2 4.7 2.0 1.9 17.6 4.9 3.2 1.8 3.1 2.6 
Textiles 
27~29 Textiles, wearing apparel, 
leather, footwear 
35.8 6.8 16.7 2.7 6.0 6.1 4.1 2.3 4.8 2.8 
Woods and Paper 
30~31 wood without furniture, 
paper, publishing, media 
17.1 7.4 4.1 2.0 0.6 3.1 2.1 1.3 2.7 2.0 
Petroleum 32 Petroleum 7.9 9.5 1.7 2.4 2.6 2.8 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Chemicals 
33 Chemicals, rubber and plastic 
products 
12.9 22.8 7.2 12.8 2.5 7.2 5.7 2.7 4.3 4.8 
Metals 
34~37 Mineral products nec, 
Ferrous metals, metals nec, metal 
products 
9.9 7.3 9.5 8.3 0.6 12.5 7.4 4.5 8.2 8.2 
Motor Vehicles 
38~39 Motor vehicles and parts, 
transport equipment nec 
11.4 13.4 3.2 4.1 2.4 3.7 2.5 1.5 2.7 1.6 
Electronics 40 Electronic equipment 56.3 48.2 21.8 19.4 1.9 5.0 3.0 1.7 2.7 2.5 
Machinery 
41 Machinery and equipment 
nec 
24.9 23.8 16.9 17.9 2.1 8.9 6.5 3.9 6.1 5.3 
Other 
Manufacturing 
42 Manufactures nec 39.0 3.9 6.0 0.4 1.4 2.0 2.5 0.6 1.5 4.0 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water 
43~45 Electricity; Gas 
manufacture and distribution; 
Water 
0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 3.3 2.8 3.4 3.5 2.1 4.5 
Construction 46 Construction 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.9 8.2 6.3 5.2 9.2 4.4 
Services 47~57 Services 4.9 4.4 8.9 9.8 45.6 23.5 37.9 68.7 29.0 40.7 
Total 13.0 11.5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012).
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Table 2: Benchmark allocation of production and imports of Electronics (% shares)  
Part 1 
Total Electronics’ imports of each region by demand type (%) Demand use of production in Electronics in each region (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment  
Inter-
mediate 
Total 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption  
Investment  
Inter-
mediate 
Export Total 
CHN 4.5 0.0 11.0 84.5 100.0 2.3 0.0 5.6 36.7 55.4 100.0 
EAS 11.5 0.0 22.2 66.3 100.0 10.2 0.0 13.3 26.9 49.6 100.0 
U.S. 20.0 0.0 26.2 53.7 100.0 5.5 0.0 23.8 52.2 18.5 100.0 
ROW 14.0 0.9 31.5 53.6 100.0 8.1 0.3 12.2 22.3 57.1 100.0 
Part 2 
Geographical share of world Electronics imports by demand type (%) Geographical share of world production of Electronics by demand type (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption  
Investment  
Inter-
mediate 
World 
Imports 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption  
Investment  
Inter-
mediate 
Export 
World 
output 
CHN 5.2 0.0 6.5 21.5 15.3 6.1 0.0 7.8 23.9 22.1 18.9 
EAS 13.2 0.2 13.1 16.8 15.3 39.6 1.8 27.1 11.8 28.8 27.5 
U.S. 28.3 0.0 19.1 16.8 18.8 15.0 0.0 34.0 20.6 7.5 19.2 
ROW 53.3 99.8 61.4 44.9 50.6 39.3 98.2 31.0 43.7 41.5 34.4 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
Note: CHN represents China; EAS stands for East Asia; ROW is Rest of the world. Due to very low public consumption, we ignore the analysis for it. 
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Table 3: Benchmark allocation of production and imports of Machinery (% shares) 
Part 1 
Total Machinery’ imports of each region by demand type (%) Demand use of production in Machinery in each region (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
Total 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
Export Total 
CHN 2.7 0.0 29.3 68.0 100.0 2.2 0.0 23.9 49.3 24.7 100.0 
EAS 7.4 0.0 35.1 57.5 100.0 2.1 0.0 19.6 28.8 49.5 100.0 
U.S. 15.0 0.0 40.3 44.8 100.0 9.3 0.0 31.8 36.5 22.4 100.0 
ROW 9.0 0.4 39.1 51.5 100.0 5.5 0.1 18.6 29.4 46.4 100.0 
Part 2 
Geographical share of world Machinery imports by demand type (%) Geographical share of world production of Machinery by demand type (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
World 
Imports 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
Export 
World 
output 
CHN 2.6 0.0 6.8 11.4 8.8 6.9 0.0 17.8 23.9 10.5 16.5 
EAS 7.9 0.0 8.9 10.6 9.7 5.5 0.7 12.3 11.8 17.8 13.9 
U.S. 23.2 0.0 14.9 12.0 14.1 34.3 0.0 27.6 20.6 11.1 19.2 
ROW 66.4 100.0 69.3 66.0 67.4 53.2 99.3 42.4 43.7 60.6 50.4 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
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Table 4: Benchmark allocation of production and imports of Textiles (% shares) 
Part 1 
Total Textiles’ imports of each region by demand type (%) Demand use of production in Textiles in each region (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
Total 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
Export Total 
CHN 13.7 0.0 0.0 86.3 100.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 54.5 34.4 100.0 
EAS 60.2 0.0 0.9 38.9 100.0 32.9 0.0 1.6 35.9 29.7 100.0 
U.S. 72.7 0.0 0.5 26.8 100.0 46.4 0.0 1.6 44.5 7.5 100.0 
ROW 59.0 0.2 0.3 40.5 100.0 36.0 0.2 0.4 28.4 35.0 100.0 
Part 2 
Geographical share of world Textiles imports by demand type (%) Geographical share of world production of Textiles by demand type (%) 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
World 
Imports 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Investment 
Demand 
Inter-
mediate 
Export 
World 
output 
CHN 0.8 0.0 0.0 8.1 3.7 10.4 0.0 0.0 40.0 30.7 27.9 
EAS 9.0 0.0 21.2 8.9 9.0 7.9 0.6 22.8 6.8 6.9 7.2 
U.S. 22.7 0.0 25.9 12.7 18.7 17.6 0.0 37.1 13.3 2.7 11.4 
ROW 67.5 100.0 53.0 70.3 68.6 64.1 99.4 40.1 39.8 59.7 53.4 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
 
Table 5: Impact on aggregate variables (% change) 
Macro indices China East Asia U.S. Rest of the World 
Wage of skilled workers 1.89  -0.43  -0.17  -0.29  
Wage of unskilled workers -0.72  -0.43  -0.13  -0.28  
Capital rent -1.65  -0.41  0.04  0.13  
National income (Welfare) 9.62  -0.45  -0.00  -0.19  
Capital stock 6.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GDP 2.07  -0.34  -0.08  -0.06  
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012).
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Table 6: Impact on output, prices and specific factors’ remunerations (% change) 
% change 
Output Price  Sectoral skilled labor price Sectoral capital remuneration 
CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS U.S. ROW CHN EAS USA ROW CHN EAS USA ROW 
Agriculture 0.8  0.2  0.2  0.2  3.7  0.7  0.9  0.4  17.5  1.6  2.6  1.3  17.5  1.6  2.6  1.3  
Mining 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  -2.5  2.1  1.8  1.8  1.5  5.3  3.7  3.4  1.5  5.3  3.7  3.4  
Food and Beverage 1.8  -0.1  0.0  0.1  2.3  0.3  0.2  0.1  10.3  -0.7  -0.0  0.1  10.3  -0.7  -0.0  0.1  
Textiles 2.4  0.5  0.2  0.1  -4.3  0.2  0.1  -0.0  -7.2  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -24.7  0.0  0.0  -0.1  
Woods & Paper -2.9  0.6  0.4  0.5  -0.9  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.8  
Petroleum 1.7  0.1  -0.4  -0.2  -2.1  1.7  1.6  1.4  8.6  -0.3  -1.2  -1.0  8.6  -0.3  -1.2  -1.0  
Chemicals -1.9  0.9  0.4  0.5  -1.5  0.9  0.5  0.4  1.4  1.6  1.0  1.0  1.4  1.6  1.0  1.0  
Metals 0.1  1.0  0.6  0.6  -1.0  0.8  0.2  0.4  5.5  1.4  0.8  1.0  5.5  1.4  0.8  1.0  
Motor Vehicles -1.3  0.6  0.3  0.2  -2.2  0.1  -0.0  -0.1  3.3  0.5  0.4  0.2  3.3  0.5  0.4  0.2  
Electronics 30.2  -2.8  -5.3  -3.6  -10.5  -2.0  -2.0  -2.6  -14.6  -6.9  -11.2  -8.3  -50.7  -6.9  -11.2  -8.3  
Machinery 9.6  -1.4  -1.0  -1.5  -7.8  -0.8  -0.7  -0.8  -16.0  -3.3  -2.0  -2.9  -39.1  -3.3  -2.0  -2.9  
Other manufacturing -2.0  0.9  1.2  0.6  -2.6  0.4  0.3  0.2  -0.8  0.9  1.4  0.8  -0.8  0.9  1.4  0.8  
Electricity, Gas and Water 2.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  13.1  -0.9  -0.2  -0.2  13.1  -0.9  -0.2  -0.2  
Construction 0.1  0.0  -0.0  0.0  -0.7  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  4.8  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  4.8  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  
Services 2.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  10.4  -0.3  -0.0  -0.0  10.4  -0.3  -0.0  -0.0  
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
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Table 7: Impact on bilateral trade in Electronics (absolute values and % change) 
Part 1. Export Quantity (benchmark values, simulations values, difference between simulation and benchmark values and % change) 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 50.5 86.5 130.1 267.1 114.9 71.6 48.0 123.4 357.9 10.7 20.3 62.0 92.9 64.3 46.5 97.5 306.8 515.0 
Simulation 65.8 110.3 169.6 345.6 125.3 65.4 42.9 112.7 346.3 11.4 18.1 55.5 85.1 71.8 43.5 89.1 287.4 491.9 
Difference 15.3 23.7 39.5 78.5 10.4 -6.2 -5.1 -10.7 -11.6 0.7 -2.1 -6.4 -7.8 7.6 -3.0 -8.4 -19.3 -23.1 
% change 30.3 27.4 30.3 29.4 9.1 -8.7 -10.7 -8.7 -3.2 7.0 -10.5 -10.4 -8.4 11.8 -6.5 -8.6 -6.3 -4.5 
Part 2. Regions’ shares in exports at FOB price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points 
Regions’ 
shares in 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 18.9 32.4 48.7 100.0 32.0 20.0 13.4 34.6 100.0 11.5 21.8 66.7 100.0 12.5 9.1 19.1 59.4 100.0 
Simulation 19.0 31.9 49.1 100.0 36.1 18.8 12.4 32.6 100.0 13.4 21.3 65.2 100.0 14.6 8.9 18.2 58.3 100.0 
Difference 0.1 -0.5 0.4 0.0 4.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.9 0.0 1.9 -0.5 -1.4 0.0 2.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.1 0.0 
Part 3. Regions’ shares in imports at CIF price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points 
Regions’ 
shares in 
Imports 
Imports of China by source Imports of East Asia by source Imports of the U.S. by source Imports of ROW by source 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 60.4 5.7 33.9 100.0 27.4 37.5 10.7 24.5 100.0 38.0 20.4 41.6 100.0 21.5 19.7 9.9 48.8 100.0 
Simulation 60.0 5.5 34.4 100.0 34.0 33.9 9.5 22.6 100.0 45.3 17.7 37.0 100.0 27.0 18.1 9.0 45.9 100.0 
Difference -0.4 -0.1 0.5 0.0 6.6 -3.6 -1.2 -1.9 -0.0 7.3 -2.6 -4.7 0.0 5.6 -1.6 -1.0 -3.0 0.0 
Part 4. % change of bilateral import price (PM) and output price of Electronics (PY) 
Prices 
bilateral PM of China, from PY_ bilateral PM of East Asia, from PY_ bilateral PM of U.S., from PY_ bilateral PM of ROW, from PY_ 
EAS U.S. ROW CHN CHN EAS U.S. ROW EAS CHN EAS ROW U.S. CHN EAS U.S. ROW ROW 
% change -5.9 -6.0 -6.1 -10.5 -6.7 -2.0 -2.1 -2.3 -2.0 -6.5 -1.8 -2.1 -2.0 -6.9 -2.3 -2.4 -2.5 -2.6 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
Note: The export quantity is in billions of dollars. It does not include any subsidy on the exports neither the transport margin.  
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Table 8: Impact on bilateral trade in Machinery (absolute values and % change) 
Part 1. Export Quantity (benchmark values, simulations values, difference between simulation and benchmark values and % change) 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 42.2  49.0  115.0  206.2  101.6  52.6  59.9  146.6  360.7  15.8  35.8  173.5  225.0  53.8  64.1  178.0  931.0  1227.0  
Simulation 49.4  58.5  138.7  246.5  98.3  50.9  59.2  146.6  355.0  15.0  34.1  170.5  219.5  51.0  60.8  172.7  912.8  1197.3  
Difference 7.2 9.5 23.7 40.3 -3.3 -1.7 -0.6 -0.1 -5.7 -0.8 -1.7 -3.0 -5.5 -2.8 -3.3 -5.4 -18.2 -29.7 
% change 17.0  19.4  20.6  19.6  -3.3  -3.2  -1.0  -0.0  -1.6  -5.0  -4.9  -1.7  -2.4  -5.2  -5.2  -3.0  -2.0  -2.4  
Part 2. Regions’ shares in exports at FOB price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points 
Regions’ 
shares in 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 20.3  23.8  55.8  100.0  28.1  14.6  16.6  40.7  100.0  7.0  15.9  77.1  100.0  4.4  5.3  14.6  75.7  100.0  
Simulation 19.9  23.8  56.3  100.0  27.6  14.3  16.7  41.4  100.0  6.8  15.5  77.6  100.0  4.3  5.1  14.6  76.0  100.0  
Difference -0.4  -0.0  0.5  0.0  -0.5  -0.2  0.1  0.6  0.0  -0.2  -0.4  0.6  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.4  0.0  
Part 3. Regions’ shares in imports at CIF price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points  
Regions’ 
shares in 
Imports 
Imports of China by source Imports of East Asia by source Imports of the U.S. by source Imports of ROW by source 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 59.2  9.2  31.5  100.0  22.3  26.7  18.2  32.7  100.0  17.7  20.6  61.6  100.0  8.8  10.8  12.7  67.7  100.0  
Simulation 59.6  9.2  31.2  100.0  25.6  25.9  17.4  31.1  100.0  20.4  20.2  59.3  100.0  10.4  10.7  12.5  66.4  100.0  
Difference 0.4  -0.1  -0.3  0.0 3.2  -0.8  -0.8  -1.6  0.0  2.7  -0.4  -2.3  0.0  1.6  -0.0  -0.2  -1.3  0  
Part 4. % change of bilateral import price (PM) and output price of Machinery (PY) 
Prices 
bilateral PM of China, 
from 
PY_ 
bilateral PM of East Asia, 
from 
PY_ 
bilateral PM of the 
U.S., from 
PY_ bilateral PM of ROW, from  PY_ 
EAS U.S. ROW CHN CHN EAS U.S. ROW EAS CHN EAS ROW U.S. CHN EAS U.S. ROW ROW 
% change -5.5  -5.3  -5.2  -7.8  -3.0  -0.7  -0.5  -0.5  -0.8  -3.2  -0.9  -0.6  -0.7  -3.3  -1.0  -0.8  -0.8  -0.8  
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
Note: The export quantity is in billions of dollars. It does not include any subsidy on the exports neither the transport margin.  
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Table 9: Impact on bilateral trade in Textiles (absolute values and % change) 
Part 1. Export Quantity (benchmark values, simulations values, difference between simulation and benchmark values and % change) 
Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 37.7  36.8  111.9  186.4  16.3  4.4  6.5  19.7  46.9  1.2  1.5  16.0  18.7  7.6  16.1  68.4  315.8  408.0  
Simulation 37.3  36.4  110.5  184.2  17.1  4.5  6.5  19.8  47.8  1.2  1.5  16.0  18.8  8.0  16.2  68.6  316.4  409.2  
Difference -0.4 -0.4 -1.4 -2.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.2 
% change -1.1  -1.1  -1.3  -1.2  4.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  1.8  4.6  0.5  0.3  0.6  4.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3  
Part 2. Regions’ shares in exports at FOB price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points 
Regions’ shares 
in Exports 
Exports from China to: Exports from East Asia to: Exports from the U.S. to: Exports from ROW to: 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 18.6  23.6  57.8  100.0  34.6  9.4  13.7  42.2  100.0  6.3  7.9  85.9  100.0  1.9  4.0  16.9  77.2  100.0  
Simulation 18.6  23.6  57.8  100.0  35.6  9.3  13.5  41.6  100.0  6.5  7.9  85.6  100.0  2.0  4.0  16.9  77.1  100.0  
Difference 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.9  -0.1  -0.2  -0.6  0.0  0.2  -0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  
Part 3. Regions’ shares in imports at CIF price in the benchmark, in the simulation and the difference in % points  
Regions’ shares 
in Imports 
Imports of China by source Imports of East Asia by source Imports of the U.S. by source Imports of ROW by source 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 64.9  4.6  30.5  100.0  64.0  7.3  2.4  26.3  100.0  40.0  5.2  54.8  100.0  26.0  4.3  3.4  66.3  100.0  
Simulation 64.9  4.6  30.4  100.0  63.7  7.3  2.4  26.5  100.0  39.7  5.2  55.1  100.0  25.8  4.3  3.4  66.5  100.0  
Difference 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  -0.3  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  -0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  
Part 4. % change of bilateral import price (PM) and output price of Textiles (PY) 
Prices 
bilateral PM of China, from PY_ bilateral PM of East Asia, from PY_ bilateral PM of the U.S., from PY_ bilateral PM of ROW, from  PY_ 
EAS U.S. ROW CHN CHN EAS U.S. ROW EAS CHN EAS ROW U.S. CHN EAS U.S. ROW ROW 
% change -4.5  -4.5  -4.5  -4.3  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
Note: The export quantity is in billions of dollars. It does not include any subsidy on the exports neither the transport margin.  
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Table 10: Impact on bilateral imports in Electronics, Machinery and Textiles (absolute values and % change) 
Electronics 
Imports of China from: Imports of East Asia from: Imports of the U.S. from: Imports of ROW from 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 114.9  10.7  64.3  189.8  50.5  71.6  20.3  46.5  188.9  86.5  71.6  97.5  255.6  130.1  123.4  62.0  306.8  622.3  
Simulation 125.3  11.4  71.8  208.6  65.8  65.4  18.1  43.5  192.7  110.3  65.4  89.1  264.8  169.6  112.7  55.5  287.4  625.3  
Difference 10.4  0.7  7.6  18.8  15.3  -6.2  -2.1  -3.0  3.9  23.7  -6.2  -8.4  9.1  39.5  -10.7  -6.4  -19.3  3.0  
% change 9.1  7.0  11.8  9.9  30.3  -8.7  -10.5  -6.5  2.0  27.4  -8.7  -8.6  3.6  30.3  -8.7  -10.4  -6.3  0.5  
Machinery 
Imports of China from: Imports of East Asia from: Imports of the U.S. from: Imports of ROW from 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 101.6  15.8  53.8  171.2  42.2  52.6  35.8  64.1  194.7  49.0  52.6  178.0  279.6  115.0  146.6  173.5  931.0  1366.1  
Simulation 98.3  15.0  51.0  164.3  49.4  50.9  34.1  60.8  195.2  58.5  50.9  172.7  282.0  138.7  146.6  170.5  912.8  1368.5  
Difference -3.3  -0.8  -2.8  -6.9  7.2  -1.7  -1.7  -3.3  0.4  9.5  -1.7  -5.4  2.4  23.7  -0.1  -3.0  -18.2  2.4  
% change -3.3  -5.0  -5.2  -4.0  17.0  -3.2  -4.9  -5.2  0.2  19.4  -3.2  -3.0  0.9  20.6  -0.0  -1.7  -2.0  0.2  
Textiles 
Imports of China from: Imports of East Asia from: Imports of the U.S. from: Imports of ROW from 
EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total CHN EAS ROW Total CHN EAS U.S. ROW Total 
Benchmark 16.3  1.2  7.6  25.1  37.7  4.4  1.5  16.1  59.8  36.8  4.4  68.4  109.6  111.9  19.7  16.0  315.8  463.4  
Simulation 17.1  1.2  8.0  26.2  37.3  4.5  1.5  16.2  59.5  36.4  4.5  68.6  109.4  110.5  19.8  16.0  316.4  462.7  
Difference 0.7  0.1  0.3  1.1  -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.3  -0.4  0.0  0.2  -0.2  -1.4  0.0  0.1  0.6  -0.7  
% change 4.5  4.6  4.4  4.4  -1.1  0.4  0.5  0.3  -0.5  -1.1  0.4  0.3  -0.2  -1.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  -0.2  
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
Note: The import quantity is derived from the bilateral export quantity, that means one country’s physical export good is exactly the physical import good of its trade partner. It is 
in billions of dollars, without any export subsidy neither the transport margin nor the import tax.  
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Table 11: Sensitivity analysis—effects on aggregate variables of changes in elasticities (% change) 
  
A) Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production B) Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
Half  Double Half Double 
CHN EAS USA ROW CHN EAS USA ROW CHN EAS USA ROW CHN EAS USA ROW 
Wage (skilled) 1.9  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3  1.9  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3  3.6  -0.5  -0.2  -0.3  0.8  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  
Wage (unskilled) -0.9  -0.4  -0.1  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.1  -0.3  -0.3  -0.5  -0.1  -0.3  -0.6  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  
Capital Rent -1.6  -0.4  0.0  0.1  -1.7  -0.4  0.1  0.2  -2.8  -0.4  0.1  0.1  -1.0  -0.3  0.0  0.1  
National income 9.8  -0.4  -0.0  -0.2  9.4  -0.5  0.0  -0.1  10.2  -0.5  0.0  -0.3  9.0  -0.4  -0.0  -0.1  
GDP 2.0  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  2.2  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  1.8  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  2.3  -0.3  -0.1  -0.0  
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
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Table 12: Sensitivity analysis –Trade Patterns for China (absolute values and percentages) 
Electronics 
Electronics X from CHN to: 
CHN Export structure, by 
destination % 
CHN Import structure, by 
source % 
EAS U.S. ROW Total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total 
Bench 50.5  86.5  130.1  267.1  18.9  32.4  48.7  100  60.4  5.7  33.9  100  
Simulation 65.8  110.3  169.6  345.6  19.0  31.9  49.1  100  60.0  5.5  34.4  100  
Sensitivity 1 67.2  112.0  172.8  352.0  19.1  31.8  49.1  100  59.9  5.6  34.5  100  
Sensitivity 2 63.5  107.6  164.6  335.7  18.9  32.1  49.0  100  60.3  5.5  34.2  100  
Sensitivity 3 69.0  115.3  178.1  362.4  19.0  31.8  49.1  100  59.9  5.5  34.5  100  
Sensitivity 4 62.3  104.9  160.6  327.8  19.0  32.0  49.0  100  60.1  5.6  34.3  100  
Machinery 
Machinery X from CHN to: 
CHN Export structure, by 
destination 
CHN Import structure, by 
source 
EAS U.S. ROW Total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total 
Bench 42.2  49.0  115.0  206.2  20.5  23.8  55.8  100  59.2  9.2  31.5  100  
Simulation 49.4  58.5  138.7  246.5  20.0  23.7  56.3  100  59.6  9.2  31.2  100  
Sensitivity 1 50.4  59.6  141.4  251.4  20.1  23.7  56.2  100  59.5  9.2  31.3  100  
Sensitivity 2 48.4  57.5  136.2  242.0  20.0  23.7  56.3  100  59.9  9.1  31.0  100  
Sensitivity 3 52.9  63.0  150.1  266.0  19.9  23.7  56.4  100  59.7  9.1  31.1  100  
Sensitivity 4 46.6  54.9  129.6  231.1  20.2  23.7  56.1  100  59.5  9.2  31.3  100  
Textiles 
Textiles X from CHN to: 
CHN Export structure, by 
destination 
CHN Import structure, by 
source 
EAS U.S. ROW Total EAS U.S. ROW total EAS U.S. ROW total 
Bench 37.7  36.8  111.9  186.4  20.2  19.7  60.0  100  64.9  4.6  30.5  100  
Simulation 37.3  36.4  110.5  184.2  20.3  19.8  60.0  100  64.9  4.6  30.4  100  
Sensitivity 1 37.6  36.7  111.6  185.9  20.2  19.8  60.0  100  64.9  4.7  30.5  100  
Sensitivity 2 37.6  36.7  111.6  185.9  20.2  19.8  60.0  100  65.0  4.6  30.4  100  
Sensitivity 3 39.0  38.7  117.9  195.6  20.0  19.8  60.3  100  64.9  4.6  30.5  100  
Sensitivity 4 36.3  35.0  106.2  177.5  20.5  19.7  59.8  100  64.9  4.6  30.4  100  
 
Source: Authors’ simulations based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
Note: See note on Table 7. 
Simulation: results after FDI shock and before sensitivity test 
Sensitivity 1: results after FDI shock and halving the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production   
Sensitivity 2:  results after FDI shock and doubling the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production 
Sensitivity 3: results after FDI shock, and halving the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
Sensitivity 4: results after FDI shock, and doubling the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
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Figure 6: Input-Output structure of Machinery, Electronics and Textiles in China (2007) 
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Figure 7: Diagrammatic illustration of the evolution of bilateral trade patterns after the FDI shock 
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Chapter 4 
 
A multilevel analysis of FDI impacts: The role of big world 
players (China, East Asia, EU28, Japan, U.S.) in production 
networks and final markets
*
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Abstract 
 
This Chapter analyzes the interplay of Chinese FDI inflows with the presence of Asian 
production networks by means of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. 
Despite the fact that East Asia is by far the main supplier of Chinese imported 
intermediates, the former experiences the largest GDP fall across all the regions considered. 
East Asia GDP structure relies heavily on the sectors in which China receives more FDI 
and the losses of East Asian exports, due to the fierce Chinese competition, result in 
production and GDP reductions. The rest of regions Japan, EU28 and the U.S., undergo 
similar crowding out effects in exports and GDP reductions, but because they are less 
specialized than East Asian in the sectors in which China becomes most competitive, they 
are less harmed. Only ROW gains because it is protected from Chinese competition and 
specialized in sectors in which China demands more.  
Key words: Vertical specialization; Fragmentation; Intermediate; Computable general 
equilibrium 
JEL classification: C68, F14, F15, F17, F21. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The emergence of China on the world stage poses important questions about its economic 
consequences for that and other regions of the world and demands powerful methodologies 
able to quantify its challenges and opportunities.  
Somehow, Chinese geographical frontiers become “blurred” in this process. On the one 
hand, China has been escalating positions as a favorable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
destination, ranking now 2
nd
 among top hosts of FDI inflows in the world (UNCTAD, 
2013). This implies that FDI must play an important role in Chinese GDP growth (e.g., 
Kym et al., 2003) and foreign trade (e.g., Dean et al., 2009). Some authors have pointed out 
that in the absence of FDI flows, the Chinese high rates of GDP growth and exports would 
be in danger (Whalley and Xin, 2010; Zhang, 2013).On the other hand, a significant part of 
what is produced in (and later exported from) China relies heavily on foreign imported 
intermediates. What does, then, the “made in China” really mean? 
Imported intermediate inputs embodied in exports have raised close attention to what the 
literature calls: vertical specialization, global production sharing, networks, supply-chain 
trade or value-added trade. Input-Output (IO) analysis is a dominant methodology in this 
research. Koopman et al. (2008) disentangle the imported intermediate inputs from 
domestic ones in Chinese exports. They obtain that only 40-50% of the value added is 
created in China, the rest being imported mainly from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and the U.S. Dean et al. (2011), following Koopman et al. (2008) methodology to split the 
Chinese IO tables, find that there is a significant Asian-supplier network, with Japan and 
the Four Tigers accounting for more than half of Chinese imported inputs in 1997 and 2002. 
Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013), based on two data sets (the World IO Database and 
the Trade in Value Added Database), suggest that supply-chain trade has shifted heavily 
towards “Factory Asia” and away from “Factory North America” and “Factory Europe”.  
In this Chapter, we study the interplay of FDI accruing to China with the presence of Asian 
networks. The regions considered are China, East Asia, Japan, EU28, the U.S. and the rest 
of the world (ROW) and, the Chinese sectors receiving FDI, Electronics, Machinery, 
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Chemicals and Textiles. We pay particular attention to the role of these sectors along 
several levels of analysis, such as their weight in GDP, imports and exports in the world, in 
China and in the rest of regions. Our approach incorporates the real numbers of costs, 
export orientation and import reliance of production in the different sectors across all 
regions, which underlie the results at the macroeconomic levels (such as GDP growth, 
wages, aggregate foreign trade and welfare). We use a Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model. This methodology allows capturing the complex geographical and sectoral 
relationships of domestic and imported intermediates. Further, CGEs rely on a well-
grounded theoretical framework in order to derive the consistent micro and macroeconomic 
results. They also combine both the demand and supply side of the economy, as well as, 
product and labor markets across regions (Markusen, 2002).  
The model, thus, captures the presence of Asian networks and production chains, together 
with the main destinations of final and intermediate goods produced by China. However, 
we go beyond the data describing the presence of networks and markets and try to quantify 
the consequences of the particular linkages of each region with the Chinese economy. In 
theory, FDI inflows may have multiple effects. They affect factors remunerations, 
investment, GDP growth, technological transfers and productivity, the climate of 
competition among firms, foreign trade, and so on (see Lipsey, 2002, Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004 or Latorre, 2010, for theoretical reviews of the literature). A small handful 
of big multinationals may transform the production landscape of entire countries. However, 
comprehensive studies of their impact, such as CGE analyses of FDI, are rather scarce 
(Latorre, 2009), with notable exceptions, such as, Lakatos and Fukui (2013), Jensen and 
Tarr (2012) and Latorre and Hosoe (2014). We, thus, aim at applying this methodology to 
the consequences of the complex globalization of China. 
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 fully describes the weight of 
sectors in the world and across regions. Section 3 describes the model and simulations. The 
aggregate and sectoral results are analyzed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data section 
 
Table 1 offers the definition of sectors and their relative importance in each region’s GDP, 
exports and imports. The GDP structure reflects the level of development of the different 
regions. Agriculture and Mining are very important in China and ROW. Services are less 
important by contrast in these two regions compared with the rest. The four sectors, to 
which FDI accrues (Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery) appear in bold. They 
account for 9.2% of Chinese GDP. In East Asia
1
, whose GDP structure in manufacturing is 
very similar to that of China, their weight is 13.3% of GDP. The shares in Japan and 
Europe are similar and around 10%. The areas in which they are less relevant are the U.S. 
(7.5%) and ROW (6.4%).  
The four sectors receiving the shock are vital for the exports of China (64%), East Asia 
(54.6%) and Japan (53.4%), while being less important in the other regions. There is a 
strong network between China and East Asia, in which Japan also participates although it is 
less integrated than the previous two areas. We summarize this in Figure 1. There we can 
see that East Asia provides the vast majority of total Chinese imports ranging from 70.4% 
in Electronics to 46.8% in Chemicals, with the smallest share in Machinery of 36.5%. The 
next most important supplier for China is Japan, which accounts for around 15% of Chinese 
imports, with the exception of Machinery where it provides 36.5%.Taking into account that 
86.3%, 96.9%, 84.5% and 68% of total Chinese imports are of intermediates in Textiles, 
Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery, respectively, this must be a strong network by 
which East Asia and, to a lesser extent Japan, provide intermediates to be further processed 
in China.  
Figure 1 also shows that Chinese export structure contrasts drastically with that of the 
imports. To the U.S., EU and ROW go between 70% and 76% of total Chinese exports. 
Imports from EAS, which is Chinese next important destination (after the U.S., EU and 
ROW) are mostly intermediates. This suggests that most of the Chinese final goods go to 
                                                          
1
 In the dataset of this Chapter, East Asia is constituted by Republic of Korea, Taipei China, Hong Kong 
China, and ASEAN countries (Singapore, Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic Lao, Malaysia, Philippine, 
Thailand and Vietnam). 
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the U.S., EU and ROW, although there may be also intermediates in those Chinese exports 
to be further processed in those areas of the world
2
.   
In the U.S. services account for the bigger share in exports (Table 1). Exports of Motor 
vehicles are very important for Japan, while ROW depends heavily on its Mining exports. 
Textiles exports are very important in China and less important in the rest of regions. 
The fours sectors experiencing FDI increases account for 53.5% of overall Chinese imports 
and 43.2% in East Asia exhibits a closer import pattern while their weight in imports from 
the rest of regions is smaller. 
Table 2 gives an outline (GDP, exports and imports) of the values and regions’ shares in the 
world
3
. Europe is the largest economy (31% of world GDP), ranking first also in world 
trade (about 40%). The U.S. and ROW come next in their GDP shares (both around 25%) 
but they are very different in their trade openness. The US is a quite close economy, so is 
Japan, although less intensively. China and East Asia, by contrast, are more open since their 
weight in world trade surpasses their 6.3% and 5.2% shares in GDP, respectively. 
Table 3 presents each region’s weight in world GDP, exports and imports focusing on the 
sectors where the FDI shock takes place in China. The brackets of the columns labeled 
“World” further offer the importance of the sector in the world GDP, exports and imports. 
Even though China has a small weight in total world GDP (6.3 %), it generates important 
shares of global value added in these four sectors, particularly, in Textiles (16.7%) and 
Electronics (14.3%). Further, its contribution to world exports in these two latter sectors is 
of remarkable importance, 30.7% and 22.1%, respectively. China, Japan and East Asia 
nearly account for half of world exports of Electronics and Textiles. The three regions share 
a trade pattern by which their role in exports tends to surpass by far their role in imports 
(i.e., they constitute the “trade surplus” areas). The contrary applies to the U.S., and to a 
                                                          
2
 In Zhou and Latorre (2013a; 2013b) we analyze more deeply the amount of imports and their use (i.e., 
whether they are for Private or Public consumption, Gross capital formation, Intermediates). We do it, 
however, for Textiles, Electronics and Machinery and for four regions.    
3
 The values for GDP and their shares in the world resemble well the ones from the World Bank “World 
Development Indicators” in current $ of 2007, which is the source used by GTAP for macroeconomic 
variables (Hussein and Aguiar, 2012). For trade data issues like re-exports are dealt carefully by the GTAP 
team, which use as a base United Nations COMTRADE for their calculations (Gehlhar, Wang and Yao, 
2010).     
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lesser extent, ROW and Europe (i.e., the “trade deficit” areas). Europe is the main single 
region in the creation of world value added, exports and imports in the four sectors 
considered. It stands out, however, in its importance in value added in Chemicals and 
Machinery and, even more, in exports from these two sectors. ROW is relatively important 
in the production and trade of Textiles but clearly less important in exports from the other 
three sectors. Note that Textiles, in turn, accounts for a very small share in world GDP 
(1.5%) and in world exports which, necessary coincide with world imports (both 
accounting for 4.6% in the total)
4
. Machinery is the most important sector in terms of world 
trade (13.7%), followed by Chemicals with 11.3% and Electronics with 8.4% shares. 
To sum up, in 2007 China accounts for rather reduced shares in world GDP, exports and 
imports. In the sectors receiving the FDI shock, however, China is considerably more 
important than on average in the world. The U.S., EU and ROW are not important supplier 
of intermediates but play more the role of markets for China. The EU is by far the region 
with highest weights in GDP, exports and imports in the world. Our data point to a strong 
integration of China with East Asia and to less intensively with Japan. Both areas do supply 
most of the intermediates that are further processed in China.    
 
3. The model and simulation 
 
We use a multilevel model that combines the technology of production of firms (their cost 
structures and output levels) together with the demand side of the economies (how much 
production of each sector is demanded internally or exported), and the presence of factor 
markets (labor and capital demanded for production and their corresponding remunerations). 
This methodology which is technically called a CGE model, tries to grasp how shocks (e.g., 
the arrival of new multinationals to a particular sector) occurring in one part of the 
economy are spread to the rest. It seeks to offer results at the microeconomic level 
(production, exports, imports…) in different sectors and also at the macroeconomic level 
                                                          
4
 Both the exports and the imports are calculated at FOB value. We have also compared the exports and 
imports at CIF value with the ones at FOB value. The differences are very small and do not affect our results. 
138 
  
(GDP, welfare, aggregate trade flows, wages…) for all the regions considered within the 
same model. It quantifies those shocks occurring at the different levels. Our model is the 
GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) version (Rutherford, 2005) of the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model (Hertel, 1997). It is explained technically in Zhou 
and Latorre (2013b). Note, however, that in the present version we use a multilevel analysis 
with different factors, regions and sectors compared to our previous studies. 
Since we want to explore the role of FDI, we simulate the shock of capital stock changes 
brought about by FDI inflows. It consists of a simultaneous increase in the capital stock of 
the Chinese sectors of Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery. Based on the data 
from NBSC (various years), the accumulated FDI inflow, proxied by fixed asset investment 
funded by foreign capital, in Electronics has nearly doubled during the period of 2004—
2011, the increase was around 50% in Machinery, and 30% in Chemicals and 27% in 
Textiles. Thus, we simulate a shock corresponding to those sectoral capital stock increases 
simultaneously, keeping the capital stock in rest sectors and regions fixed.  
Capital is assumed to be firm-type and sector specific, i.e., the capital used in, say, 
chemicals will be different to the one used in other sectors. This assumption of specific 
capital also implies that capital is fixed and cannot move across sectors. As a consequence, 
our results should be interpreted as the short run outcome, i.e., the impact after two or three 
years. The assumption of specific capital also involves that its remuneration will differ 
across sectors. Labor, by contrast, is fully mobile within regions and its endowments are 
fixed. Therefore the wage will be the same within each of the regions considered in the 
model. 
The macroeconomic outcomes, arise from the aggregation of all sectoral results. 
Additionally, the resulting aggregates have to fulfill equations reflecting the national 
accounts identities. These latter equations reproduce the circular flow of the economy: 
production, income distribution, and (domestic and foreign) demand. After the simulation, 
factor remunerations in the sectors receiving a shock will be changed (i.e., the rental rate of 
capital and the overall wage will vary). As a consequence, those sectors will readjust their 
factor demands, intermediate inputs, prices, production, exports and imports. The rest of 
sectors respond to the shock as well, changing their inputs, production and price. Due to the 
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change of capital stock and the overall wage, national income changes. Domestic demand 
for private consumption and intermediates adjust to national income and output changes, 
respectively.  
However, the export orientation, domestic/imported intermediate intensity, private 
consumption orientation and trade relationship vary largely in the four sectors studied. 
Given the division and collaboration through production networks and other trade patterns, 
the rest of regions respond to the changes of Chinese trade. As a result, they will also adjust 
production, imports, and exports. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Sectoral results 
Table 4 presents the percentage change in output and the differences with respect to the 
benchmark of the value of exports and imports across all regions and sectors.   
Chinese production in the sectors receiving FDI will expand heavily. The larger the FDI 
increase, the higher the output goes up. Therefore, the biggest increase takes place in 
Electronics (30.3%) and the smallest in Textiles (1.2%). The arrival of FDI will decrease 
the price of goods, enhancing the competitiveness in exports with the only exception of 
Textiles
5
. Chinese exports increase dramatically, crowding out exports from the rest of 
regions in Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals, which explains their respective 
reductions in production in those sectors. This will bring about a mild fall in overall 
production across regions, which contrasts with the Chinese output expansion (see row 
“Total” at the bottom of Table 4).  
Chinese exports in the sectors receiving FDI crowd out all exports across all the rest of 
regions. Only one exception to this general trend arises in Chemicals, in which Europe and 
                                                          
5
 The causation chain of more FDI producing more exports is analyzed in detail in Zhou and Latorre (2013a; 
2013b). 
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Japan escape from the reductions in exports. The world predominance of Europe in foreign 
trade of Chemicals is clear in Table 3 above. Besides, Europe is a very important provider 
of Chemicals for ROW and will not be displaced by Chinese exports in this area. Japan 
accounts for higher Chinese import shares in this sector and will benefit from the increase 
in Chinese production sufficiently enough so as to compensate the exports lost in the rest of 
regions
6
.  
China will export less in several sectors, especially in Metals and Services, which will turn 
out to be supplied by the rest of regions excluding ROW. In the case of Metals, the overall 
increase in Chinese production brings about a higher demand for this product in order to be 
used as an intermediate. Regarding Services, the expansion of national income, stemming 
from FDI inflows, explains the rising demand for this private consumption oriented sector. 
The increase in Chinese output and lower exports in Food and Beverages is also related to 
higher national income. Exports from Textiles do not follow the general pattern of sectors 
receiving FDI, because they will be more demanded with higher private consumption. 
Therefore, the amount of Textiles exports from China will shrink.  
Chinese aggregate exports increase and so do those of the other regions with the exception 
of ROW. Aggregate imports accruing to China go up as well. This is because more 
intermediates are needed for higher levels of production and for the rising Chinese private 
consumption. By contrast, overall imports in other regions will be reduced. As we shall see 
shortly, national income decreases (so does production) in them (again with the exception 
of ROW). 
Looking at the absolute values of exports and imports, we find that the largest adjustments 
(in real value) occur in Electronics, Chemicals, Metals and Services. Interestingly, the 
exports of Services and Metals counteract to some extent the evolution of foreign trade in 
the sectors where the shock in FDI takes place in China. Chinese competitiveness does 
crowd out exports in the other regions, but those regions still manage to compensate that 
phenomenon by increasing their exports in the sectors in which China is now exporting less. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 by the percentage changes in the four main sectors, which are 
calculated as the change in absolute values reflected in Table 4, with respect to the value of 
                                                          
6
 Figures describing these bilateral trade patterns are available from the authors upon request. 
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exports in each sector and region in the benchmark. Looking at China and its exports of 
Electronics and Machinery we find the important increases it experiences (29.6% and 
16.2%, respectively) after the FDI shock. Its overall imports of Machinery will go down (-
2.8%) because it will substitute imported Machinery by the cheaper Machinery it now 
produces. Imports of Electronics in China rise by (10.1%), since this production, in contrast 
with Machinery, relies very heavily on imported intermediates.  
China will however, export considerably less of Metals (-19.2%) and services (-21.6%) of 
which it will import more (15.3% and 18.1%, respectively). This will expand heavily the 
exports of the rest of regions in these two sectors, which will go mainly to satisfy Chinese 
rising appetite from them, reducing the amount exported to other destinations. 
All in all, Figure 2 shows that while exports of most regions in Electronics and Machinery 
fall there is a compensating force in the increase of exports from Services and Metals. We 
also find that overall imports and exports in the world increase after the shock across the 
four sectors considered.  
Let us turn to analyze the evolution of East Asia, which is so heavily integrated with 
Chinese production. Table 4 shows that East Asia reduces total exports in the sectors in 
which Chinese export competition becomes more aggressive, despite its role as Chinese 
intermediate supplier in the Asian networks. It exports more to China but it is displaced by 
China in the other markets. We will briefly illustrate this point by showing the bilateral 
import and export trade in Electronics, where the largest volumes of trade are affected.  
Figure 3 shows the bilateral trade changes (in billions of dollars) of Electronics after the 
shock. One of the axis shows the ‘Exporter’ and the other one the ‘Importer’. Take ‘China’ 
in the ‘Exporter’ axis and the ‘EU’ in the ‘Importer’ axis as an example —the pink cone of 
Figure 3, the bilateral change of 20.9 means that the Electronics exports from China to 
Europe increase in 20.9 billions or the imports of Europe from China go up by that amount. 
‘Total imports’ in the ‘Exporter’ axis, shows the overall import change of importers shown 
in the ‘Importer’ Axis. For instance, the navy blue cone, whose dimensions are ‘Total 
imports’ in ‘Exporter’ axis and ‘CHN’ in ‘Importer’ axis, means that the overall imports of 
China increase by 19.1 billions (which coincides with overall Chinese imports in 
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Electronics in Table 4). Similarly the light yellow cone, with dimension of ‘China’ in the 
‘Exporter’ axis and ‘total exports’ in the ‘Importer axis’, means that the overall exports of 
China go up by 81.3 billions (as shown in Table 4). 
Chinese exports mainly go to the U.S., Europe and ROW, which are the biggest markets for 
its exports (Figure 1). Overall exports across all regions are heavily crowded out, even 
though they all increase the exports going to China. East Asia experiences the highest 
increases in exports going to China but it faces the fierce competition of Chinese exports in 
the rest of markets. This latter effect predominates and its overall exports go down. This 
leads us to say that being integrated in Chinese production networks as an intermediate 
supplier does not guarantee profits.  
 
4.2. Aggregate results 
Table 5 presents the percentage change of the overall wage, the rental rate of capital, 
national income which is a proxy for welfare, the capital stock, aggregate imports and 
exports, as well as, GDP.  
FDI accruing to China will increase its capital stock by 7.36%. This will improve labor 
productivity and therefore wages by 0.42%. An accumulation of capital causes a reduction 
in its remuneration of 1.99%. The increase in wages, together with a higher capital stock, 
leads to a strong expansion of national income and welfare (11.54%)
7
. As a result, 
aggregate imports rise heavily (7.84%), propelled by higher demand and production, while 
exports also rise although less intensively by 2.90%. Recall the sectors receiving the FDI 
increase heavily their exports but due to the rise of national income and production, exports 
in other sectors will be reduced. Finally, all these forces drive up GDP in China by 2.68%. 
These findings are in accordance with our previous studies on the impact of FDI on host 
economies (Gómez-Plana and Latorre, 2014; Latorre 2012, 2013).  
The adjustments are logically of smaller magnitude for the rest of regions. Because 
production shrinks slightly in all of them (Table 4), wages, and often the rental rate of 
                                                          
7
 See Latorre et al. (2009) or Latorre (2010) for a full explanation about why national income can be used as a 
proxy for welfare in the GTAP model. 
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capital, will diminish. The decrease is most intense in East Asia, Japan and Europe. In these 
regions, the weight in GDP of the three sectors where Chinese exports increase most 
(Electronics, Machinery and Chemical) is the highest (Table 1). Chinese competition 
crowds out exports of the rest of regions in these sectors, thus, reducing their output. As 
shown in Table 1, East Asia is the region in which these sectors account for a higher GDP 
(13.3%). Accordingly, wages and the rental rate of capital experience the largest decrease 
in East Asia. In the opposite extreme, ROW and the U.S. exhibit the lowest weight of GDP 
in these three sectors (5.3% and 6.6%, respectively). This explains why the fall in wages is 
the smallest in these two regions and the capital rental even increases. This evolution of 
factor’s remunerations lies behind the outcomes on national income and GDP. The latter 
decrease most in East Asia, followed by Japan and Europe. The U.S. also undergoes a 
reduction in national income and GDP, while ROW, whose capital rental increases heavily, 
exhibits rises in both national income and GDP. Recall the GDP structure in ROW is quite 
protected from Chinese competition, since it heavily relies on Mining, Agriculture and 
Services in which Chinese exports are going down. 
The fall in national income, which drives down private consumption across all regions, 
explains the reduction in aggregate imports (except in China and ROW). Aggregate exports, 
by contrast, rise slightly due to the higher exports in the sectors in which China competes 
less. 
All in all, China benefits from FDI inflows. ROW also benefits because its economic 
structure differs the one in China. The contrary applies to East Asia, whose GDP 
manufacturing structure closely follows that of the Asiatic giant. As a result, East Asia is 
heavily crowed out in important sectors that coincide with the ones in which China 
becomes very aggressive. Japan and Europe are intermediate cases in the sense that they are 
crowded out in some sectors but are able to compensate that by exporting more in others. 
Finally, the U.S. benefits mainly due to its low exposure to Chinese competition. 
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4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
We carry out an Unconditional Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (Harrison et al. 1997), in 
which we change two critical elasticities: 1) The Amington elasticity (substitution between 
imports and domestic production and 2) The elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital. We halve and double their values in all the sectors and regions while keeping the 
rest of elasticities at their initial value.  
Table 6 offers the percentage changes of the aggregate variables with the new elasticities. 
The row labeled “bench” repeats, for the sake of comparison, the results obtained with the 
original elasticities, i.e., the ones from Table 5. Percentages adjustments in GDP are 
negligible across regions, even though for China the higher the elasticities the slightly 
higher the GDP turns. This implies that more flexible technologies facilitate a more 
efficient use of resources leading to more growth. Across the rest of variables changes are 
very small with the different elasticities. The causation chain behind the results which has 
already been explained clearly remains applicable. ROW and China would be the only 
regions that win after the shock. 
With the higher (“double”) elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production, production in the sectors receiving FDI increases more than in the benchmark 
case. Aggregate imports and exports will be somewhat higher because more imported 
intermediates will be used for production and higher production will lead to more exports in 
these sectors. In order to produce more in the FDI receiving sectors a higher amount of 
labor needs to be reallocated to them. This will raise the wage and bring about a lower 
rental rate of capital. The latter effect prevails reducing national income, always compared 
to the central case we had already analyzed. 
With a lower (“half”) elasticity of substitution between labor and capital production in the 
sectors receiving FDI is also larger than in the central scenario. Because more labor needs 
to go to those sectors the wage will be higher, but the rental rate of capital will be smaller 
leading to lower national income. Production in the FDI sectors is higher, which brings 
about higher aggregate imports of Chinese intermediates. However, their higher production 
does not translate in overall higher Chinese exports because other sectors are exporting less. 
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But note that the key for the adjustment in the rest of regions would be the weight in their 
GDP of the sectors involved in the FDI shock. We get a more negative outcome in East 
Asia because in that region the weight in GDP of Electronics, Machinery and Chemical is 
the highest across regions. GDP is also slightly worse in Japan and the EU and slightly 
better in ROW with the half value of this elasticity. These trends should be familiar to us 
since they again reflect that the higher the increase in production in the FDI receiving 
sectors in China the more harmful their effects for the rest of regions with the exception of 
ROW. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
By 2007 China accounted for a relatively small share in World GDP (6.3%), exports (8.3%) 
and imports (6.4%). This was far from the weights of regions like Europe (31%, 39.7% and 
40.8%, respectively) or the U.S. (25.2%, 9.2% and 14.5%, respectively). However, the 
arrival of FDI inflows to Chinese manufacturing seems to have produced negative effects in 
many regions of the world. When Chinese exports increase, due to FDI, exports and 
production shrink in the sectors that compete with them across the rest of regions. The latter 
experience an overall reduction in production which drives down wages and the capital rent, 
thus, reducing their national income and GDP. 
We simulate the real FDI increases that have taken place in Chinese Electronics, Machinery, 
Chemicals and Textiles. These four sectors account for 64.5% and 53.5% of Chinese 
overall exports and imports, respectively, while their weight is of 38.1% in total world 
exports (or imports).  
China benefits from the FDI inflows, since there is a rise in wages (0.42%), GDP (2.68%) 
and national income (11.54%). Chinese export competitiveness increases very heavily in 
Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals. East Asia is the region that is most negatively 
affected, even though it has strong connections through production networks with China. It 
will export more in those sectors in which China compete less after the FDI increase. 
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Further, it will, generally, supply important intermediates for the sectors in which China 
increases production, but it will be displaced by China in the rest of markets. The main 
negative outcomes for East Asia arise from its decrease in production in the sectors in 
which China is more aggressive (Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals). These three 
sectors explain 13.3% of GDP in East Asia, the highest share among all the regions 
considered. As a consequence, its fall in GDP is the largest across all regions (-0.4%, 
approximately). 
In Japan and Europe the weight in GDP of Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals is 8.6% 
and 9.1%, respectively. Their Chemicals sectors are the only case of survival to Chinese 
competition in sectors that have received the FDI. Indeed, except in these latter cases, 
China crowds out exports across all regions when it becomes more competitive due to FDI. 
Despite this virtuous evolution of Chemicals, overall production still shrinks in Japan and 
Europe, driving their GDP down by 0.26% in both areas. In the U.S., the weight in GDP of 
the three sectors, in which Chinese competition rises strongly, is lower than the three 
previous regions. This, together with its smaller openness to trade and big importance in 
services (in which China export less), considerably reduces its negative outcomes in GDP (-
0.10%). 
The Rest of the world (ROW) is the only region that we have analyzed that is positively 
affected by the Chinese booming economy. ROW is protected from Chinese competition 
because in its GDP sectors like Mining and Agriculture account for the biggest shares. In 
fact, ROW’s exports from these sectors are primarily going to satisfy Chinese rising 
demand for Agricultural products and Mining resources. 
In the light of the literature on vertical specialization, this Chapter finds that engaging in 
networks in China does not guarantee profitable outcomes. Our general equilibrium 
analysis allows to further analyze the role of regions as final markets. We could a priori 
expect that consumers would benefit from cheaper Chinese imports. This does not seem to 
be the case, either. Europe, the U.S. and ROW are the main destinations of Chinese exports. 
These may become cheaper, but the point is that Europe, the U.S. and ROW are also 
important producers in the world.  
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Our analysis reveals that the forces from the production side of the economy are more 
important than the ones from the consumption side. As we have said, this benefits ROW 
but will harm Europe and the U.S. in a different magnitude.  
All in all, our Chapter suggests that the best industrial policies outside China should further 
strengthen the comparative advantage in the sectors in which China competes less. 
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Table 1: Definition of sectors and their relative importance in each region's GDP, Exports and Imports (2007) 
Sector/Goods Definition 
GDP (%) Exports (%) Imports (%) 
CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW 
01-14  Agriculture 11.0 1.2 5.5 1.0 1.7 6.6 0.9 0.1 0.8 3.8 1.6 3.8 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.3 2.2 2.6 
15-18 Mining 4.0 0.1 3.7 1.2 0.7 11.0 0.5 0.1 3.4 1.1 1.1 32.6 13.9 
23.
3 
12.7 12.6 6.9 7.3 
19-26 Food & 
Beverages 
3.2 3.3 3.5 2.2 4.1 4.5 2.0 0.4 3.4 3.1 5.2 4.9 1.8 5.2 3.3 2.9 4.8 4.8 
27-29 Textiles 4.1 0.6 2.0 0.8 1.7 1.6 17.2 1.1 5.2 1.4 3.5 3.9 2.7 5.1 3.3 5.8 4.8 4.6 
30-31 Woods & Paper 2.1 1.8 1.6 2.4 2.3 1.5 4.2 0.7 2.3 2.7 4.0 2.6 1.9 2.7 1.7 3.6 3.7 3.0 
32 Petroleum 0.6 2.6 2.3 0.5 2.1 1.3 1.8 1.5 3.9 4.1 2.2 6.3 2.4 3.8 4.3 3.5 3.0 4.4 
33 Chemicals 5.7 2.5 4.0 2.6 3.6 2.4 7.4 12.2 10.8 13.3 15.3 6.0 12.5 7.8 10.5 8.4 
13.
0 
10.9 
34-37 Metals 7.4 3.0 3.7 2.2 3.7 3.5 9.8 9.2 6.5 6.1 9.5 10.2 8.4 6.8 10.0 6.7 9.5 9.8 
38-39 Motor Vehicles 2.5 2.6 2.8 1.9 2.7 2.0 3.3 24.1 6.1 14.5 13.0 5.9 4.2 4.3 4.5 12.5 
11.
1 
12.4 
40 Electronics 3.0 2.8 4.6 0.6 1.0 0.8 22.5 13.5 25.3 6.8 4.5 2.3 20.2 9.0 15.4 11.0 5.7 5.4 
41 Machinery 6.5 3.2 4.8 3.5 4.4 2.1 17.4 26.6 13.3 16.5 16.5 5.2 18.2 
10.
5 
14.0 13.5 
12.
5 
15.3 
42 Other manufacturing 2.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.8 6.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.4 1.6 1.2 3.4 1.7 1.5 
43-45 Electricity & Gas 
& Water 
3.4 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.3 3.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 
46 Construction 6.3 6.4 5.7 6.3 7.1 6.7 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.9 
47-57 Services 37.9 
67.
4 
52.8 
72.
5 
61.
5 
52.2 6.2 8.2 16.8 24.5 21.1 13.8 10.3 
16.
0 
16.2 14.3 
19.
8 
16.5 
Whole economy 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: The definition of sectors follows the ISIC Rev 3 Classification. CHN, JPN, EAS, US, EU and ROW stand for China, Japan, East Asia, United States, 
Europe and Rest of the world, respectively. East Asia is constituted by Republic of Korea, Taipei China, Hong Kong China, and ASEAN countries (Singapore, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic Lao, Malaysia, Philippine, Thailand and Vietnam). 
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Table 2: Each region's GDP, exports and imports and their weight in the world (2007) 
Region 
GDP 
(Billions $) 
GDP (%) 
Exports 
(Billions $) 
Exports (%) 
Imports 
(Billions $) 
Imports (%) 
China 3494.1 6.3 1222.8 8.3 941.0 6.4 
Japan 4377.9 7.8 742.1 5.0 670.2 4.5 
East Asia 2917.8 5.2 1666.5 11.3 1435.6 9.7 
United States 14061.8 25.2 1366.2 9.2 2139.5 14.5 
Europe 17327.1 31.0 5867.3 39.7 6031.4 40.8 
Rest of the world 13652.6 24.5 3914.2 26.5 3561.4 24.1 
World 55831.3 100 14779.2 100 14779.2 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
 
 
Table 3: Each region's weight in world GDP, exports and imports of Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery (2007) 
Sector 
Regional % in world sectoral GDP  
World 
Regional % in world sectoral exports 
World 
Regional % in world sectoral imports 
World 
CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW 
Textiles 16.7 3.2 7.0 13.6 34.4 25.1 100 (1.5) 30.7 1.2 12.7 2.7 30.3 22.4 100 (4.6) 3.7 5.0 7.0 18.3 41.6 24.4 100 (4.6) 
Chemicals 11.3 6.4 6.6 20.7 35.9 19.0 100 (3.1) 5.4 5.4 10.7 10.8 53.6 14.0 100 (11.3) 7.3 3.1 9.2 10.8 46.0 23.6 100 (11.3) 
Electronics 14.3 16.9 18.6 10.8 24.3 15.2 100 (1.3) 22.1 8.1 34.0 7.5 21.1 7.2 100 (8.4) 15.3 4.9 17.8 19.0 27.7 15.4 100 (8.4) 
Machinery 11.0 6.9 6.8 24.0 37.4 14.0 100 (3.7) 10.5 9.7 11.0 11.1 47.6 10.1 100 (13.7) 8.5 3.5 9.9 14.4 36.8 27.0 100 (13.7) 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: see Table 1 
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Table 4: Impact on output (% change), exports (change in billions $) and imports (change in billions $) 
Sectors 
Output (% change) Exports (change in billions $) Imports (change in billions $) 
CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW World CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW World 
Agriculture 2.0  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.2  -3.3  0.0  0.5  1.7  1.6  3.4  3.8  5.9  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  -1.5  0.1  3.8  
Mining -0.3  0.8  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.1  -0.5  0.0  0.6  0.6  0.6  4.9  6.2  7.6  0.1  0.5  -2.0  -1.2  1.2  6.2  
Food & 
Beverages 
3.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.0  0.2  -6.9  0.2  1.2  1.4  4.3  -0.1  0.1  4.4  -1.3  -0.5  -0.9  -2.7  1.1  0.1  
Textiles 1.2  1.6  0.7  1.1  1.1  0.0  -9.7  0.5  1.0  0.7  5.1  -1.2  -3.6  1.6  -0.6  -0.2  -1.8  -3.1  0.4  -3.6  
Woods & Paper -2.5  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.1  -8.8  0.4  0.7  1.3  4.9  0.5  -0.9  2.3  -0.4  -0.1  -2.1  -0.9  0.4  -0.9  
Petroleum 3.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.6  -0.5  -0.2  -1.1  0.2  0.6  0.1  -0.2  0.0  -0.4  1.5  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -1.0  -0.2  -0.4  
Chemicals 6.9  -0.1  -0.7  -0.1  0.1  -0.8  7.0  0.2  -1.2  -0.2  2.0  -4.4  3.5  2.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  -1.2  2.2  3.5  
Metals -0.2  1.4  0.8  0.8  1.2  -0.0  -23.0  4.2  2.5  3.9  15.3  1.7  4.7  12.0  -0.8  -0.8  -3.3  -1.5  -1.0  4.7  
Motor Vehicles -1.2  1.1  0.0  0.4  0.4  -0.5  -5.9  3.0  -0.1  2.1  6.3  -2.6  2.9  3.8  -0.2  -0.1  -0.7  -1.8  1.9  2.9  
Electronics 30.3  -2.9  -2.0  -5.8  -4.6  -4.2  81.3  -5.2  -7.6  -8.6  -15.1  -6.7  38.0  19.1  3.4  0.0  10.8  0.8  3.8  38.0  
Machinery 8.5  -0.9  -1.6  -1.0  -0.9  -2.2  34.6  -2.1  -4.2  -5.8  -11.8  -8.1  2.6  -4.7  0.8  -0.1  3.2  -0.4  3.9  2.6  
Other 
manufacturing 
-2.0  0.9  0.7  1.8  1.0  0.2  -8.1  0.4  0.3  0.7  3.2  0.1  -3.5  0.4  -0.4  -0.2  -1.5  -2.0  0.2  -3.5  
Electricity & 
Gas & Water 
3.6  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.1  -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  -0.7  -0.4  0.2  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.5  0.1  -0.4  
Construction 0.1  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.7  0.2  -0.0  0.1  0.8  -0.2  0.1  0.3  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.3  0.2  0.1  
Services 2.9  0.0  0.2  0.0  -0.0  0.1  -16.3  2.2  5.6  4.7  18.7  -6.5  8.5  17.5  -1.6  -1.6  -1.8  -9.5  5.5  8.5  
Total 3.8  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0  -0.1  38.2  4.3  0.0  2.7  36.3  -19.7  61.8  73.9  -1.2  -3.5  -0.8  
-
26.5  
19.9  61.8  
Source: Authors’ simulation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
154 
  
Table 5: Impact on aggregate variables (% change) 
Aggregate variables China Japan East Asia United States Europe Rest of the world 
Wage 0.42 -0.36 -0.58 -0.18 -0.33 -0.22 
Rental rate of Capital -1.99 -0.32 -0.31 0.06 -0.22 0.48 
National income (Welfare) 11.54 -0.32 -0.41 -0.07 -0.81 0.51 
Capital stock 7.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Imports 7.86 -0.19 -0.25 -0.04 -0.44 0.56 
Exports 2.90 0.60 0.02 0.25 0.63 -0.47 
GDP 2.68 -0.26 -0.40 -0.10 -0.26 0.18 
Source: Authors’ simulation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis—impacts on aggregate variables (% change) 
FDI shock 
GDP Imports Exports 
CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW 
Bench  2.7  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  7.9  -0.2  -0.2  -0.0  -0.4  0.6  2.9  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.6  -0.5  
Elasticity of substitution 
between imports and 
domestic production 
Half 2.6  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  7.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.3  0.3  2.0  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.8  -0.7  
Double 2.8  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  0.2  8.5  -0.1  -0.2  0.2  -0.6  0.9  3.9  0.6  0.1  0.5  0.4  -0.1  
Elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital 
Half 2.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  9.6  -0.3  -0.3  -0.0  -0.6  0.7  2.7  0.7  0.1  0.3  0.9  -0.6  
Double 3.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  0.1  6.3  -0.1  -0.2  -0.0  -0.3  0.4  3.0  0.5  -0.0  0.2  0.4  -0.3  
FDI shock 
Wage Rental rate of capital National income 
CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW 
Bench         0.4  -0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -2.0  -0.3  -0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.5  11.5  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.8  0.5  
Elasticity of substitution 
between imports and 
domestic production 
Half 0.2  -0.3  -0.6  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -1.9  -0.3  -0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.5  11.8  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.9  0.5  
Double 0.7  -0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -2.1  -0.3  -0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.5  11.1  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.7  0.5  
Elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital 
Half 1.4  -0.5  -0.8  -0.2  -0.4  -0.3  -3.4  -0.4  -0.5  0.1  -0.3  0.6  12.2  -0.4  -0.6  -0.1  -1.1  0.6  
Double -0.0  -0.2  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -1.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  -0.2  0.4  10.9  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.5  0.4  
Source: Authors’ simulation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al,. 2012) 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Figure 1: Main trade relationships of Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery among regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ caculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012) 
Note: see Table 1.
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Figure 2: Impact on exports and imports of Metals, Services, Electronics and Machinery across regions (% change) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See Table 1.
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Figure 3: Impact on Electronics bilateral trade (change in Billions $) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See Table 1.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
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1. Main results 
 
Regarding the sectoral adjustments… 
We use a CGE model, namely, the GTAPinGAMS, whose equations appear in the appendix 
of Chapter 3, to analyze the interplay of FDI and global production networks (GPNs) in 
China. We provide an in-depth and step-by-step analysis of the evolution of trade patterns, as 
well as, a wide set of micro and macroeconomic results, analyzing the causation behind the 
adjustments after the FDI shock.  
In Chapter 2 we focus on the analysis of FDI in Chinese Electronics, while Chapter 3 
expands the study to FDI going to Machinery and Textiles in China. Finally, Chapter 4 
examines the impact when FDI goes to the four most export oriented sectors of China, 
namely, Electronics, Textiles, Machinery and Chemicals. This progressive inclusion of new 
sectors allows deriving different patterns in their responses. 
One important outcome is that the magnitude of the adjustments within each sector tends to 
be proportional to the amount of FDI received. Because Electronics experiences the highest 
increase in FDI inflows (100% increase), the scope of changes are largest within this sector. 
Next in importance come the adjustments in Machinery (50% of FDI increases), then 
Chemicals (30%) and, finally, Textiles (27%).  
After discussing the magnitude of the adjustment let us turn to the patterns we find. The 
latter are graphically summarized in the diagram of Figure 2 in Chapter 3. The output of all 
the sectors receiving FDI inflows expands and their prices fall. This is a common pattern 
they all share. Some contrasts arise, however, in the adjustment of other variables in the 
different sectors to which FDI accrues. Most, but not all of them, will export more after the 
shock, while some will also import more and others will reduce imports.  
The exports of Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals increase, contrasting with the reduced 
exports of Textiles. Chinese price reductions tend to increase its export competitiveness. The 
pattern in Textiles differs because, even though, it is a quite export oriented sector, it also 
exhibits a high weight in Chinese private consumption. After the shock of FDI national 
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income increases in China and private demand will go up. As a result, more Textiles will be 
demanded and less will be exported. What is more, the amount of Textiles imports increase, 
after the shock in China, in order to satisfy the rising demand for these goods. In fact, the 
imports of Electronics, Chemicals and Textiles go up while those of Machinery imports 
decrease after the same shock reflecting the arrival of FDI flows. Because imported 
intermediates in Electronics and Chemicals are very intensively used in their respective 
production processes, their output expansion will require more imported intermediates. The 
production technology in Machinery relies more heavily on domestic intermediates. That is 
why the cheaper domestic intermediates of Machinery will replace some of the previous 
imports of intermediates in this sector.   
 
Regarding the regions involved… 
East Asia, as the biggest supplier of Chinese imports, undergoes the most substantial changes 
in trade. When China enlarges the imports of Electronics, Chemicals and Textiles, the 
amount of exports increased mainly comes from East Asia. Similarly, when China reduces 
the Machinery imports, East Asia experiences the biggest reduction in Chinese imports. The 
U.S., Europe and ROW are the biggest markets for Chinese exports. So they are the main 
destinations of the increases in Chinese exports after the shock.  
Our analysis confirms the existence of production networks. China relies heavily on East 
Asian intermediate supply and its increasing exports mainly go to the U.S., Europe and ROW. 
The “Triangular trade pattern” prevails among China, East Asia and the developed 
economies, especially in Electronics and Chemicals. Chinese Machinery also shows a strong 
production network with East Asia but less intensively than the other two sectors, because its 
production uses intensively domestic intermediates. Though Textiles has a close trade 
relation with East Asia, this production network is weaker than the previous ones, given that 
its production mainly relies on its domestic intermediate inputs and it is a more private 
consumption oriented sector. Our results are consistent with the analysis of Koopman et al. 
(2012), Haddad (2007), Dean et al. (2011) and Costinot et al. (2012). However, we also 
derive what the impact of these GPNs interacting with FDI is. 
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In chapters 2 and 3 our analysis has focused on four regions (China, East Asia, the U.S. and 
ROW). This multi-regional framework is expanded to two more regions in Chapter 4, 
separating Japan from East Asia and Europe from ROW. We analyze now these latter setting 
with richer results. Recall that FDI accrues also to the biggest number of sectors we have 
analyzed, four. Interestingly, at the aggregate level, the results vary substantially across the 
regions considered. Only China and ROW benefit from the FDI inflows, while the other 
regions get harmed according to the changes of GDP and welfare. 
To be more specific, ROW, relying heavily on exports of Mining, gains from FDI inflows in 
China. The rest of regions, especially East Asia, experience a fall in their GDP and welfare. 
The essence for this contrast is the GDP, import and export structure across regions. The 
GDP structure of East Asia is close to that of China, i.e., their shares tend to be high or small 
across the same type of sectors in these two regions. The main negative outcomes for East 
Asia arise from its decrease in production in the sectors in which China is more aggressive 
(Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals). These three sectors explain 13.3% of GDP in East 
Asia, the highest share among all the regions considered. As a consequence, its fall in GDP is 
the largest across all regions (-0.4%, approximately).  
Japan and Europe are intermediate cases in the sense that they are crowded out in some 
sectors but are able to compensate that by exporting more in other sectors. The GDP 
structure in the U.S. and ROW differs more than the ones of the two other regions, compared 
to the Chinese one. So they are least affected. As already noted, ROW even gets better off, 
because it is specialized in sectors from which China will demand more.  
In the light of the literature on vertical specialization, this paper finds that engaging in 
networks with China does not guarantee profitable outcomes. As noted above, East Asia will, 
generally, supply important intermediates for the sectors in which China increases 
production, thus exporting more to China. But it will be displaced by China in the rest of 
markets. The latter effect prevails and East Asia will reduce its overall exports. 
Our general equilibrium analysis allows to further analyze the role of regions as final 
markets. We could a priori expect that consumers would benefit from cheaper Chinese 
imports. This does not seem to be the case, either. Europe, the U.S. and ROW are the main 
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destinations of Chinese exports. These may become cheaper, but the point is that Europe, the 
U.S. and ROW are also important producers in the world.  
Our analysis reveals that the forces from the production side of the economy are more 
important than the ones from the consumption side. As we have said, this benefits ROW but 
will harm Europe and the U.S. in a different magnitude. All these results are derived taking 
into account many different dimensions, such as, the particular production technologies of 
each of the sectors (e.g., the intensity of the use of imported versus domestic intermediates in 
production) and their demand orientation (e.g., the private consumption orientation of 
Textiles and export orientation of the rest of sectors). Furthermore, the proportions of each of 
the regions in world trade and GDP, as well as, the particular dimension of the sectors 
directly involved in the FDI shock, both within each region or country and in terms of the 
world have been deeply analyzed.  
 
2. Main contributions 
 
This PhD dissertation provides a holistic view of the interplay between FDI and GPNs. It 
uses a multiregional model which allows analyzing a rich set of micro and macroeconomic 
results. Unlike the existing literature on GPNs in which Input-Output analysis is the 
dominant methodology, we use a CGE. To the best of our knowledge no previous CGE 
analyses on the interactions between FDI and GPNs exist. Only Kawai and Zhai (2009) use a 
CGE to illustrate the transmission of global financial crisis through the reduction in final 
demand, which further impacts on the fall of Chinese demand for intermediate imports from 
Asian economies. 
As noted in the introductory chapter, one of the main challenges for trade statistics nowadays 
is to combine the dimension of type of good traded (i.e., final versus intermediate) with that 
of country of origin. The Chinese trade data are however, so “extreme”, that even in the 
absence of exact information on this double dimension, it must be the case that East Asia 
provides most of the imported intermediates of China and that most of Chinese final goods 
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are directed to Western Markets. The available data in the GTAP Data base have been 
explored in detail in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and are graphically summarized in Figure 1 of 
Chapter 4. These analysis and data provide new evidence that confirms the existence of 
strong production networks in East Asia, which through China export the final goods to 
Western markets. However, giving a step further we find the outcomes we have just 
summarized above, many of which, to the best of our knowledge, were not present in the 
literature. We identify winners and losers, as well as, differential and common patterns 
across four sectors.  
Some policy implications arise from our findings. FDI strengthens the role of China as a 
production center and export base in the world. However, FDI inflows pose an upward 
pressure on wages. As a consequence, China might lose its attractiveness for processing and 
assembly trade, as some authors have pointed out (Xing, 2010). Note, however, that we 
obtain an important qualification when we differentiate between skilled and unskilled wages 
in Chapter 3. There we model capital and skilled labor as sector-specific, while unskilled 
labor is fully mobile within but not across regions. The results derived show that the 
aggregate skilled wages are pushed up by 1.9%. By contrast, the unskilled wages are pulled 
down in China, 0.7%, following the entry of FDI in Electronics, Machinery and Textiles. So 
maybe, in the end, there is not such pressure for unskilled wages and China could continue 
being an attractive area for FDI in low value added products.  
What is more, an increase in wages has the positive side of stimulating the private 
consumption in China, which may help to change the Chinese growth pattern. The latter is 
highly dependent on imports for key intermediates and on exports. This may well be limiting 
Chinese innovation. Instead, it could be better to develop production technology at home and 
rely more on domestic intermediates than imported ones, moving up in the value chain. 
Furthermore, the Chinese external dependence and exposure may imply other dangers. An 
additional danger of being so exposed to external markets is what Kawai and Zhai (2009) 
have found using a CGE model. As noted above, production networks are also a mechanism 
of transmission of vulnerabilities that arise elsewhere. 
One way for China to move up in the value chain may, precisely, be FDI. This is an 
important instrument for policy intervention since we have seen that the magnitude of FDI 
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inflows proportionally affects the relevant changes in sectoral variables (such as exports, 
production, prices, and etc.). If China wishes to move up the value chain, they could set up 
incentives to attract FDI inflows in the high-tech sectors. Koopman et al. (2012) and Baldwin 
and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) find that China is moving up to some extent in the value chain, 
although they point out that processing trade is still pervasive. Our results of Machinery, 
which substitutes the imported intermediates with domestic ones, fit well with the idea that 
China could be moving up in the value chain. The ‘Xiaomi’ smart phone1 is also a typical 
case in which a Chinese domestic firm tries to catch up with the high-tech leader. 
For the rest of regions, our results also point out that getting engaged in production networks 
can be a double-edged sword, if the regions that integrate later compete in export markets, as 
happens with East Asia and China. The best industrial policies outside China should further 
strengthen the comparative advantage in the sectors in which China competes less. Besides, 
final markets may not benefit from Chinese cheaper imports if they are also important 
producers and are displaced by Chinese competition, therefore, reducing their production. 
In brief, our work has shed new lights, using a general equilibrium perspective, on the 
relative darkness regarding the effects of the FDI and GPNs.  
 
3. Proposals for future research  
 
We are aware of some limitations that are present in our current analysis. First, FDI is an 
activity of MNEs and MNEs have not been explicitly modeled in our CGE. To the best of 
our knowledge only Hosoe (2014), Latorre and Hosoe (2013) and Lakatos and Fukui (2013) 
have introduced different cost structures of national firms and MNEs operating within the 
same sector in a multi-regional CGE model of FDI. In our analysis, we focus on the presence 
and effects of GPNs and we do not have data on how the production, imports and exports 
within the production networks are related to domestic of foreign firms in China. Therefore, 
                                                          
1 “Xiaomi Phone faster, cheaper than iPhone4”, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2011-
08/19/content_13151719.htm  
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we do not model MNEs but FDI, which accrues to particular sectors in China. This is a fairly 
good proxy in the case of Electronics in which 80% of the production is in the hands of 
MNEs, but it is not such a good proxy in Textiles, Machinery and Chemicals. In the latter, 
24%, 27% and 24% of production are under MNEs’ control in China, according to NBSC 
(several years). These sectors are constituted by domestic and foreign MNEs which we do 
not separate. Note, however, that the modelization of increases of FDI in particular sectors is 
only possible using the GAMS software for CGE models and is not possible with the 
alternative GEMPACK software. With GEMPACK only capital increases for the whole 
economy can be introduced in the shock, without being able to introduce them in selected 
sectors. 
Second, introducing imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale is also another 
avenue for future research. Among the few CGE models with MNEs only Jensen and Tarr 
(2012) include it, although, they do not model explicitly a multi-regional framework. Latorre 
(2014), following Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2010) also develops a CGE with a climate of 
imperfect competition that is, however, a one-country model. It seems, therefore, that the 
combination of a multi-regional setting of MNEs with imperfect competition is a challenge 
in the CGE literature.  
Additionally, since FDI is a form of investment another possible extension is to use recursive 
model like Hosoe (2014) and Latorre and Hosoe (2013) instead of a static one. We could also 
introduce unemployment in the line of the study by Gómez-Plana and Latorre (2014), which 
is to the best of our knowledge the only model that combines the presence of both MNEs and 
unemployment. These are the main suggestions for further work based on current work.  
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